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Situating Climate Justice in Australian Development Cooperation

Australia's Development Policy Approach to Climate Change and Pacific Small Island Developing States

Ellen Ledger

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To Con, who should have been here. Thank you for everything.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIP	Aid Investment Plan
AIFFP	Australian Infrastructure Finance Facility in the Pacific
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AODF	Adaptation-related Official Development Finance
APPR	Aid or Development Program Progress Report
AUD	Australian dollars
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CBDRRC	common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
CCAS	Climate Change Action Strategy 2020-2025 (DFAT)
Coalition, the	See LNP
CODF	climate-related official development finance
COP	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
COP26 (*n*)	Twenty-sixth (*nth*) Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DRR	disaster risk reduction
EFA	Export Finance Australia
FSF	Fast start (climate) finance
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
GVT	Government (of Australia)
HIC(s)	high income country(ies)
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDC(s)	Least Developed Country(ies)
LIC(s)	low-income country(ies)
LLA	locally led adaptation
LNP	Liberal National Party (Australia)
MEA(s)	multilateral environmental agreement(s)
MDB(s)	multilateral development bank(s)
MIC(s)	middle income country(ies)
MODF	Mitigation-related Official Development Finance
NDC(s)	Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
NGO(s)	non-governmental organisation(s)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODE	Office of Development Effectiveness

ODF	Official Development Finance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF	other official flows
PCF	public climate finance
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PM	Prime Minister
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PSIDS	Pacific Small Island Developing State(s)
RBA	Reserve Bank of Australia
RMI	Republic of the Marshall Islands
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SIDS	Small Island Developing State(s)
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNOHRLLS	UN Office of the High Representative for the LDCS, Landlocked Developing Countries and SIDS
USD	United States dollars

Abstract

Climate justice is central to international cooperation on climate change, with notions of differentiated power, responsibility, vulnerability, and capacity driving questions relating to the distributional, procedural, compensatory, and systemic justices. The former justice type – distributional – is central to the provision of public climate finance, which is the funding provided by developed to developing countries in view of their relative disadvantage. Public climate finance finds itself at the intersection of two key frameworks – the international climate regime and the international development cooperation system. These frameworks are plagued by a variety of parallel and overlapping justice and coordination challenges that impede the capacity of public climate finance to act as a mechanism of climate justice. A large literature deals with these challenges, with some authors even drawing out a variety of 'indicators' from international climate agreements like the 2009 Copenhagen Accord that can be engaged to consider the 'justness' of climate finance, such as a focus on Small Island Developing States (SIDS), who are particularly vulnerable. At the same time, other aspects relating to donor coordination can be engaged in view of the position of climate change as a commons problem. Drawing on this literature, this research compiles a number of indicators as a lens through which climate finance and its justness can be examined: additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention to the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds, 'fair share' in relation to donor peers and identified benchmarks, and policy coherence in relation to climate mainstreaming and contradictory public spending.

To operationalise these indicators, this research undertakes a case study of Australia's development program from 2010 to 2019, by examining (a) its official development finance data reported with the Rio Markers for climate adaptation and mitigation through the OECD Creditor Reporting System; and (b) its discourse through a series of key word searches in a corpus of 187 policy documents sourced from the former Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT). This research seeks to understand how Australia approaches climate change in its development program over the study period, with a particular focus on Pacific SIDS, in view of their critical vulnerability and the strong emphasis that Australia places on the region within its development program. It further seeks to understand to what extent this approach reflects the concept of climate justice, via the noted indicators. The results show broadly consistent failure on the part of Australia to address the climate justice indicators, with some clear trends over time that align with some of the key events throughout the period, such as change in government and the absorption of AusAID into DFAT. The results also raise some questions for the future of Australian climate finance in the Pacific.

Image: Artwork at COP26 related to the '1.5 to stay alive' campaign
Source: Supplied by Author.

... praise your capacity to dilute

our heavy metals and greenhouse gases

sewage and radioactive waste

pollutants and plastics

praise your capacity to bury

our shipwrecks and ruined cities

praise your watery grave

human reef of bones

...

praise your capacity for mercy

please let my grandpa catch just one more fish

please make it stop raining soon

please make it rain soon

please spare our fragile farms and fruit trees

please spare our low-lying island and atolls

please spare our coastal villages and cities

please let us cross safely to a land without war…

From 'Praise Song for Oceania'
For Habitat Threshold
Written by Craig Santos Perez

* * *

... Prime Minister, the Convention must establish equitable access to climate financing and viable technological transfer for both mitigation and adaptation. We, the islands that are devastated most, demand that your commitments of $100 billion annually be increased to meet the four trillion dollars the World Bank reports is needed, with substantial shares of climate financing to support costly adaptation needs.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Palau has a long and varied colonial past – our contacts with westerners began with our chief Ibedul discovering the Antelope commandeered by Captain Henry Wilson of England in 1783. We were then colonised by Spain, Germany, Japan, and last by the US. Finally, in 1994 we regained our independence and sovereignty over our lands and seas. However today, we are once again being invaded by the most powerful nations on earth by the results of their unbridled emissions, exploiting us for their benefit and our detriment. How long must we suffer under colonisation?

The scorching sun is giving us intolerable heat. The warming sea is invading us. The strong winds are blowing us every which way. Our resources are disappearing before our eyes, our future is being robbed from us. Frankly speaking, there is no dignity to a slow and painful death. You might as well bomb our islands instead of making us suffer only to witness our slow and fateful demise...

From the Statement by
His Excellency Surangel S. Whipps, Jr.
President of the Republic of Palau
World Leaders Summit, 26th Conference of Parties
November 1, 2021

Introduction

At the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2021, the President of Palau, Surangel Whipps, Jr., called on rich nations to increase their climate financing from the yet-to-be-met USD 100 billion target to encompass the trillions estimated as necessary to meet the challenge of climate change. He went on to describe some of the impacts of climate change in the Pacific islands – the strong winds, the scorching heat, the invading sea – and likened the invasive nature of these impacts via the contrivance of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the successive colonisations experienced by his nation from the 18th to the 20th century. Though the President did not explicitly invoke the term 'climate justice', the inference is clear – one long communicated by Pacific Island actors and others as understandings of climate change, and relative responsibility, have evolved (Ourbak, et al., 2019; Thomas, et al., 2020). This includes the notion that climate finance in support of mitigation and adaptation must be provided to developing nations by developed ones, and that this would take place in recognition of the *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* (CBDRRC) of these actors, the state Parties to the UNFCCC.

The idea is founded on the global disparity in the burdens of climate change responsibility and impacts, and capacities to address them, with, broadly, those least responsible – developing countries – facing some of the worst impacts and capacity constraints. By now, we know that the severity of climate change and our adaptation to it will be defined not only by existing large emitters but by the trajectories of many developing countries, who now account for the largest portion of emissions growth (IEA, 2021) and whose comparative vulnerability is seeing the need for adaptation become a defining characteristic of their development. Yet these countries are often largely unburdened by historical responsibility for climate change – as a measure of emissions, or in the early and sustained shaping of global development in the form of fossil-fuel driven industrialisation. Several countries in particular, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like Palau, are among those least responsible (then and now). For example, even Papua New Guinea (PNG), who is the largest emitter of the Pacific SIDS (PSIDS), has only contributed 0.1% to global cumulative CO_2 emissions (Ritchie, 2019). Yet SIDS will be among those impacted the most, with the climate threat for many an existential one. It can also be considered that such stark climate inequalities are symptomatic of a longer history of systemic injustice – with patterns of inequality built on colonialism, exploitation of natural resources, extraction of wealth, unfair trade rules, and so on, continuing to influence the relative capacity of countries to contribute to climate change mitigation, and adapt to those impacts which are now inevitable but whose long-term severity will be determined by collective efforts.

In this sense it is natural that questions of climate justice have evolved alongside the international climate regime, which, while subject to its own inequalities, has been a platform for climate-vulnerable countries to plead their case. There has been a surge, in recent years, of attention devoted to the issue – from the explosion in youth activism, to the huge rise in climate litigation, to growing advocacy for recognition of climate change loss and damage. But in the realm of international cooperation, public climate finance is by far the most established – and arguably the most frustrated – mechanism designed to redress climate injustice. It is subject to a plethora of features established within the international climate regime, in principle agreed to by Parties who sign onto relevant agreements, as well as in the broader spheres of academia, activism, and legal precedent. But while having been picked over considerably, and indeed officially embedded in climate agreements for decades, public climate finance remains a problematic tool – in no small part due to disagreements between Parties about taking responsibility, accepting liability, and providing compensation.

The existing climate finance commitment of USD 100 billion a year, first written into an agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen, is largely delivered through development finance, an apparatus whose purview extends beyond the bounds of climate change. In both capacities, public development finance is broadly considered necessary but flawed – subject to many similar justice issues as the international climate regime. In addition, in its current amounts it is also considered insufficient (Shine & Campillo, 2016). In this context, targeting of scarce climate finance to the most vulnerable has been institutionalised (though not necessarily implemented), with global climate agreements calling for concentration of adaptation finance in particular to SIDS and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Other such qualifiers have also been employed, like the provision of 'new and additional' finance that is

'balanced' between mitigation and adaptation. These qualifiers have been touted as potential measures of the justness of climate finance, designed to allow finance to serve a fairer distribution of resources made available, or to promote improved participation of implicated actors, in view of e.g., the polluter pays principle (Carty, et al., 2020; Khan, et al., 2020; Okereke & Coventry, 2016). Understandings of climate justice also go beyond these inscribed factors, extending into a realm of contested understandings of relative responsibility, systemic bias in international systems, historic patterns of North-South inequity, climate debt, and mutual advantage, amongst others (Ciplet & Robert, 2017; Khan, et al., 2020; Okereke & Coventry, 2016). Reconciling and applying these various ideas to a particular case is a useful way of determining whether the reality of climate finance aligns with the abstractions of climate justice discourse – and to what extent it can really be seen as a mechanism of climate justice.

The case of the Pacific SIDS, some of the world's most climate-vulnerable states and amongst its strongest advocates for climate action, and Australia, their largest provider of development finance, is of particular interest. At COP26 – the same forum in which Palau called so strongly for improvements – Australia announced a 'doubling' of its climate finance commitment from 2020-2025, in the amount of AUD 500 million to the Indo-Pacific (PMA, 2021; DFAT, n.d.). This announcement was presented as one of Australia's key commitments to climate action within the COP framework but was met with scepticism by many, served on the back of a troubled decade of domestic and international climate politics (Edney-Browne, 2021; Hudson, 2019). In such a context, it is useful to consider the recent history of climate change in Australia's development program, considering several important milestones in the international climate regime – such as the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, and the Paris Agreement in 2015 – as well as domestic structural changes in both governance and foreign policy.

In order to examine this more deeply, I will elaborate a case study of Australia's approach to climate change through its development program – with a particular focus on Pacific SIDS, who have taken a growing place within it. By examining this case, I hope to tease out some of the major justice challenges faced by public climate finance, while also addressing the current dearth of comprehensive analysis of climate change in Australia's development program. This thesis seeks to understand these dynamics by answering the questions:

How does Australia approach climate change in its development program, particularly in Pacific Small Island Developing States? And, to what extent does this approach reflect the concept of climate justice?

As such, I will examine the situation of climate finance disbursements and discursive approaches to climate change undertaken in Australia's development program in the decade following Copenhagen. I will do so using a climate justice framework, a lens that allows for inspection beyond simply accounting for quantity via reported data. I thereby hope to not only to fill a literature gap and illustrate the climate justice complexities at play in a dedicated case, but to tease out and consolidate some key points of entry for improving donor approaches to public climate finance, and/or scrutiny of these approaches.

The paper is set out as follows. Firstly, a literature review traces some of the key typologies and contestations attached to climate justice, the overlapping frameworks of the international climate regime and the international development cooperation system, and some of the relevant challenges faced by public climate finance. It introduces a selection of criteria drawn from this context as a theoretical framework through which the case can be examined. Secondly, the case is introduced, with special attention paid to tracing climate justice factors throughout, before thirdly, the methodology is elaborated, and fourthly, the results. Finally, the results are discussed in relation to the research questions set out above before conclusions are drawn about the relevance of the case to the larger field of inquiry: climate finance as a mechanism of climate justice.

Literature Review

This section reviews the literature engaged in the wide ranging and contested fields of climate justice, development cooperation, and climate finance. To situate climate finance as a mechanism of climate justice in this context, it is necessary firstly to clarify the concept of climate justice, as well as the two frameworks within which both justice and finance are central – the international climate regime, and the development cooperation system – and their intersections. Parallel evolutions and contestations across these frameworks provide context for the many of the challenges associated with the provision of public climate finance. The section following will then introduce the theoretical framework that will be engaged in the later analysis: a selection of climate finance criteria that can be used to assess its 'justness'. The final section will introduce the case, providing an overview of relevant literature.

1. Institutional framing: the international climate regime and the development cooperation system

The function of public climate finance as a potential mechanism of climate justice is dependent on two key international frameworks:

The international climate regime is a concept used commonly across climate justice literature. To borrow from an analysis by Okereke (2010, p. 463), 'regimes' can be understood as intersubjective phenomena built around implicit or explicit norms and principles, that 'shape and reflect underlying social expectations of the international community'. For the international climate regime, this therefore encompasses a wide range of international legal and quasi-legal mechanisms (like the UNFCCC), diplomatic relationships (such as the Alliance of Small Island States, AOSIS), and expected interactions and standards of state behaviour. It could also encompass factors like scientific knowledge, with scientific updates from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) an anticipated occurrence, and activities of involved or observing but arguably meaningfully excluded parties, such as private companies, non-government organisations (NGOs), climate funds, and civil society.

The *development cooperation system* rather encompasses the system of diplomatic and financial transactions that range from Official Development Assistance (ODA) in its most narrow interpretation, to wider definitions incorporating new development assistance and even market flows like some foreign direct investment (FDI) (Alonso & Glennie, 2016; Zheng, 2020). This incorporates actors broadly qualified as donors, including bilateral donors, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the like in the strictest terms, and potentially NGOs and philanthropic donors in broader terms; and beneficiaries – for the most part developing countries, though recipients can span from regional organisations to the state, to grassroots actors, etc. This system is less comprehensive than the international climate regime in its representation of implicated actors (see Section 2.2. p. 7). This is in part due to centralisation of power and influence in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where 'traditional'[1] donors largely dictate the agenda, rules, oversight, etc. relating to most international development cooperation and finance flows – though this balance is tipping with the rise of newer donors and South-South cooperation (Alonso & Glennie, 2016; Mello e Souza, 2021; Zheng, 2020).

2. Classifying and contesting climate justice

Climate justice and finance have been subject to a myriad of contestations, within both the international climate regime and the development cooperation system. A well-established literature explores these dilemmas and provides several key typologies of climate justice that are relevant to an understanding of the role of finance in this context; in particular, distributional, procedural, compensatory, and systemic justice.

[1] Providers of development finance that do so as members of the DAC are often referred to as 'traditional' donors. Many of these donors emerged in the nascent period of bilateral and multilateral development cooperation and international institutions when the agenda of the development cooperation system was evolving from one of post-war reconstruction to broader international development. The 'traditional' donor moniker is also situated in opposition to new or 'emerging' donors like China, India, and Brazil (Alden, et al., 2020).

2.1. Typologies of climate justice

Climate justice encompasses several important notions. One of its simplest iterations considers that countries have not only differentiated vulnerabilities and capacities, but also differentiated responsibilities in relation to climate change, as they have contributed to and are impacted by it differently. In short, while developed nations have emitted the most greenhouse gases (GHG), and thereby benefitted, it is developing countries that will bear the major brunt of the evolving impacts of climate change (Okereke, 2010; Thomas, et al., 2020; Althor, et al., 2015). These and other problematics have been considered across the large body of climate justice literature, which proposes several 'types' of justice to be considered.

There are two 'main strands' of climate justice discourse, one that focuses on distributional and the other on procedural justice (Colenbrander, et al., 2021; Khan, et al., 2020; Thomas, et al., 2020, p. 17)[2]. Distributional (or 'distributive') justice deals with the differential distribution of the benefits and burdens of climate change across space and time – that is, between populations and generations – and functions on the principle that all primary social goods be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution is to the advantage of the least favoured in which case a fair outcome should be sought for the disadvantaged (Thomas, et al., 2020; Khan, et al., 2020). This form of justice is the one most commonly, though not exclusively, associated with climate finance (and adaptation finance in particular) (Colenbrander, et al., 2018; Khan, et al., 2020). Procedural justice rather focuses on equitable representation and participation of all stakeholders in the decision-making processes associated with climate change (Thomas, et al., 2020; Khan, et al., 2020).

Procedural justice is to an extent provided for within the international climate regime via the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or 'the Convention') which has 197 Parties[3], or near universal membership, and stipulations for equal involvement (e.g., Article 11 dealing with 'equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance' of the Convention's financial mechanism (United Nations, 1992, p. 14)). The creation of other subsequent mechanisms like the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and the 2015 Paris Agreement, established by the Conference of Parties (COP) to the Convention, relied on such arrangements. Many argue however that these mechanisms do not always serve true procedural justice, given the absence of many non-state stakeholders in decision making and the imbalances of power between Parties (Khan, et al., 2020; Grecksch & Klöck, 2020). In addition, several authors emphasise extending participation beyond the level of states, to incorporate local level or grassroots actors, to avoid the perpetuation of within-state inequalities, avoid the sidelining of adaptation, improve climate finance effectiveness, and ensure multiple vulnerabilities are accounted for (Colenbrander, et al., 2018; Grecksch & Klöck, 2020; Schlosberg, et al., 2014).

There appears to be wider consensus on the integration, at least nominally, of distributional justice in the international climate regime via the concept of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDRRC), found in the UNFCCC (Article 3.1, which also mentions 'equity'), and reiterated in subsequent agreements (United Nations, 1992; United Nations, 2009; United Nations, 2015). This concept can be seen to reconcile the need for collective action with justice issues like those aforementioned, by explicitly acknowledging the variation in responsibilities and capacities of Parties, and the according requirements for emissions reduction and climate finance provision. There are a variety of approaches to this principle taken by different Parties, with (broadly) developed countries emphasising the need for common action, while developing countries emphasise differentiated responsibility, such as the higher historical or cumulative emissions of developed nations, and the enhanced capabilities of these countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Okereke & Coventry, 2016).

[2] And potentially a third dealing with representation, though this is not typically evoked in climate finance literature (Colenbrander, et al., 2018).

[3] These Parties are divided into Annex 1, Annex II, and non-Annex 1 Parties. Annex I Parties include industrialized OECD member countries (as at 1992), and countries with economies in transition (EIT Parties) e.g., Russia and the Baltic States. Annex II Parties include the OECD member countries of Annex I but exclude EIT parties; they are required to provide climate finance and relevant technology transfer under the Convention. Non-Annex I Parties are primarily developing countries, including LDCs (UNFCCC, n.d.).

Developed countries have largely tended to prefer the latter to a narrative of guilt, which would open avenues to pursue the compensatory justice sought by some Parties (Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Pill, 2022; Robinson & Carlson, 2021). Compensatory justice calls for compensation to be paid to those harmed or whose rights are violated by others' actions, equivalent to the harm caused – in this case, in explicit recognition of that harm caused to developing nations by the high-emitting industrialisation paths taken by developed nations (Khan, et al., 2020). This notion is, to some extent, operationalised in the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), which was established at COP19 in Warsaw in 2013,[4] though work on this mechanism has been slow (UNFCCC, 2021; Pill, 2022). In addition, reference to loss and damage in the Paris Agreement explicitly states that the relevant Article 'does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation' (United Nations, 2015, p. 8) and stakeholders in the loss & damage process, while broadly agreeing on the *polluter pays principle,* do not seem to be moving forward on this notion (Pill, 2022).

These kinds of controversies are reflective of a major disagreement in the realm of public climate finance: whether it is differentiation in vulnerability, capacity, or responsibility (or some or all) which drives its provision and/or distribution. Such divisions evoke the well-used, sometimes controversial idea of the North-South divide (see e.g., Elliott (2011), Khan et al. (2020), Mahony & Hulme (2018), Thomas et al. (2020)). The North-South divide forms the basis of the concept of systemic justice, which deals with systemic bias in the international climate regime built on historical patterns of North-South inequity (Okereke, 2010; Robinson & Carlson, 2021; Roberts & Parks, 2007). It is inherent in the relative power of states in both climate negotiations and the international system more broadly, such as in global trade and financial markets or colonial history and is also a frequent theme of development cooperation and aid system critique, associated with indebtedness of poorer nations, dependency on external finance, and neo-colonialism (Khan, et al., 2020; Okereke, 2010; Thomas, et al., 2020; Roberts & Parks, 2007).

2.2. Practical and conceptual complexities in the international climate regime and the development cooperation system

While each of these notions is relevant to the function of the international climate regime and the international development cooperation system and their role in the provision of climate finance, there are many impasses that remain in both these realms and the climate justice literature. How effectively these international frameworks can deal with these challenges is dubious.

In the case of the international climate regime, this is firstly because of the regime's somewhat insular nature, reflected in the incoherence between international climate commitments and other contradictory policy, like fossil fuel subsidies.[5] Secondly, while distributional and other justice issues have been considered within the regime, in practice they remain contested and subject to theoretical and practical constraints. For example, compensatory justice relies on the ability to firstly, attribute harm to climate change, and secondly, to assign blame and thereby liability (Robinson & Carlson, 2021), difficult in view of the ambiguities in both attribution science and assigning liability, e.g., in calculating the degree to which intensity of natural disasters can be attributed to climate change, or to what extent contemporary governments can be held liable for historic emissions, often discharged in ignorance of their impacts (Robinson & Carlson, 2021). Amongst others, these proportion and time scale issues have been examined by many other authors; for example, Vanderheiden (2013) argues that the situation of inequity as either *ex-ante* or *additional due to* climate change poses a key dilemma (see also e.g., Ansari et al. (2013), Methmann & Roth (2012), San Martín & Wood (2022)).

[4] This mechanism is meant 'to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change' (UNFCCC, 2021). At COP26 in 2021, several states including SIDS, called for a finance commitment for loss and damage that makes a clear distinction between it and finance for adaptation, though such an obligation was only 'urged' and not formally established in the Glasgow Climate Pact (United Nations, 2021, p. 7; United Nations, 2011; United Nations, 2009).

[5] For example, compare the unmet USD 100 billion climate finance target to the USD 5.9 trillion in global fossil fuel 'subsidies' in 2020 (IMF, 2021).

These examples, and others, relate to the conception of climate change as a commons problem[6], reflected in both mitigation activities (e.g., emissions reduction), and climate finance provision (Paavola, 2012; Ansari, et al., 2013). Climate change requires collective action in a global economy characterised by competing users and interests, and subject to coordination failure as actors hesitate, take disproportionately small steps, and fail to harmonise their activities (e.g., minimal distribution of adaptation funds despite pressing need, (Buchner, et al., 2019)). Besides such technical contestations, these commons and coordination problems also manifest in the difficulties inherent to relying on cooperation in systems characterised by misalignments in relative power and representation.

Moreover, such challenges – like coercive or nationalistic behaviours, competition and lack of donor coordination, and the maintenance of an underlying logic of rational self-interest – undermine the capacity of the international climate regime to deliver climate justice (Khan, et al., 2020; Okereke, 2010; Pickering, et al., 2015). This can be seen clearly in not only the more diplomatically dramatic examples of states derailing climate negotiations and initiatives, but also in the somewhat mundane practices of inserting 'voluntary' commitments into international climate mechanisms, or states signing on to and then failing to meet targets, apparently with little compunction (Khan, et al., 2020). Methmann & Rothe (2012, p. 333) posit that this kind of incongruous behaviour reflects a 'logic of apocalypse', demonstrated in e.g., mitigation discourse, rather than provoking exceptional measures against an existential threat, instead provoking technocratic approaches that remove the onus from decision makers and place it on the 'political machine of technology'. Similarly, these incongruities evoke what Khan et al. (2020, p. 253) describe as 'neoliberal justice', built on an economic logic that institutions should protect the freedom of actors to exploit their natural advantages in competition, with 'justice' protecting (a) *mutual advantage*, or the rational agreement of agents to cooperate to further self-interest, and (b) *private property*, which asserts the primacy of property rights over all others (see also Ciplet & Robert (2017) and Okereke (2010)). This, they argue, is a rationale that can explain how wealthy countries 'avoid measures that would evoke responsibility and incur liability,' in the face of calls from developing countries and civil society for other forms of climate justice (Khan, et al., 2020, p. 253).

The development cooperation system faces similar justice dilemmas – from the more obvious North-South divide and distributive justice to definitional issues related to emerging donors and South-South and triangular cooperation. A chief issue is the rub between (a) the apparent moral obligation of HICs to compensate for the impacts of colonialism and imperialism – considered by some as paternalistic – and (b) a broader definition of development cooperation that exceeds ODA to encompass diverse economic exchanges and horizontal approaches built on demand-driven activities and local ownership (Mello e Souza, 2021; Zheng, 2020). Such discussions contributed to e.g., the semantic evolution from 'aid' to development 'cooperation', to ostensibly resituate the relationship between providers and beneficiaries of development financing (Breuning, 2002). They also evolved alongside critiques of the concept of development (e.g., of modernisation theory) which have long been institutionalised in 'Western'-dominated bilateral assistance and international institutions like the OECD and multilateral development banks (MDBs) (Bazbauers, 2018; Alden, et al., 2020). This relates to criticism of development cooperation acting as a tool of 'prescribing' development pathways according to hegemonic understandings of development (Bazbauers, 2018; Alden, et al., 2020).

Such North-South discrepancies also relate to the challenges posed by primacy of the DAC, whose membership is formed entirely of HICs despite the rising relevance of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil as providers of development finance, and narratives of stakeholder engagement and partnership with beneficiaries (Mello e Souza, 2021; OECD, 2018). The DAC and its associated frameworks (like the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005)) may be the closest thing to an 'international development cooperation regime' globally (Mello e Souza, 2021). However, its exclusionary nature (bearing in mind efforts to engage beyond its membership[7]), and the choice of several major emerging economies like the BRICS[8] to opt out of various endeavours prevents the regime from taking full shape (Mello e Souza, 2021). In this case, an absence of procedural justice may not

[6] This sees 'atmospheric sinks for GHGs… as a common-pool resource', whose services, such as the capacity to absorb pollutants, must be shared among competing users, and from whom it is difficult to exclude unauthorised users (Paavola, 2012, p. 419).
[7] Refer to e.g., the DAC's Global Relations Strategy, OECD (2018)
[8] Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

only impede the just pursuit of objectives within the relevant framework, as in the case of the international climate regime, but prevent a coherent, non-fragmented regime from forming in the first place.

Other parallels between the international climate regime and the development cooperation system can be seen across a range of issues. For instance, where, as noted, the former can be seen as insular, troubled by contradictory behaviour outside the regime, so too can the latter (e.g., concurrent provision of humanitarian assistance and armaments). The OECD has a *Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development* (2019), an update of a similar recommendation adopted in 2010. The recommendations are in part aimed at making coherent the activities undertaken by governments in both development and domestic policy. Existence of these recommendations does not however imply adherence to them beyond the nominal. Indeed recent efforts to coordinate donors to align development cooperation with the Paris Agreement have been coloured by the self-exclusion of donors such as Japan and Australia from the commitment to 'limit… ODA investments in fossil fuels to when there are no economically or technically feasible clean energy alternatives…' (OECD, 2021, p. 3)[9]. Such siloing of issues and development and maintenance of incoherent policy could pose a direct threat to the achievement of climate justice, for example by driving greenhouse gas emissions and thereby undermining many of the potential gains which could be made by public climate finance.

Plagued as the international development cooperation system is by many of the injustices it purports to address, numerous actors consider the system as it is currently formed to be inherently flawed – with proffered solutions ranging from systemic reform to the proposal of alternative forms of finance, to calls to abolish aid entirely (Alden, et al., 2020; Bazbauers, 2018; Ramalingam, 2013; Zheng, 2020). That the system suffers from many of the same challenges as the international climate regime is not strictly surprising – they operate with the same actors in many of the same spaces and are divided along many of the same lines. Of course, it can be argued that these similarities also offer opportunities to address comparable challenges in tandem; consider for instance parallels between calls for needs-based development cooperation and inclusion of adaptation, vulnerability, and developing country 'needs and priorities' in climate finance mechanisms. And despite criticisms, provision of development finance as a general concept is widely supported and cited as a critical tool for international development and climate action. However, equivalence in justice inconsistencies between these international frameworks provokes questions about their mutual capacity to deliver climate justice through public development finance.

3. Public climate finance: operationalising distributive justice

Public climate finance is the major overlapping mechanism between the international development cooperation system and the international climate regime. It is part of a larger scheme of global climate finance, which is, in its broadest definition, financing – local, national, or transnational, drawn from public, private, or other sources – that seeks to support climate change mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC, 2021). Within this is situated the flows of climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries towards mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, underwritten by an international commitment to provide USD 100 billion per year by 2020, now anticipated for 2023 (United Nations, 2021; OECD, 2021). Though some interpret this as including private finance 'mobilised' by public finance, finance towards the USD 100 billion goal comes primarily from public sources, with most of that channelled through bilateral and multilateral development finance, including via funds like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (United Nations, 2021; OECD, 2021) (Figure 1). This thesis primarily deals with this kind of finance, which for donors that report to the OECD, refers to

[9] Despite the fact that both are listed as 'adherents' to the 2019 Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. The document in questions is the *Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change* (OECD, 2021).

ODA[10] or 'Official Development Finance' (ODF) where this includes 'other official flows' (OOF)[11] that do not meet ODA criteria.

Figure 1: Development assistance channels for public climate finance



Note: The Convention: UNFCCC; ODF: "Official Development Finance", PPPs: "Public-private partnerships"
Source: Author's compilation adapted from Figure 2.1, OECD (2021, p. 11) and 'Channel' list in OECD (2021)

While climate finance has existed in some form in the international climate regime since its inception (a financial mechanism was built into the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2021)), it is considered to have become central at the 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP15) in 2009, commonly referred to as the Copenhagen Summit (Klöck, et al., 2018; Okereke, 2010). This summit delivered the then non-binding 2020 USD 100 billion target, which was concretised in the 2010 Cancun Agreements, and subsequently in the 2015 Paris Agreement (Klöck, et al., 2018; OECD, 2021). This target was not met, acknowledged in the Glasgow Climate Pact as of 'deep regret' (United Nations, 2021, p. 5). The most recent official figures indicate USD 79.6 billion was provided and mobilised in 2019 (OECD, 2021). In addition, this and other official figures are often branded overestimates when considering a myriad of definitional and accounting issues. Overreporting of climate finance, particularly in public aid programmes and figures submitted to the UNFCCC and the OECD CRS, is a common issue driven by a lack of internationally agreed climate finance accounting modalities that gives rise to a variety of methods engaged by donors, undermining the validity and comparability of

[10] The OECD defines "Official Development Assistance' (ODA) as: '…flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions that are: i. Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective. Changes to ODA accounting were made in 2018 to define ODA by its 'grant equivalent', and explanation of which can be found here: https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm

[11] The OECD defines 'Other official flows'(OOF) as: '… official sector transactions that do not meet ODA criteria. OOF include: grants to developing countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes; official bilateral transactions intended to promote development, but having a grant element of less than 25%; and, official bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes, by definition: export credits extended directly to an aid recipient by an official agency or institution (official direct export credits); the net acquisition by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and funds in support of private investment.

climate finance data (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019; Weikmans, et al., 2017). For example, Carty et al. (2020, p. 8) estimate that once reporting issues are accounted for, only 32%-38% of the USD 59.5 billion in climate finance reported in 2017-2018 could be considered the 'true value' of climate finance. Furthermore, recent work using machine learning to assess CRS-reported adaptation finance found that overreporting via mislabelling could amount to as much as 20-40% for the top five DAC donors (Borst, et al., 2022). Besides reporting challenges, other issues remain, such as adequate quantity, equity in allocation, delivery methods, prioritisation of conflicting development goals, questions of aid effectiveness, real capacity of donors to provide finance, whether states are meeting targets and keeping promises, the imbalance of power between donors and beneficiaries, and even the establishment of consistent understandings of the function of climate finance – as recently as COP26, efforts to establish a clear definition were frustrated (Carty, et al., 2020; Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Tripathi, 2021; Wood, et al., 2020).

3.1. Distributive justice: what can explain climate finance distribution?

Public climate finance can be seen as one of the major mechanisms by which the international regime seeks to redress climate injustice, by redistributing funds from developed to developing countries in support of, for example mitigation in developing countries that might otherwise benefit from high-carbon development paths, and adaptation in countries with high vulnerability and reduced capacity that will bear the brunt of climate change impacts. The extent to which this mechanism is delivering or even can deliver distributive (or other kinds of) climate justice is of course disputed, given hitherto described challenges in international frameworks.

It is worth bearing in mind that these systems are not static, and that as noted there are attempts to redress some of these challenges (e.g., consider policy coherence work and the aid effectiveness agenda). Another example lies in efforts made across both frameworks to align finance provision with recipient needs, priorities, vulnerability and capacity constraints (e.g., OECD (2006), OECD (2018), OECD (2021), United Nations (2009), United Nations (2015)).[12] A key challenge with the use of recipient need in the context of climate change is the ongoing challenge of defining, identifying, and costing climate-related needs. The first stocktake of these needs was only released by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance in 2021 for COP26, and one of its major findings was the inconsistency in identifying and costing Party needs (UNFCCC, 2021). Of course, this method – compiling needs communicated by Parties under various regime mechanisms, e.g., Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) – is not the only one available to donors, who often have close bilateral relationships with recipients and access to a range of relevant research by which to establish need.

Irrespective of these complexities, climate finance is tracked across both the international climate regime and the international development cooperation system. Therein, exclusion or limited inclusion of the climate justice notion in finance-related works is consistent with its treatment as a contested notion.[13] Bearing this in mind, numerous external authors have also examined reported climate finance data according to a variety of measures, including climate justice considerations (e.g., Oxfam produces a *Climate Finance Shadow Report*, which has been referred to by the UNFCCC (Carty, et al., 2020)). Other relevant factors that can play a role include domestic ambition (Peterson, 2022) and donor governance factors, e.g., the prioritisation of climate issues, such as the balance between adaptation and mitigation and recipient country choice, by different donor ministries (Pickering, et al., 2015). There is

[12] E.g., the 2006 OECD Declaration on Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation considers '…that adaptation… is of high priority for all countries and that developing countries, especially the LDCs and SIDS, are particularly vulnerable. The LDCs are among the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and…widespread poverty limits their adaptive capacity…' (OECD, 2006, p. 5).

[13] For example, the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance releases a 'Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows' (UNFCCC SCF, n.d.), though there is limited reference to climate justice (an examination of the most recent report found reference to climate justice only in the context of 'just transition') (UNFCCC SCF, 2021). The OECD provides yearly Development Cooperation profiles that include a section on donor climate finance, though with no explicit connection to climate justice (OECD, 2021). It also conducts periodic Development Cooperation peer reviews, which may have reference to climate (e.g., the 2018 review of Australia), and has released several reports relating to climate finance, such as its 'Climate finance and the USD 100 billion goal' series (OECD, 2022; OECD, 2021).

also a well-established literature exploring the allocation of development finance according to not only recipient need and donor interest, but also recipient merit (based on governance), which can help to contextualise the distribution of public climate finance (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; McKinlay & Little, 1977; Weiler, et al., 2018). The latter is symptomatic of an ongoing dispute in development cooperation, with DAC members endorsing and many recipients rejecting finance conditionalities relating to human rights, good governance, and democracy (Mello e Souza, 2021).

These models have been variously tested across the literature, against factors from donor foreign policy to aid effectiveness, with a variety of results (Weiler, et al., 2018). For example, Berthélemy (2006) found that some DAC donor countries had what he described as more 'altruistic' approaches (based on recipient needs and merits), and others more 'egoistic' (based on donor self-interest)[14]. More recently and more specifically, Couharde et al. (2020) found that G7 aid allocation could be explained by domestic energy security concerns and oil endowment of recipient countries, while Blodgett Bermeo (2017) found that 21st century aid has been focused on recipients where 'targeted development' could promote positive spillovers for donors. In the context of climate finance, Betzold & Weiler (2017) found that at an aggregate level, more vulnerable countries tend to receive more bilateral adaptation aid, though Klöck & Fagotto (2020) found that this was not the case when examining distribution amongst disaggregated SIDS recipients. Weiler et al. (2018) found that countries with lower adaptative capacity (recipient need) do not necessarily receive more adaptation aid, with allocation instead being dictated by the economic interests of donors and interpretations of recipient merit.

Beyond need, other notions of climate justice can also be considered when analysing climate finance and donor behaviour. For instance, Klöck et al. (2018) also found that climate aid provision does not strictly follow the principle of CBDRRC, as while richer (capable) donor countries tend to provide more climate aid, countries that have historically higher emissions (responsibility) contribute less. Khan et al. (2020) (looking primarily at public finance) and Bracking & Leffel (2021) (examining newer permeations of private finance) both point to finance governance challenges as a key issue. Specifically, these authors express reservations about the governance of private finance and criticise neoliberal approaches to climate finance distribution that give power to the market and market actors, removing the onus of justice from governments and undermining accountability, while maintaining the rational pursuit of self-interest as an underlying logic even though the international mechanisms in place are designed to coordinate collective action for collective benefit. In fact, Khan et al. (2020, p. 265) suggest that powerful countries often take advantage of ambiguity in climate finance governance and justice to 'creatively interpret expectations according to their own self-interests'.

3.2. Teasing out climate justice from climate finance: regime understandings and other approaches

In view of these challenges, I will present a range of qualifiers built into existing climate agreements that arguably aim to promote the provision of 'just' climate finance – though these were often loosely defined and actively reinterpreted by Parties (Khan, et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). These indicators have been variously employed by other authors, as noted, to inter alia describe the provision of climate finance and assess its 'justness'. I will also make note of two other areas worthy of consideration which relate to donor coordination in view of both the collective commitments made, and the commons and coordination problems noted earlier.[15]

[14] Based on OECD aid commitment data from 1980-1999, he found that Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and most Nordic countries were among the most altruistic, while Australia, France, Italy, and to some extent Japan and the United States, were among the most egoistic.

[15] The indicators described focus on distributional justice, though there are of course overlaps with other justice types, and further indicators could be considered, e.g., support for multilateral finance like the GCF; alignment of donor approaches according to recipient 'priorities and needs', such as those articulated in NDCs and NAPs; facilitation of engagement in international climate negotiations and other relevant decision-making forums in view of procedural justice; intra-country vulnerability factors such as gender-sensitive climate finance and locally-led adaptation projects; aid effectiveness; aid dependence and recipient agency in management of finance; and improvement of access to climate finance.

3.2.1. Climate justice in regime commitments

Firstly, the Copenhagen Accords (2009, p. 3) and later agreements (United Nations, 2011; United Nations, 2015) stipulate that climate funds should be 'scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate'. In other words, climate funds should grow over time; countries should not have to forgo existing development finance, and climate finance should correspond to the *additional* burden that climate finance represents; climate finance should be provided in a predictable manner to its recipients, such as via multi-year commitments, allowing countries to better prepare for mitigation and adaptation in awareness of their available resources; and finance should be sufficient in view of the challenges climate change presents (Carty, et al., 2020; Khan, et al., 2020; OECD, 2019). This latter characteristic is difficult to define and has been acknowledged as such – the USD 100 billion goal itself is well short of 'adequate', given the trillions estimated as necessary to address climate change (Samuwai, 2021). 'Adequate' could also be understood as sufficient in view of the timely and coordinated achievement of the USD 100 billion goal, bearing in mind progress is well behind on this score. The first three attributes, however, are more easy to measure – though there is general consensus that climate finance provided often does not align with them, given, for instance, shrinking public aid budgets, overcounting in finance reporting, the practice of recategorizing existing development programmes as climate-related, and the potential sensitivity of development budgets to internal political changes (Carty, et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019).

In addition, note is made of the use of 'grant-based finance', particularly for adaptation (United Nations, 2015, p. 28). Given the indebtedness of many climate-vulnerable developing countries, there remains criticism of provision of climate finance in the form of loans rather than grants, which comprise the vast majority of finance – in 2019, 71% of public climate finance was provided in the form of loans, concessional and non-concessional (OECD, 2021, p. 8). Many consider the provision of loans as incompatible with the idea of climate change as an *additional* burden, arguing that climate finance should also be additional, as opposed to provoking a debt burden (Carty, et al., 2020; Klöck & Fagotto, 2020). This links to the justice concept of 'climate debt', which considers the financial debt owed by developing countries to be far exceeded by the 'climate debt' of developed countries – that is, their disproportionate use of atmospheric space to store carbon emissions (relative to the global carbon budget)[16], as well as the compensation owed to developing countries for them to adapt to climate impacts not of their own making (Khan, et al., 2020). While this notion is largely rejected by developed countries, it has been strongly pursued by developing countries (Khan, et al., 2020).

Another indictor requires a balance between adaptation and mitigation (United Nations, 2009; United Nations, 2011; United Nations, 2015). While some adaptation finance had previously been mobilised via the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, the 2009 Copenhagen Accords and later agreements explicitly acknowledge the imperative for balance (UNFCCC, 2021; United Nations, 2009). For this reason, climate finance reported to the OECD has been broken down between mitigation and adaptation since 2009 (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; OECD, n.d.). Despite this acknowledgement and growing support for the importance of adaptation, by 2019 adaptation finance made up only 25% of global climate finance (OECD, 2021). In addition to overall low sums, other challenges include under-prioritisation by donors, lack of clarity on allocation triage amongst vulnerable countries, and lack of criteria for what constitutes adaptation (mitigation is easier to measure, with emissions reductions quantifiable) (Klöck & Nunn, 2019; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017).

Further, preferential access to adaptation funds for vulnerable and capacity-constrained states (along with attention to recipient 'priorities and needs') have been cited as essential since Copenhagen (United Nations, 2009, p. 3; United Nations, 2011; United Nations, 2015). Priority provision according to vulnerability and capacity – an extension of the CBDRRC principle – is thereby also a method for ensuring the justness of climate finance. The UNFCCC (2021) defines vulnerability as:

[16] The amount of carbon dioxide emissions permitted over a period of time to keep within a certain temperature threshold, such as the 1.5ºC target outlined in the Paris Agreement (Carbon Tracker, 2020).

'The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity'

Vulnerability can be driven by many factors, from geographical, to social, to governance, and so on, and varies between and within populations and ecosystems. While it has a somewhat winding definitional history (MacFeely, et al., 2021), vulnerability is one of the most common metrics used in the literature to classify relevant countries – ranging from climate to economic and social vulnerability. In addition to vulnerability, states have variable *capacity* to manage and bear the actual costs of adaptation and mitigation measures, as countries are often faced with considerable financial, technical, and institutional constraints. Similarly, in such contexts, competing development priorities like poverty reduction and addressing infrastructure deficits can undermine mitigation efforts and make adaptation more difficult, by inter alia drawing policy focus and funds, and relying on high-carbon pathways to address such challenges.

Because of their multiplicity, vulnerability and capacity are some of the more methodologically challenging concepts to engage in finance analysis. The most common indicator of vulnerability and capacity constraints engaged in the international regime are the Least Developed Country (LDC) classification, and the SIDS classification (United Nations, 2009, p. 3). It should be noted that this latter designation is inconsistently defined and applied – various major bodies proffer differing lists of SIDS, with characteristics varying in terms of inter alia geography, economy, human development, and vulnerability (MacFeely, et al., 2021). This results in differential treatment of SIDS, including in access to concessional finance – for example, while the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS) lists 58 states as SIDS, the OECD identifies only 35 as ODA recipients (MacFeely, et al., 2021). This challenge has been acknowledged by SIDS actors for whom climate finance access is a challenge – for example, the President of Seychelles, a high income country, has called for use of a vulnerability index as a classification, rather than income brackets (Office of the President of the Republic of Seychelles, 2021; MacFeely, et al., 2021).

While LDCs and SIDS are undoubtedly amongst the most vulnerable and capacity-constrained states in the face of climate change states (see, e.g., Betzold & Weiler (2017), Filho et al. (2020), OECD (2018), Scandurra et al. (2020)).), they are not a monolith, and differ in their degree of vulnerability and capacity amongst themselves. Of course, there are states who fit into both categories, while atoll status could also be considered a further indicator, given their particular exposure to climatic effects such as sea level rise and natural disasters (IPCC, 2021). Low GNI or GNI per capita can also be utilised, recognising both the constraints poor economic conditions can place on state capacity and its resilience to shocks, as well as its use as a qualifier for ODA access (OECD, 2022). However, these classifications are not complete measures of vulnerability – lacking the nuance required to capture the multiplicity and cascading relationships of the many drivers of vulnerability. As such, numerous organisations have developed indices to 'measure' and rank the vulnerability of states. For example, the UN is in the process of developing a multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI), which has been advocated by SIDS (e.g., via AOSIS) as a criterion for access to concessional finance, as opposed to the current system of graduation based on income level (UNOHRLLS, n.d.) (see Section 6.2.4. 31).

3.2.2. Donor coordination in view of the commons problem

There are two other aspects not so explicitly aborded in the international climate agreements, which relate to donor coordination in view of their *collective* commitment to provided USD 100 billion according to the indicators above, amongst others. Firstly, there is the issue of donors providing their 'fair share' of climate finance, an issue linked to the *adequacy* of finance in view of the timely and coordinated achievement of the USD 100 billion goal. Donors have long lacked parameters for coordination of their climate financing efforts, despite work to clarify what this coordination could look like (Pickering, et al., 2015). There is an extensive range of methodologies employed to determine the fair share amount of climate finance to be provided by donors (e.g., WRI (2021), Colenbrander et al.

(2021), towards the USD 100 billion, or Kowalzig (2019) for GCF contributions). Calculation of the fair share attempts to operationalise the notion of CBDRRC, while accounting for the issues of climate change and climate finance provision as commons problems.[17] The second issue is that of policy coherence, described by the OECD as 'fostering synergies across economic, social, and environmental policy areas; identifying trade-offs and reconcil(ing) domestic and international objectives; and addressing the spillovers of domestic policies on other countries and on future generations' (OECD, n.d.). By extension, and in simpler terms in the context of climate change, this means acknowledging and addressing the hypocrisy of providing climate finance for mitigation and adaptation on one hand, while driving climate change via e.g., support for fossil fuels, on the other.

While international climate agreements naturally seek countries to lower their emissions, it is only recently – in the Glasgow Climate Pact – that specific mention has been made of reducing support to fossil fuels – or 'the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies' (United Nations, 2021, p. 4; Piggot, et al., 2017). Indeed, this latter phrase is articulated in the context of 'targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition' (United Nations, 2021, p. 5). While it was lacking from earlier climate agreements, the policy coherence rhetoric emerged in the OECD around the era of Copenhagen, with an *OECD Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development* published in 2008 that acknowledged the impacts of DAC donor domestic policy on broader international development challenges (OECD, 2008). It was likewise on the agenda around the time of the Paris Agreement, when policy coherence for sustainable development was made one of the UN SDG targets (target 17.4, (United Nations, n.d.)).

Consideration of policy incoherence entails two key issues: contradictory spending (such as on fossil fuel subsidies) and the 'mainstreaming' of climate change across relevant sectors. The first speaks for itself: public support to fossil fuels drives and exacerbates the very impacts public climate finance is meant to address, including climate vulnerability and inequalities between countries.[18] Some authors even argue that money spent on contradictory activities – such as fossil fuel subsidisation – could be redirected to climate finance (Gass & Echeverria, 2017). Climate mainstreaming on the other hand, is a deliberate tactic that can be used to ensure the relevance of development policy and finance across multiple sectors, ensuring activities in these areas will be coherent with international climate obligations, including those relevant to climate justice. However, mainstreaming should be considered as a floor to *additional* climate finance – given the risk of mainstreaming becoming 'a superficial accounting exercise' that undermines the impact of the USD 100 billion target (Carty, et al., 2020, p. 22).

I argue that policy coherence should be taken into consideration within the broader climate justice framework dealing with climate finance. This is because incoherence contributes to the maintenance of distributional injustices by inter alia increasing emissions and impacts within an already burgeoning climate debt and thereby undermining any 'additional' or potentially 'compensatory' nature that could be attributed to the finance in question; demonstrating a disregard for the meaningful participation of those nations calling for emissions reductions; and deepening systemic inequalities between countries by way of uneven climate change impacts and enrichening some at the expense of others. More broadly, ensuring donor coordination in view of both fair share and policy coherence could improve the effectiveness of climate and development finance, prevent the undercutting of this finance, and improve the overall outcomes that could be expected from climate finance (Carty, et al., 2020; Pickering, et al., 2015). These donor coordination indicators can therefore be considered foundational to the capacity of climate finance to contribute to climate justice according to its other accepted identifiers (additionality, etc.).

[17] There is also work done to consider the fair share of greenhouse gas emission reductions, in view of the same issues, e.g., Climate Action Tracker (n.d.), Eric et al. (2019)

[18] Though note should be made of the equity issues associated with 'imposed' energy transitions, bearing in mind the argument that Annex 1 countries should move first and fastest in accordance with CBDRRC.

4. Case Overview: Australia, Pacific SIDS, and climate change

There is a considerable literature devoted to climate change, justice, finance, and SIDS, including in the Pacific (PSIDS). This involves a mixture of hard and social sciences to multifariously classify climate risks, impacts, preparation and responses, and SIDS approaches and strategies, from local to international levels. It touches on a range of issues including disaster risk reduction and response, long-term adaptation methods, climate policy, climate litigation, and environmental migration, amongst others (ADB, 2020; Barnett, 2017; Klöck & Nunn, 2019; Kumar & Taylor, 2015; McNamara, et al., 2020; MHumNut, et al., 2021; Thomas, et al., 2020; Weiss, 2015; Zhang & Managi, 2020). It also considers SIDS as vulnerable according to multiple metrics and as having capacity constraints, particularly relating to adaptation; though also agency (Bordner, et al., 2020; Filho, et al., 2020; Ourbak, et al., 2019; Scandurra, et al., 2020; Thomas, et al., 2020). They have also been broadly identified as well-ranked recipients of development finance in per capita terms, though lower in terms of quantity overall, facing issues such as barriers to access, aid volatility, low aid effectiveness, and aid dependence (Dornan & Pryke, 2017; Iulai, 2014; Niles & Lloyd, 2013; OECD, 2018; Wood, et al., 2020). Several authors examine SIDS and climate finance (Klöck & Fagotto, 2020; OECD, 2016; Samuwai, 2021; Scandurra, et al., 2020). Attention has also been given to their advocacy role in the international climate regime, including for climate finance issues like access challenges, multilateral funds like the GCF, and loss and damage finance, as well as their own mitigation and adaptation ambitions (Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Dornan, 2015; Ourbak, et al., 2019; Thomas, et al., 2020).

There is also some work devoted to development finance in the Pacific (see summary by Dornan & Pryke (2017), pp. 388-389) (Clark & Feeny, 2019; Dornan, 2015; Dornan & Pryke, 2017; Iulai, 2014; Oveton, et al., 2012; Wood & Nicholls, 2021; Yates, 2020), including climate finance (Atteridge & Canales, 2017; Barnett, 2008; Betzold, 2016; Maclellan & Meads, 2016). Likewise, there is some literature dealing explicitly with Australia's role as a provider of development finance broadly and in the region (Wood, et al., 2020; Wood, et al., 2021), and of climate change and/or the Pacific in Australia's foreign policy (Elliott, 2011; Makinda, 2014; Warbrooke, 2014). However, there appears to be a very limited amount dealing with its provision of climate finance (Jotzo, et al., 2011; Wood, et al., 2021), though several NGOs have undertaken assessments (see Table 1, p. 20). However, these assessments do not provide breakdowns over time of the type intended, nor do they consider Australia's relevant discourse. This work will contribute to filling this knowledge gap by firstly, providing an integrated overview and analysis of Australia's reported climate finance in relation to its rhetorical approach to climate-related development cooperation, with a particular focus on Pacific SIDS; and secondly, mobilising the larger climate justice and climate finance literature heretofore described in relation to this case. On this foundation, this section introduces the case study, tracing the positioning of PSIDS and Australia in a broader context of climate justice.

4.1. Tracing climate justice issues for Pacific SIDS

PSIDS are responsible for just a few tenths of a percent of the global GHG emissions (Ourbak, et al., 2019). Despite this, climate change represents a disproportionate – even existential – threat to these states. Conventional scientific and political understandings have designated distinct thresholds for this threat, such as the famous 1.5°C threshold in the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015). Even warming at this limit will result in increasing occurrence of extreme events unprecedented in the observational record, provoking severe impacts across the Pacific, and will even constitute a risk to the capacity of atoll[19] environments (such as in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tokelau, and Tuvalu) to sustain contemporary population levels (Barnett, 2017; IPCC, 2021). Warming to this limit is expected to be reached in the 21st century, with only very low emissions/warming scenarios[20] having the potential to reduce warming back below this threshold by the end of the century (IPCC, 2021).

[19] Atolls are low-lying coral and island formations with geographical characteristics that make them particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and other challenges, including poor soil quality and limited potable water (National Geographic, 2012).

[20] The IPCC examined projected climate change impacts under five designated scenarios. See Annex 1 for further detail.

Given the high likelihood of reaching this limit, there are numerous critical impacts expected for PSIDS, such as more intense tropical cyclones, as well as increased heat extremes and stress, ocean acidification, marine heatwaves, and sea level rise (IPCC, 2021) (see Annex 1). The latter will result in shoreline retreat on sandy coastlines, and combined with storm surges and waves, will exacerbate coastal inundation and saltwater intrusion (IPCC, 2021). In the Pacific, rainfall has decreased in the poleward areas and increased in parts of the western and equatorial Pacific, with both trends expected to continue, at the same time as aridity increases in some areas (IPCC, 2021). Various impacts become more certain and intense under higher warming/emissions scenarios, and indeed globally every additional increment of warming will provoke increases in extremes like heat waves, heavy precipitation, and agricultural and ecological droughts (IPCC, 2021)[21].

Pacific SIDS populations are acutely exposed to and dependent on the natural environment, and thereby vulnerable to such impacts. For example, in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands (RMI), and Tuvalu, 95% of built infrastructure is located within 500 metres of coastlines, increasing inundation risk (Kumar & Taylor, 2015, p. 992). In addition, sea level rise increases saltwater contamination of potable water and arable land (Weiss, 2015; Thomas, et al., 2020; Filho, et al., 2020). Highly exposed PSIDS populations are less resilient to increasingly intense natural disasters, including extreme sea-level events, tropical storms, and flooding (Thomas, et al., 2020). The strong dependence of island livelihoods and economies on the ocean means that declining fish stocks and threats to other marine resources have far-reaching impacts, as does decline in tourism, e.g., due to erratic weather or damage to coral reefs (Thomas, et al., 2020). Adverse economic impacts likewise impact a country's resilience to shocks, particularly given many are reliant on other vulnerable revenue streams such as development finance and remittances (OECD, 2018).

These various vulnerabilities provoke flow-on effects for a wide array of development issues in the Pacific, including food and nutrition security, sanitation, public health, displacement, employment, living conditions, and urban drift (MHumNut, et al., 2021; Weiss, 2015). In addition, while biodiversity loss and other environmental impacts are adverse in their own right, they also incite social and health impacts, particularly in communities that have a strong connection to the land and the natural environment (Barnett, 2017). Prospects of environmental loss and forced migration also provoke concerns about loss of cultural values and continuity, traditions such as land tenure practices, connection to place, and even entire cultural groups should populations be obliged to leave their homes and integrate into other communities (Barnett, 2017). Moreover, international law is now faced with the prospect of redefining or dissolving Pacific statehood, given the current requirement for a permanent population and defined territory (per the *Montevideo Convention* (1933)) (Teles, 2021).

These vulnerabilities also interact with the capacities of Pacific SIDS to mitigate – but more significantly given their low emissions and high vulnerability, adapt to – climate change, whether that involves establishing community resilience programmes, developing climate-resilient infrastructure, or absorbing and recovering from climate-related economic shocks. For example, gaps in education and health system infrastructure and funding influence human capacities to manage shocks and contribute to brain drain from the islands (Usher, 2004). Climate data gaps – a critical barrier to effective adaptation and disaster resilience planning – are in part driven by a lack of access to the required technical equipment and related research capacity (SPREP & WMO, 2021). Climate impacts themselves undermine the adaptive capacities of communities by inter alia destroying infrastructure and damaging productive activities like agriculture and fishing (Filho, et al., 2020).

Many of these vulnerability and capacity issues also interact with systemic justice challenges. For example, limited fiscal space, precarity in the ocean economy, and concerns relating to governance, sovereignty, debt sustainability, and aid dependence all reflect historical injustices and systemic inequalities faced by Pacific SIDS in supply chains and the international financial system, while weighing on the financial and institutional capacities of these states (Thomas, et al., 2020; MHumNut, et al., 2021; Yates, 2020; Dornan & Pryke, 2017). As an illustration: the Pacific is one of the most aid-

[21] At this stage, while the certainty of adverse climate impacts is high, the extent of them is yet to be determined, given the relative uncertainty associated with charting emissions trajectories based on policies yet to be enacted or implemented (IPCC, 2021; IPCC, 2021; Barnett, 2017). In addition, the IPCC has noted difficulties in constructing climate information for SIDS due to data gaps (IPCC, 2021, p. 2).

dependent regions on the world, a phenomenon driven in no small part by colonial history, which also influences the contemporary sovereignty of islands, many of whom retain administrative ties with colonial and occupying powers (Bordner, et al., 2020). Aid dependence is both a reflection of low fiscal capacity of states and a major capacity inhibitor in itself, recognised to constrain the development of states' productive capacities and prompt negative institutional and governance outcomes through, for example, incentivising rent-seeking behaviour (Barnett, 2008; Curtain, 2012) It can also increase economic vulnerability and make countries more prone to shocks, including of the kind provoked by climate change (Dornan & Pryke, 2017).

Colonial history[22] also shapes the distribution of climate financing in the Pacific – for example, as noted, French- and US-affiliated Pacific islands are largely excluded from receipt of Australian development finance, having their own financing arrangements with their respective 'administrators'. In fact, Bordner et al. (2020, p. 1) argue that colonial dynamics in the Pacific not only shape climate vulnerability and response, but limit climate adaptation through a process of 'reproducing colonial subordination', evident in both dependence of states on external funds for adaptation, and lack of sovereignty over adaptation strategies. Donors have been openly accused of using bilateral funding programmes to pursue their own interests in the region (e.g., Edney-Browne (2021)). Concerns about sovereignty as it relates to climate financing are part of the reason that many Pacific states have been such advocates for accessing funds through the Green Climate Fund, which is considered by some to provide states with more agency over funding; though barriers to access remain, and it can be argued that these kinds of mechanisms perpetuate neoliberal climate governance patterns (PIF, 2019; GCF, n.d.).

While PSIDS faces challenges, many authors have noted the importance of recognising social and cultural capacities over which Pacific communities have power. Indeed, it can be argued that simplistic analyses of the challenges faced by PSIDS (e.g., the phenomenon of vanishing islands) can provoke nihilistic approaches to complex problems, by concealing the diversity of challenges, vulnerabilities, and capacities in small islands, and establishing a premise of inevitable climate catastrophe and limited agency of Pacific Islanders (Barnett, 2017; Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Klöck & Nunn, 2019).

In fact, PSIDS have been among the most vocal and effective advocates for climate action on the international stage, highlighting their vulnerability in climate negotiations, advocating for stronger ambitions to limit emissions, and playing major roles in the establishment of mechanisms such as the UNFCCC and the 1.5°C threshold (Ourbak, et al., 2019; Thomas, et al., 2020). PSIDS were amongst those that negotiated most strongly for inclusion in the Copenhagen Accords of reference to balance between mitigation and adaptation, as well as preferential access for SIDS to climate finance in consideration of their vulnerability (Ourbak, et al., 2019). In addition, while these states often face challenges in terms of representation and presence in global negotiations (see e.g., Lyons (2021)), they have some relative success through platforms like AOSIS.

There is, however, 'general recognition' that SIDS communities have thus far not been provided adequate avenues for redress via international climate agreements (Thomas, et al., 2020, p. 18). In this context, PSIDS have also made use of other avenues. For example, governments and civil society have brought various cases of climate litigation to seek improved outcomes where these have not been achieved within the regime. For example, the government of Vanuatu recently announced that it will seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the rights of present and future generations to be protected from climate change (Carreon, 2021; Regenvanu, 2021). PSIDS have also advocated for climate action in other international and regional fora, including the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and its Smaller Island States Group (e.g., PIF (2019)). Recognising climate action efforts of Pacific Islanders beyond the confines of the international climate regime helps to underline their strong prioritisation of the issue.

[22] Relatedly, historical use of Pacific islands for nuclear testing by colonial powers has caused serious long-term health and economic impacts on populations (O'Brien, 2021) and prompted grave questions about ongoing responsibility, while also inducing contemporary climate-related vulnerabilities, such as threats to the safe containment of nuclear waste in the face of sea level rise.

4.2. Positioning Australia

Australia is the largest provider of development finance in the Pacific, far outstripping the next largest provider, New Zealand (Lowy Institute, 2020). The country frequently positions itself as a major player in the Pacific, is a member of the PIF, and it has undertaken a strategic reorientation of its development program towards the Indo-Pacific (DFAT, 2017; PIF, n.d.).

Australia is also the largest emitter of GHGs in the Pacific, and the fifth largest if Asia is included, behind China, India, Japan, and Indonesia (Ritchie & Roser, 2020). Historically, Australia has contributed 1.1% to global cumulative GHG emissions since 1751 (Ritchie, 2019). It has amongst the largest per capita emissions of the Annex I countries, emitting 17 tonnes per capita, three times higher than the global average, 4.8 tonnes (Ritchie, 2019). It has the world's largest per capita emissions from coal, emitting five times the global average (Broadbent, 2021), and is one of the largest exporters of coal and natural gas (Australian Government, 2021; Australian Government, 2021). This means it also contributes considerably via its scope 3 emissions – recent analysis placed this at 3,320 million tonnes of CO_2 in 2019, around five times the official Scope 1 and 2 figure reported by the government, potentially bumping it to 9.4% of CO_2 emissions globally (Blundell-Wignall, 2021).[23]

Australia is a signatory to all the UNFCCC climate agreements, including the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and the Paris Agreement. Despite being a signatory, Australia has frequently been accused of not meeting its obligations, greenwashing its emissions, manipulating its carbon accounting, derailing international climate negotiations, and not honouring its commitments (Joshi, 2021; Morton, 2019; Morton & Hannam, 2021; Readfern, 2021). Most recently, Australia refused to update its NDC emissions target for 2030 for the Glasgow Climate Summit, a requirement under the Paris Agreement, and indicated the target would not be updated for COP27 as required under the Glasgow Climate Pact (Kelly, 2021; Readfern, 2021). The target of 26-28% emissions reduction under 2005 levels has not been improved upon since it was first submitted to the UNFCCC in 2015. Domestically, Australia provides growing sums of subsidies to fossil fuels (OECD, n.d.), and has even been held as an example of state capture by fossil fuel interests (Ludlam, et al., 2022; West & Marsh, 2019). Recent analysis found that Australia has over 100 fossil fuel projects in the pipeline, which, if all approved, would be equivalent to more than three times Australia's annual emissions (Ogge, et al., 2021). Domestically, politics surrounding climate change have caused significant disruptions, with behaviour over preceding decades subject to descriptions like 'a history of killings', 'toxic climate politics,' and 'Australia's climate wars' (Crabb, 2018; Hudson, 2019; Joshi, 2021; Taylor & Tischer, 2021). Australia's recent discursive pivot on climate targets has been qualified by some commentators as greenwashing or misinformation is it remains inconsistent with policy (Martin, 2021; Cave, 2021). The country has been rated poorly by several respected metrics; for example, Australia's climate action is rated by Climate Action Tracker as 'highly insufficient', and the Climate Change Performance Index as 'very low', and Australia received the lowest score of 193 UN members for its level of climate action in a report by UN-backed Sustainable Development Solutions Network (Climate Action Tracker, 2021; CCPI, 2022; SDSN, 2021) (refer to Table 1, p. 20).

While the country is engaged with the international climate regime – indicating an implied, if not explicit, acceptance of the 'rules of the game' – the country's actions, described above, frequently do not appear to reflect this. In its position as an Annex I & II country, even if it does not accept the responsibility argument (e.g., claiming Australia's emissions are too small to make a measurable difference on climate impacts (Karp, 2019)), Australia has considerable relative capacity to provide climate finance to Pacific SIDS. In fact, it has positioned its work in the Pacific as an important contribution to its global climate obligations; for example, at COP26, Australia unveiled AUD 500 million in climate finance to Asia and the Pacific as a headline announcement (Murphy, 2021). However, its climate finance commitments have been variously welcomed and met with scepticism by Pacific actors, and Australia's behaviour domestically and in international fora in relation to climate change has been a major source of tensions between the country and neighbouring Pacific SIDS (e.g., Regenvanu (2021), Edney-Browne (2021)). This is due in part to their continued laxness in

[23] More detailed analysis of global figures would be needed to calculate this precisely (Blundell-Wignall, 2021).

meeting 'fair' mitigation obligations, as well as concerns about aid dependency and influence elicited through bilateral provision of development finance (Edney-Browne, 2021).

4.2.1. Existing analyses and evaluations of Australia's public climate finance

Much of existing analysis evaluating Australia's public climate finance considers overall figures both on face value and in relation to other donors. For example, Wood et al. (2021) conducted an expansive analysis of Australia's overall development finance since the 1960s, which included some reference to climate finance. Edney-Browne (2021) also released a report during the course of this research that briefly analysed Australia's recent disbursements of climate finance, with particular attention paid to reporting issues. In addition, as noted, (p. 14), several actors have used various methodologies to calculate a 'fair share' of climate finance that should be provided by donors, according to a variety of metrics including GDP, GNI, population, and GHG emissions (Climate Action Tracker, 2021; Colenbrander, et al., 2021; Edney-Browne, 2021; Jacobs, et al., 2021; Jotzo, et al., 2011; WRI, 2021). Broadly, Australia has not scored well under these methods (refer to Table 1 for a sample). Evaluations of Australian development finance more broadly also exist, e.g., in relation to transparency (Publish What You Fund, 2020), the extent to which it is 'principled' (ODI, 2020), and aid quality (Centre for Global Development, 2021).

Table 1: Sample of assessments of Australia's climate finance according to its 'fair share'

Source	Assessment year	Assessed 'fair share' (USD)	Assessment
Climate Action Tracker	2021	Not specified	Critically insufficient (consistent with >4°C warming)
Greenpeace Australia-Pacific, per PSIDS, AOSIS, PICAN	Up to 2030	3 billion AUD [2.2 billion USD] per year 2020-25; 12 billion [8.7 billion USD] per year by 2030. Recommit to GCF.	Cites CAT's assessment (above)
Jotzo et al. (2011)	2011	1.9-2.7% of the global goal, with 2.4% as a reference i.e., USD 2.4 billion by 2020; >0.1% of GNI	N/A
Overseas Development Institute	2017-2018	2.7–3.7 billion per year	Provided 16% of fair share in assessment year; 7% projected to 2025 based on commitments
Oxfam, based on the Climate Equity Reference Project	Up to 2030	9.3-12.85 billion per year (to meet a 1.5°C pathway)	Based on Australia increasing its domestic emissions reduction targets to 75% below 2005 levels, or maintaining current targets, Australia must provide more CODF to meet its fair share
World Resources Institute	2018	3.8 billion per year; 0.22% of GNI	USD 3 billion discrepancy

Notes: AOSIS: Alliance of Small Island States; PSIDS: Pacific SIDS; PICAN: Pacific Island Climate Action Network
Source: Author's compilation based on Climate Action Tracker (2021), Colenbrander et al. (2021) Edney-Browne (2021), Jacobs et al. (2021), Jotzo et al. (2011), WRI (2021)

Methodology and Research Design

This section presents the methodology employed during the research. Firstly, it introduces the purpose and scope of the case study, before describing the two-step methodology undertaken – discourse analysis and ODF data analysis utilising descriptive statistics – in relation to the theoretical framework outlined in Section 3.2. It then describes some of the potential weaknesses in approach, as well as prospects for future research. The methodology is engaged in the view of answering the following question:

> *How does Australia approach climate change in its development program, particularly in Pacific Small Island Developing States? And, to what extent does this approach reflect the concept of climate justice?*

5. A mixed-methods case study

Case study research in social sciences is not a new phenomenon, though there are some basic contentions around semantics and whether case study methodology is fixed (Ylikoski & Zahle, 2019). Ylikoski & Zahle (2019, p. 1) provide a useful overview of the common characteristics and purposes of case studies:

> *'...*
> 1. *The focus of study is a single case or a handful of cases at most.*
> 2. *The case is a naturally occurring item or process that is conceptualized as a case of something.*
> 3. *The case is studied intensively: the case study researcher collects a lot of data about the case rather than generating very specific kinds of data about multiple cases.*
> 4. *The case is studied using multiple methods: as a part of the intensive focus, a case study researcher usually employs multiple methods of data collection and analysis. The research is not method-driven, but question-driven.*
> 5. *The goal of a case study is to produce a comprehensive in-depth account of the case. The account is often presented in a narrative form.'*

Critically, they argue that an important aspect of case study research is its detailed nature, and the fact it should cover multiple aspects of the case; therefore, multiple methods are often employed (Ylikoski & Zahle, 2019). This research will take the form of a mixed-methods case study. The case is a descriptive or demonstrative one, 'in that it uses a reference theory or model that directs data collection and case description' (Scholz & Tietje, 2011). It also has some aspects of an explanatory case study (Scholz & Tietje, 2011) in that it will attempt to draw connections between finance, discursive patterns, and context, though it does not attempt to intimate causality.

5.1. Case selection: Australia and the Pacific SIDS

The case examines the situation of climate change and PSIDS in Australia's development program. The case was chosen in view of several factors, principal among them the minimal attributable responsibility and high climate vulnerability of PSIDS amongst non-Annex I countries, and the strong relevance of Australia as their largest provider of development finance (Lowy Institute, 2020). Relatedly, SIDS have been explicitly acknowledged within the international climate regime as priority recipients of adaptation finance, while Australia is an Annex I & II country who has undertaken to provide climate finance in line with international agreements (United Nations, 2015; United Nations, 2009). The relative positioning of these actors makes for strong relevance to the larger area of inquiry dealing with climate finance as a mechanism of climate justice.

On a more practical note, there is a comprehensive array of source material from which a useful analysis can be drawn, notably the availability of development finance data delineated according to its relevance to climate change – members of the OECD DAC who report their official development finance (ODF) via the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) make use of the Rio markers for climate mitigation and adaptation (see Section 6.2.1.). For this research, I chose to focus my attention on a singular donor – Australia – to maintain a reasonable scope of work while exploring a variety of routes for analysis, though a comparative analysis could also be a feasible approach.

5.1.1. Timeline

The case was organised according to a set time frame: 2010 to 2019. This allowed for analysis of Australia's CODF spending on adaptation, as the Rio marker for adaptation was introduced after the COP15 Copenhagen summit in 2009 (OECD, n.d.). In addition, while non-binding, the Copenhagen Accord provides the explicit language based upon which many climate finance parameters were established, and therefore any adjustment to aid policy in accordance with knowledge cemented at Copenhagen could be reasonably expected to take place from at most 2010 onward. Over the decade, this also allows for examination of the program in light of several factors, including change in government and Prime Minister; the dissolution of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Australia's former development agency, and absorption of its program into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); and potential changes in approach that may have been prompted from key international climate summits, namely Copenhagen, Cancun, and Paris. This also leaves space to track longer-term patterns in climate-related official development finance (CODF) according to climate justice indicators. A timeline for the case can be found on page 34 (Figure 4).

5.1.2. PSIDS Scope

The PSIDS included in this study are the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. The selected states have been chosen for this study as *recipients of Australian development finance*. Note that the Cook Islands and Niue are sovereign microstates in 'free association' with New Zealand, Tokelau is under New Zealand administration, and Wallis and Futuna is a French overseas 'collectivity' (*collectivité d'outre-mer*).

Non-recipient states not covered by this study include US and French territories such as American Samoa (US), Guam (US), the Northern Mariana Islands (US), French Polynesia, and New Caledonia (France). The study also excludes the Torres Strait islands, which are administrated by Australia, though notably actors from the Torres Strait have engaged in relevant climate advocacy[24]. Similarly, the study excludes the Indonesia provinces of Papua and West Papua, whose pursuit of independence is supported by many Pacific SIDS, while Australia accepts the claim of Indonesia (Weedon, 2019). This is as such not an exhaustive study of all Pacific islands but rather engages those immediately relevant to Australian development cooperation.

The study states are identified on the map below. A full-size map can be found in Annex 2.

[24] For instance, a group of Torres Strait Islanders brought a petition to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2019, arguing that Australia is violating their human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by failing to (a) establish sufficient greenhouse gas mitigation targets and plans, and (b) fund adequate coastal defence and resilience measures on the islands (UNEP, 2020).

Figure 2: Map of the Pacific, study states indicated



Note: See larger version of this map in Annex 2
Source: Author's compilation based on Sciences Po Atelier de Cartographie *(2007)* Fond de carte Pacifique Sud 2007, available: https://bibnum.sciencespo.fr/s/catalogue/ark:/46513/sc16dvvs#?c=&m=&s=&cv=

It is to be noted that Timor-Leste is not classified as a 'Pacific' ODF recipient by DFAT and is instead classified as 'South-east and East Asia' (DFAT, n.d.). However, the state is frequently grouped with other Pacific SIDS across relevant Australian policy documents and discourse (for example, the *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* (DFAT, 2017), and the Pacific Labour Scheme (DFAT, 2019)). It is also identified by the UNOHRLLS as a SIDS. For this reason, it has been included in the country selection, however data and analysis for Timor Leste should be considered distinct from any associated with Pacific regional development programmes where it is excluded.

5.1.3. Contribution

Given the considerable inconsistencies identified in not only donor behaviour and reporting, but recipient vulnerability, capacity, and the like, it is not reasonable to expect any case study to be 'representative' of the global context. However, as this case exhibits characteristics relevant to the body of work dealing with climate justice and finance, it will at least be illustrative of some the challenges facing international frameworks, particularly where this allows for coherent application of relevant methodology. Understanding how – or indeed whether – climate finance acts as a mechanism of climate justice is a potentially complex endeavour because it requires consideration of multiple understandings of climate justice, as well as the actions and interactions of a variety of stakeholders – both within and outside official structures. In such a context, it is useful to consider the hitherto described body of work devoted to the development of methodology to measure climate finance and its interaction with climate justice. Consolidation and application of such a body to this case will be a useful exercise, for several reasons. Firstly, it will allow for an exploration of the interoperability of a large and evolving climate finance literature. Secondly, it will allow for a more comprehensive assessment of a case of climate-related development cooperation to enrich a more generalised body of work (for example, the discrepancy noted between distribution of adaptation finance to vulnerable recipients in general, compared to by relative vulnerability amongst SIDS (see p. 11) (Betzold & Weiler, 2017; Klöck & Fagotto, 2020))). Thirdly, it will explore the capacity of such a case study to provide useful conclusions in a broader realm of inquiry – that is, in the application of climate finance as a mechanism of climate justice. Lastly, it will fill a gap in the literature regarding Australia's approach to climate change in its development program, and its 'justness'.

6. A two-step approach

The analysis took place in two steps: a discourse analysis of relevant Australian development program documentation, and an analysis of Australian official development finance (ODF) data reported to the OECD. The results of both are presented concurrently after this *Methodology* section.

The analysis aims to trace the extent to which the reported ODF data and climate-related discourse align with climate justice and with each other. In doing so, it seeks to shed light on the extent to which Australian public climate finance could contribute to climate justice according to global understandings, as well as the coherence of Australia's climate spending in relation to its own discourse. In simpler terms, it considers – is Australia's climate finance just? And does it do what it says it does? Following the *Results* section, the *Discussion* reflects on the findings to these sub-questions in order to address the research question:

> *How does Australia approach climate change in its development program, particularly in Pacific Small Island Developing States? And, to what extent does this approach reflect the concept of climate justice?*

Accordingly, the data was examined *in its entirety* and *according to the 'climate justice indicators'* identified in the literature review (refer to Section 3.2. , p. 12): additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, the related fair distribution of adaptation funds, 'fair share' relative to donor peers and identified benchmarks, and climate mainstreaming and policy coherence. These criteria, as noted, primarily deal with the notion of *distributive justice.* Note will be made of the reporting and other data-related challenges identified during the research.

6.1. Analysis of climate-related discourse in Australian policy documents

The first step involved developing a document corpus, coding it with software *MAXQDA*[25], generating a dataset, and analysing said data. The major aim of this step was to track Australian discourse within its development program over time as it related to climate change and the Pacific, in general and according to the previously defined climate justice indicators.

6.1.1. Defining the document corpus

The document corpus was developed from documents published by AusAID or DFAT that were publicly available on the current DFAT website, as well as former DFAT and AusAID websites available through *Trove*[26], the archival search engine of the National Library of Australia. This involved manual searching to find relevant documentation, including to complete document sets only partially available at certain points in time. This corpus is not exhaustive and represents a sample of 187 documents published over the study period.

Several documents and document sets were excluded from the final corpus for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there was a question of scope; webpages, for example, were excluded on this count. Some documents had to be excluded due to the poor quality of the files available – they were not compatible with the analysis software used. It should also be noted that on occasion, there is some overlap with 2009 and 2020, where documents were dated (2009-2010) and (2019-2020). Documents with multiple year dates were dated by taking the first year; for this reason, there are five documents dated 2009 in the corpus. Data from 2009 should be taken as *potentially* demonstrative of pre-Copenhagen discourse (Australia, for instance, did not incorporate the Rio Marker for adaptation until 2011, indicating there may be some lag, see Section 6.2.1. , p. 28).

Two other notes should be made here. Firstly, throughout the analysis, reference is made to "climate-specific" documents. These documents were identified so that some analysis excluding these

[25]Copyright © 1995 - 2022, MAXQDA - Distribution by VERBI GmbH. All Rights Reserved. Available: https://www.maxqda.com

[26] Copyright © n.d., National Library of Australia. Available: https://trove.nla.gov.au

documents could be made. This allows for some indication as to whether climate change was referred to in an isolated or integrated manner. This assumes that a document making specific reference to climate change in its title can be expected to refer to climate change throughout the document. The *Environmental Protection Policy for the Aid Program* (2014) is excluded on this basis.

Secondly, given the lack of a dedicated policy document, the DFAT website was searched for any detail on Australia's climate change engagement presented under the banner of 'Pacific Step-Up'. The latest available 'snapshot' within the study period of the DFAT website on the National Library Archives, from 7th November 2010, include a page entitled '*Pacific regional – climate change and resilience'* (DFAT via NLA, 2019). This webpage was not included in the document corpus and was referred to only briefly during the manual analysis (described below).

A table containing the list of documents and their characteristics can be viewed in Annex 7.

6.1.2. Manual analysis

Some key documents were subject to a manual analysis, which involved reading the documents and considering the manner in which climate change, the Pacific, and relevant justice issues were (or were not) treated. This involved considering keys issues defined in the literature review. Key documents included core policy, and the 2017 White Paper; climate or environmental policy; other climate related materials; and Pacific regional policy, including a brief analysis of material DFAT website. These documents were chosen considering their discursive centrality to management of the program overall, and of climate and environment with the program, in view of their potential to demonstrate fundamental discursive changes over time and in relation to events in the case timeline (e.g., change of government). A small section was also devoted to monitoring and evaluation documents in view of their potential influence on program management and thereby discourse. External monitoring and evaluation documents are not included in the corpus as they were not published by DFAT.

6.1.3. Creating the dataset: MAXQDA coding

Qualitative analysis software MAXQDA was utilised to track the incidence of terms across the defined corpus. This involved integrating the corpus into the program, before running an array of simple and complex keyword searches to consider discursive patterns, such as whether climate and other relevant terms were invoked; at what frequency and to what extent they were invoked; change over time; and in what context they were invoked.

Keywords were searched as either (a) individual terms or (b) terms within two sentences of each other. The latter was designed to consider the *context* of keywords; for example, to what extent "adaptation" was discussed in proximity to "climate change". Several terms were adjusted to ensure the maximum combination of terms could be found; for example, "adapt" to account for "adapt", "adaptation", "adapting", and "adapted". Key words were selected according to their capacity to illustrate climate change/justice discourse (e.g., "climate change", then in combination with "adapt", "mitigat", "capacity", "vulnerab") and links to PSIDS (e.g., "Pacific", "Indo-Pacific", "SIDS", or "Pacific" in combination with "climate change", "adapt", "mitigate", etc.). Efforts were made to avoid redundant words (for example, searching "climate change" rather than "climate" to avoid instances discussing e.g., economic climate). However, an undefined margin of error is expected for all combined terms as there is no guarantee that all instances are strictly connected; for example, one phrase may reference "climate change" while the next discusses "adapt"-ing to new economic circumstances. Similarly, incidence in this case could include some overlap; for example, "adapt" within two sentences before an incidence of "climate change", and "adapt" within two sentences after the same incidence of "climate change" would count as an incidence of 2. This was considered an unavoidable risk within the parameters of this research, acceptable on the principle that the same undefined margin is applied consistently across the corpus. It is possible that some adjustment could be made to compensate for such an error, but more research would be required on this score.

Keyword searches were used to 'code' the relevant terms or sections in each document, then the codes were transformed into document 'variables.' In addition to these keyword codes, each document was classified with several variables manually entered by the author, such as year, agency, relevant

recipient state, and whether it was a "climate document" (per Section 6.1.1. p. 25). Once this process was complete, a spreadsheet with a complete dataset was generated. See Annex 7 for a list of document variables included key words.

6.1.4. Addressing some data challenges and accounting for other explanations

A key challenge with keyword searches lies in the ability to draw meaning from the *incidence* of terms. Incidence can be explained by more than simply discursive shifts, e.g., distribution of documents over time or donor drafting methods. Steps were taken to address this challenge. Firstly, all incidence data was normalised by dividing the incidence for each year by the number of documents per year. This avoids the issue of higher incidence in certain years being explained by a higher number of documents, instead providing us with an average figure. For this reason, use of the term "incidence" refers to "incidence per document" in the analysis.

However, other factors could still explain the distribution of incidence, such as the reporting methods of the donor. For example, could lower incidence be explained by reporting becoming *less substantive* overall – i.e., was the donor simply writing 'lighter' reports and thereby lessening incidence? In this case, document characteristics were recorded, including the number of pages and words per document. By examining this over time, one can consider whether this may have an impact on the results, bearing in mind the different types of documents disbursed over time. For instance, thematic policies with less reference to climate change, focused earlier in the period, were heavier than communications materials, which were later and bore more relevance. On average, pages and words per document reduced over time from, respectively, 67.57 to 44.75 pages and 19, 867 to 15, 599 words between 2010 and 2019 (2009 was an outlier at 142.4 pages, 40, 678 words). The largest reduction was in *annual reports*, from 389 pages in 2010 to 134 in 2019. Aid program progress reports (APPR) also shrunk considerably, though more suddenly, from an average of 25 pages per document from 2012-2018, down to four in 2019. Figures were not altered to compensate for this as it was considered that reduction in substantiveness of documents is also a finding and reflective of discursive choices on the part of the donor. However, this kind of normalisation is a step that could potentially be taken in the future.

Efforts were also made to account for any bias in years with "climate-related documents". For this reason, on several occasions comparisons were made with figures that exclude these documents. This provided the added benefit of illustrating the extent to which climate terms were *mainstreamed* across the entire corpus, as opposed to instances where climate change may be only have been dealt with in an superficial or isolated manner.

6.2. Analysis of reported climate finance data

The second stage of the investigation involved analysing the data reported by Australia during the study period (2010-2019) to the OECD through its Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Bilateral and multilateral donors report project-level data via the OECD CRS, with these data used for finance analysis and to measure donors' compliance with various international recommendations for development co-operation (OECD, 2021). It is the most comprehensive development finance dataset available internationally, though subject to some limitations discussed below.

The major aim of this analysis was to consider actual disbursement of ODF over time as it related to climate change and the Pacific. By presenting the results concurrently with discourse analysis results, it was also possible to track patterns across the two datasets to consider how consistent spending was in relation to discourse.

6.2.1. Introduction to the Rio markers and associated data preparation

The Rio Conventions on climate change (the UNFCCC), biodiversity, and desertification were derived from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Since 1998, the DAC has monitored development finance according to objectives under these agreements through the CRS using the Rio markers for biodiversity, climate change mitigation, and desertification (OECD, n.d.). A marker for adaptation has been applied since 2010, post-Copenhagen (OECD, n.d.).

DAC members are requested to indicate whether each development finance activity targets environmental objectives by indicating whether an objective is 'significant' (a score of 1) or 'principal' (2) to the project. An activity will receive a 'significant' score if the adaptation or mitigation objective 'is explicitly stated but it is not the fundamental driver or motivation for undertaking [the activity]. Instead, the activity has other prime objectives, but it has been formulated or adjusted to help meet the relevant climate concerns' (OECD, n.d., p. 5). A 'principal' score will be applied when the mitigation or adaptation objective 'is explicitly stated as fundamental in the design of, or the motivation for, the activity. Promoting the objective will thus be stated in the activity documentation as one of the principal reasons for undertaking it. In other words, the activity would not have been funded (or designed that way) but for that objective' (OECD, n.d., p. 5). A score of 0 indicates that the activity 'was examined but not found to target the objective in any significant way', while those activities that have not been assessed are left blank (OECD, n.d., p. 5).

The climate change markers are applied according to the definitions outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Definitions and eligibility criteria for Rio markers for climate change mitigation and adaptation

Marker	***The activity:***
Mitigation	*Definition* '… contributes to the objective of stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG sequestration. *Criteria for marker eligibility* '… contributes to: a) the mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of GHGs, including gases regulated by the Montreal Protocol; or b) the protection and/or enhancement of GHG sinks and reservoirs; or c) the integration of climate change concerns with the recipient countries' development objectives through institution building, capacity development, strengthening the regulatory and policy framework, or research; or d) developing countries' efforts to meet their obligations under the Convention.
Adaptation	*Definition* '… intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the current and expected impacts of climate change, including climate variability, by maintaining or increasing resilience, through increased ability to adapt to, or absorb, climate change stresses, shocks and variability and/or by helping reduce exposure to them. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions. *Criteria for marker eligibility* a) the climate change adaptation objective is explicitly indicated in the activity documentation; and b) the activity contains specific measures targeting the definition above.

Source: Author's compilation based on OECD DAC Rio Markers for Climate: Handbook (OECD, n.d., pp. 3-4)

Sets of CRS data files for (a) Australia, (b) DAC donors, and (c) Pacific recipients for each ODA and OOF for every year from 2010 to 2019 were collected. Files contained data for disbursements as opposed to commitments, to attain a clearer image of the finance actually provided over the study

period. It should be noted that there is potentially for marker application to differ between commitments and disbursements; data reported to the CRS may also differ from that reported to the UNFCCC for this reason (OECD, n.d.). These files were consolidated into a single spreadsheet, and the data was cleaned, with superfluous columns (such as OECD codes) removed.

Subsequently, each data point was reclassified according to its reported Rio Markers for mitigation and adaptation. This involved associating each possible Rio Marker combination with a number from 1 to 16 (representing the number of possible combinations), before simplifying this list to a number from 0 to 7, to combine duplicate classifications. Refer to Table 3 below for detail.

Table 3: Rio Marker Reclassification Matrix, Stage 1

Rio Marker Score		Reclassified by author		
Mitigation score	**Adaptation score**	**Initial score**	**Final score**	**Classification**
N/A [blank]	N/A [blank]	1	0	Not relevant/not classified
0	N/A [blank]	2	0	Not relevant/not classified
1	N/A [blank]	3	1	Mitigation (significant)
2	N/A [blank]	4	2	Mitigation (principal)
N/A [blank]	0	5	0	Not relevant/not classified
0	0	6	0	Not relevant/not classified
1	0	7	1	Mitigation (significant)
2	0	8	2	Mitigation (principal)
N/A [blank]	1	9	3	Adaptation (significant)
0	1	10	3	Adaptation (significant)
1	1	11	5	Mixed (significant)
2	1	12	6	Mixed
N/A [blank]	2	13	4	Adaptation (principal)
0	2	14	4	Adaptation (principal)
1	2	15	6	Mixed
2	2	16	7	Mixed (principal)

Source: Author's compilation

For the most part, the analysis refers to figures according to the eight classifications ultimately established. However, on occasion, data was combined to provide broader illustrations of various patterns. In these cases, the data was combined as follows in Table 4.

Table 4: Rio Marker reclassification, Stage 2 (simplified)

Score	Overall classification	Simple Classification	Climate or non-climate ODF?
0	Non-climate ODF	Non-climate ODF	Non-climate ODF
1	Mitigation (significant)	Mitigation ODF (MODF)	Climate ODF (CODF)
2	Mitigation (principal)		
3	Adaptation (significant)	Adaptation ODF (AODF)	
4	Adaptation (principal)		
5	Mixed (significant)	Mixed (total) ODF	
6	Mixed		
7	Mixed (principal)		

Source: Author's compilation

As noted in the OECD Rio marker methodology, 'assigning a double principal score… to the same activity should be considered only upon explicit justification.' (OECD, n.d., p. 6). Typically, no project should therefore receive a score of 2/2 (score 7, *mixed (principal)*) without explicit justification.

It is important to note that the Rio marker system was not designed to quantify finance flows, but rather to measure the 'mainstreaming' of environmental objectives into development cooperation (OECD, n.d.). There is no common reporting standard, a fact often criticised in relevant literature, due to the considerable inconsistency in reporting by donors (OECD, n.d.; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019; Borst, et al., 2022). However, the Rio marker system provides a useful proxy for public climate finance flows and is widely used to this end. Data can also be sourced from the UNFCCC, where donors report on climate finance on a biennial basis, however this data is not provided alongside that of total development finance. Data reported to the UNFCCC is often adapted from the data provided to the OECD (OECD, 2021).

6.2.2. Data analysis

The data analysis is presented in the form of descriptive statistics, analysed according to the following distributional justice issues identified in the literature: additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention to the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds, 'fair share' relative to donor peers and identified benchmarks, and climate mainstreaming and policy coherence (see Section 3.2. p. 12).[27] Criteria were selected according to (a) commitments made within the international climate regime – that is to say, those indicators identified in climate-finance related paragraphs of selected UNFCCC texts, namely the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and the Paris Agreement – and (b) measures related to donor coordination in view of the collective nature of commitments made.

6.2.3. Managing data limitations

The data used for this analysis was sourced from the OCED CRS in October 2021. Australia's provided data for 2019 has since been revised, changing somewhat the proportions of reported CODF, as USD 52.7 million worth of projects originally classified as ODF were reclassified as CODF, and there was a transferral of projects marked *mixed (significant)* to, for the most part, projects marked *adaptation (significant)* (Figure 3). While this somewhat frustrated the process of analysis, the update of reporting has been illustrative of two key points: that the Rio markers are subject to interpretation by reporting entities; and thereby that the data reported via this system is likely inconsistent and open to bias and misinterpretation (i.e., how could a project have been marked as 'mixed' finance in one instance, but then 'adaptation' in the next?). Future development of this research would of course require recalibration of results with this updated data.

Figure 3: Australian CODF reported originally vs. updated data



Note: Original 2019 data was sourced in October 2021. Updated 2019 data was sourced in January 2022.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS

As noted, this kind of difficulty has been extensively commented on in the climate finance literature (Borst, et al., 2022; Hattle, 2021; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019; Weikmans, et al., 2017). Challenges include a lack of common reporting methodology; instances of overreporting; self-policing in terms of, for example, ensuring that markers (Rio or otherwise, e.g., gender) applied to commitments are adjusted for disbursements according to the actual application of the ODF initially intended for particular outcomes; and absence of reporting from emerging donors like China and Brazil (OECD, n.d.; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019; Borst, et al., 2022; Weikmans, et al., 2017). A lack of accurate and transparent CODF data impedes the predictability of climate finance, as prescribed by the relevant international agreements, by hampering accurate tracking. It also calls into question adequacy, particularly when considering the vast differences in accounting sums of climate finance (as noted, p. 9). In view of these challenges, all data utilised needs to be treated as potentially flawed. Further

[27] Additional criteria could be established based on other justice types, e.g., compensatory, procedural, and systemic, and/or to account for understandings of climate justice beyond those that must be agreed by consensus in regime agreements (which are thereby potentially less generous), and in view of the fact that not all regime commitments are systematically met by donors, who may embrace other justice aspects not delineated in the agreed texts. Distributional justice was focused on in this research in view of scope.

research would do well to examine the veracity of Australia's reporting via the Rio Markers (see, e.g., Borst et al. (2022), Edney-Browne (2021), Hattle (2021)), to review Australia's reporting behaviour, its transparency, and thereby its reliability and predictability for recipients and other relevant stakeholders. Such investigation could also be used to adjust results presented in this thesis.

6.2.4. Other methodological considerations

There are several other methodological considerations that needed to be made in the course of analysis, primarily relating to the variables against which ODF data was compared or presented.

(i) Measuring vulnerability and capacity: income and geographical classifications vs. vulnerability indices

Across international frameworks, accepted measures of vulnerability and capacity in relation to climate and development finance include SIDS or LDC classification and GNI, while atolls could also be considered in the SIDS context (see p. 13). Several authors have also developed indices of vulnerability to encompass more comprehensive understandings of this concept (p. 13). Given the UN MVI is yet to be finalised, I made use of the Commonwealth Universal Vulnerability Index (UVI), one index considered in MVI development, which was developed under the direction of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, including several PSIDS (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2021). This index incorporates measures of vulnerability to climate change, socio-political or societal fragility, and economic vulnerability to external and natural shocks (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2021). The index essentially works as a scale of vulnerability to resilience (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2021, p. 20): UVI scores above 1.5 indicate a country is *extremely vulnerable*; between 1 and 1.5 *highly vulnerable*; 0.5 and 1 *vulnerable*; and below 0.5, *resilient*. The distribution of Australian CODF to its recipients was analysed according to not only GNI and SIDS, LDC and atoll status, but their UVI score, as an additional proxy for vulnerability. Refer to Annex 3 for a summary of these cases and other sample vulnerability measures in the Pacific.

(ii) Between-donor comparisons and Australia's 'fair share'

Part of the analysis undertaken considers Australia's 'fair share', which has been calculated by a variety of authors (see Table 1, p. 20). This firstly includes the dollar target (USD 2.4 billion by 2020) set by Jotzo et al. (2011, p. 1), which was calculated 'based on existing pledges of international finance and a range of indicators of responsibility and capacity'. It was selected on this basis, as well as being the lower bound of the fixed sum targets reviewed in the literature. Similarly, WRI calculated donors should provide climate finance to the equivalent of 0.22% of GNI each in order to provide their 'fair share' (OECD, n.d.; WRI, 2021). This 0.22% target was calculated on the basis that every developed country 'make the same effort relative to the size of its economy to reach the $100 billion goal' and was engaged on this basis (WRI, 2021). These are samples of potential fair share targets, bearing in mind that the WRI target is more ambitious and was established later than that outlined by Jotzo et al. (2011). The ODA target of 0.7% of GNI was also engaged, being long established in the development cooperation system. Australia's contribution was also compared to other DAC donors and other major donors in the Pacific. Both between-donor comparisons and share of GNI are widely used to relativise ODF spending (e.g., Wood et al. (2021)). It should be noted that data in Section 9.3.1. on fair shares utilises the updated 2019 data (see Figure 3 above) due to availability. Note also that the lack of common reporting methodologies also impedes the accuracy of donor comparisons which can be made (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019).

(iii) Narrowing the lens: a focus on Pacific SIDS

As part of this case study, particular attention was given to the position of PSIDS in Australia's development program. This involved analysing the broader program according to the two-step approach described above, while (a) highlighting the position of the Pacific SIDS throughout, and (b) utilising the region as a point of focus for more in-depth analytical exercises. This allowed Australia's treatment of the PSIDS as a regional group within its development program to be considered over time, given its reorientation towards PSIDS over time. This approach also allowed for analysis of potentially

interesting trends, rhetoric, and the like across the broader program that may also shed light on Australia's development policy approach to climate change, including in the Pacific. Given PSIDS are SIDS, particular attention was given to their treatment as especially vulnerable climate finance recipients identified within both the international climate regime and the development cooperation system as target recipients; for example, consideration was given to their relative rankings as recipients of AODF, bearing in mind other potential donor motivations for provision and distribution of ODF (refer to p. 11). Further, SIDS have a raft of specific findings in the literature such as high per-capita aid and lack of differentiation by vulnerability in their receipt of adaptation aid, which may be reflected in comparing the PSIDS case with Australia's wider recipient pool (Atteridge & Canales, 2017; Curtain, 2012; Iulai, 2014; Klöck & Fagotto, 2020; OECD, 2018).

7. Research weaknesses and potential for future work

The research can be seen in two contexts: as an addition to a body of literature devoted to climate finance and climate justice, and as a contribution to pathfinding work about Australia's approach to climate change thorough its development cooperation. The work itself will encompass a variety of methodologies in order to develop a more comprehensive picture of this, meaning that all or some of the techniques employed may be considered useful for other researchers undertaking similar analyses, whether singular or comparative. It does however result in a somewhat large and complex body of results that require further interpretation and could benefit from simplification depending on their intended use.

The case study could of course also be expanded. Additional evidence that would be useful for further investigation includes sources such as internal and external program evaluation material, government reporting to the UNFCCC and the DAC, and government communication material including website text, social media posts, press releases, and ministerial speeches. It would also benefit from field work, stakeholder interviews, and Freedom of Information[28] requests targeting relevant reporting, internal communications, briefings, etc., and relevant transcripts or recordings of parliamentary discussions, etc. More emphasis could be given to the *effectiveness* of Australian climate-related development programming in Pacific SIDS, as this research focuses primarily on reporting and rhetoric delivered by the donor but does not consider the ultimate outcomes of actions undertaken. Similarly, further scrutiny of the veracity of the information provided by the donor would be beneficial.

A key challenge lay of course in the quality of the data available, as previously discussed. Similarly, analysing policy documents in a (relative) vacuum without clarification of policymakers, DFAT employees etc. provides only one part of the picture – that publicly or institutionally presented. A further challenge related to the timeline limitations: examining Australia's approach over a longer term (for example, considering its evolution post-signature of the UNFCCC could be a useful exercise). Some of the core methods used in this research were constrained by the introduction of the Rio marker for adaptation after 2009. A more extensive study period would also provide more scope to compare approaches of different governing Parties; between 2010 and 2019, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was in power until November 2013, so over half of the period deals with the approach of the Coalition government (the Liberal National Party (LNP)), albeit under the stewardship of three different Liberal Prime Ministers and two different Ministers for Foreign Affairs, all with potentially differing attitudes towards climate change and the development program.

Efforts were made to clarify research issues with several professionals, including academics, analysts at the OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, and climate finance experts from the Pacific. These conversations were not formal interviews and anecdotal evidence from those conversations has not been used in this analysis.

[28] Australians have the right to request information from the government that may not be public under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982*. For further information, see: https://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-of-information/how-to-make-an-foi-request

Results: Climate Justice, Australian Development Cooperation, and the Pacific

This section will firstly provide an overview of Australia's relevant development policy from 2010 to 2019, based on manual analysis. This illustrates core discourse and relevant events to provide context for the later whole corpus analysis (see Section 6.1.2. p. 26). The second section will present the discourse and finance data results concurrently, so that direct connections can be drawn between the two datasets. To situate climate justice in Australia's development program, the analysis will present results of the discourse and finance data analyses according to indicators as follows (per Section 3.2. p. 12): additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention to the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, and the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds. Attention will also be given to donor coordination issues, i.e., 'fair share' in relation to donor peers and identified benchmarks, and policy coherence. Note will be made of the reporting challenges identified during the research.

8. Manual Analysis: a brief timeline of Australia's development policy, tracing climate and the Pacific

The study period commences in 2010, after signature of the Copenhagen Accord in December 2009. During the study period, there were several changes of government, via both election and leadership spill (refer to Figure 4). The period commenced under the Kevin Rudd Labor government, which had taken power from the John Howard Liberal-National (LNP) government in 2007. In June 2010, Julia Gillard became Labor Prime Minister (PM). Rudd briefly took back the Prime Ministership in June 2013, before losing power to the LNP under Tony Abbott in September. Malcolm Turnbull took the reins of the LNP in September 2015, and Scott Morrison in August 2018. Morrison remained PM for the remainder of the study period and remains PM as of writing.[29]

Figure 4: Case Timeline with major policy, 2010-2019



Note: M&E: monitoring and evaluation. In order, Ministers for Foreign Affairs were Stephen Smith, Kevin Rudd, Bob Carr, Julie Bishop, and Marise Payne. Prime Ministers were Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Kevin Rudd, Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull, and Scott Morrison. See Annex 4 for a larger version.
Source: Author's compilation.

[29] Post-submission update: the ALP was re-elected in May 2022 under Anthony Albanese. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs is Penny Wong.

Three different overarching aid policies were released during, respectively, the Gilliard Labor, Abbott LNP, and Morrison LNP periods, the latter in 2020. There was no major policy update under the Turnbull LNP government, though language around 'Pacific Step-up' (see Section 8.4. , p.39) emerged with inter alia a funding announcement at the PIF in 2016 and release of the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (DFAT, 2021). The latter refers to climate change and the aid program and is frequently referenced in relevant Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) publications, including the new climate strategy and aid policy introduced under the Morrison government.

Besides change in government, another critical change took place during the study period: Australia's formerly independent development agency of 40 years, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), was absorbed into DFAT (Figure 4). This merger took place in November 2013, two months after the election of Abbott, ostensibly to allow 'the aid and diplomatic arms of Australia's international policy agenda to be more closely aligned' (Davies & Betteridge, 2013). Notably, this was reported as having taken place with little warning and no voter mandate and was characterised by loss of institutional expertise as the jobs of 500 DFAT and AusAID workers were targeted for cutting, by redundancy or 'natural attrition' (Donaldson, 2015). This includes loss of climate-specific expertise (ODE, 2018). Aid program reporting also became more integrated with DFAT's other workstreams – for example, where AusAID annual reports were initially provided separately, the development program was later integrated in DFAT's Annual report, under '*Outcome 1: Foreign policy, trade and international development'*.[30] Following overtake by DFAT, in addition to the core policy noted above, a raft of new thematic policy was released in 2014 and 2015.[31]

8.1. Core Policies

The 'strategic framework' under which the study period commenced was communicated in a White Paper published by AusAID during the Howard LNP period (1996-2007)[32]. It dealt with climate change primarily in the context of economic growth, situating adaptation as a method for dealing with 'environmental challenges to growth' (AusAID, 2006, p. xii). However, the first overarching development program policy published during the study period was *An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results*, established in 2011 under the Gillard Labor government. This policy explains that:

> *'The fundamental purpose of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty. This also serves Australia's national interests by promoting stability and prosperity both in our region and beyond. We focus our effort in areas where Australia can make a difference and where our resources can most effectively and efficiently be deployed' (AusAID, 2011, p. 1).*

This policy mentions climate change 29 times (26 explicitly) and has a section treating climate change as a development challenge. It lists 'reducing the negative impacts of climate change and other environmental factors on poor people' as one of its ten development objectives (p. 4, 10), in support of 'sustainable economic development' (p. 4). It refers to some justice issues, including support for adaptation in LDCs and SIDS (p. 35) and focusing fast-start finance (FSF) on vulnerable countries (p. 36).

A new aid policy was released in 2014, under the freshly elected Abbott Liberal government – *Australian Aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability.* This policy was published by DFAT following the absorption of AusAID into the Department. It mentions "climate change" only once, or three times if only "climate" is searched, including one reference to "climate variability" and another to "climate-related disasters" (pp. 14, 23). It indicates that:

> *'…In line with our global responsibilities, Australia will respond promptly and effectively to humanitarian disasters. In our own region, we will pursue a number of measures to build the*

[30] DFAT Annual Reports are included in the corpus in their entirety for this reason. Due to poor PDF quality, DFAT Annual Reports from 2009-2010 to 2012-2013 had to be excluded from the corpus. However, AusAID Annual Reports from this era, which are more relevant to the development program in any case, were included.

[31] Given the timing, AusAID documents can be broadly attributed to the Labor government, while DFAT publications span both Labor and LNP eras. An index of examined documents with year and document type can be found in Annex 7.

[32] *Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability* (AusAID, 2006)

resilience of countries, communities and the most disadvantaged members of communities to future disasters and shocks. We will…work with countries in the region to build resilience to climate-related shocks and manage the impacts of climate change'. (p. 24)

No reference is made to climate finance, mitigation, or adaptation (though there is to resilience). The quote above can be interpreted as referring to climate vulnerability ("the most disadvantaged…"), though this is ambiguous.

The most recent core policy was published by DFAT in 2020, after the study period. Entitled *Partnerships for Recovery: Australia's COVID-19 Development response,* it reshapes the program in view of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 30 pages, it mentions climate change transiently on five occasions, primarily in the context of security and stability, at one stage classifying 'the climatic threat' as 'an underlying security vulnerability' for Pacific Island countries (p. 5). It also notes that climate resilient infrastructure will be funded by the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility (AIFFP) and lists adaptation as a factor for *resilience*, under Tier 1 – *the Indo-Pacific development context* – of the 'context and results of Australia's Development Program' (p. 29). It lists the Pacific as a focus region and its core objective as:

'Australia will partner with the Indo-Pacific in responding to and recovering from COVID-19, in support of our region's—and our own—security and economic recovery.' (p. 8)

It refers to 'protecting the most vulnerable, especially women and girls', but makes no link between these groups and climate change anywhere in the document. It makes no reference to climate finance nor to the *Climate Change Action Strategy* released the year prior (see p. 37).

8.2. 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper

The Foreign Policy White Paper was released by DFAT in 2017 under Turnbull[33]. It 'sets out a comprehensive framework to advance Australia's security and prosperity in a contested and competitive world' (DFAT, 2017, p. 7). The document describes Australia's approach to several foreign policy topics, including climate change, the development program, and the Pacific. It mentions climate change on slightly more than 40 occasions (29 explicitly) over 122 pages. Once again, this paper deals with climate change primarily in the context of security and economy, arguing that 'countries will need to factor [it] into long-term planning and investment, including its implications for national and regional security,' and that 'changing environmental conditions' are leading to 'economic, environmental and security risks' (p. 84). It similarly notes that climate change compounds the pressures of food, energy, and water demand, which can limit future prosperity, and contribute to conflict and displacement (p. 94). It notes the increasing impact of climate change on SIDS, relating to economic development, displacement, and food and water supply stress (p. 33).

It further states that 'Australia has comprehensive policies to reduce domestic emissions while maintaining our economic competitiveness' and refers to its still-contemporary target of a 26-28% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 2005 levels (p. 84-85). Notably, it takes pains to emphasise shared (though not differentiated) responsibility, noting that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, require 'action by both developed and developing parties.' (p. 85). It indicates that 'Australia will work in partnership with developed and developing countries to take effective action on climate change.' It notes that 'responding to climate change will continue to be a priority for Australia's development assistance', describing its AUD 1 billion investment over five years 'to support developing countries to reduce their emissions and build resilience to climate change.' (p. 85-87). It also makes note of its investment in 'regional disaster preparedness to help save lives, minimise economic loss and enable communities to recover more quickly' (p. 87).

When describing its development cooperation (though not climate finance), the paper cited a differentiated capacity notion of justice, linking relative wealth to responsibility to provide aid:

[33] Other relevant White Papers such as the 2012 *Australia in the Asian Century* and the 2016 Defence White Paper were published during the study period, however as these were not published by either AusAID or DFAT they are excluded from the corpus

'…as a prosperous *country, Australia has a* responsibility *to contribute to global efforts to reduce poverty, alleviate suffering and promote sustainable development' (p. 87, author's emphasis).*

It made pains, however, to link provision to Australia's interest, particularly as it relates to security:

'This also serves our interests because the more that countries can provide economic opportunity for their citizens the more stable they will be. They will be less vulnerable to challenges such as irregular migration and extremism. In an interconnected world, investing in the development of other countries helps to limit negative impacts on our own security.' (p. 87)

The paper also makes links between economic growth and poverty reduction – for example, indicating that 'Australia will use its overseas development assistance, including through aid for trade, to catalyse sustained and inclusive economic growth to help reduce poverty.' (p. 88)

The White Paper devotes an entire chapter – entitled 'A shared agenda for security and prosperity' – to Australia's relationship with 'Papua New Guinea, other Pacific Island countries and Timor–Leste,' whose 'stability and economic progress… is of fundamental importance to Australia' (p. 99). It describes these countries as 'neighbours' with 'long-standing and enduring' ties linked to migration, education, and history (p. 99). It notes that most countries in the region face acute development challenges that 'hamper economic growth', including small formal economies, distance from major markets, high costs, and rapidly growing populations (p. 99). It notes that 'governance and capacity constraints' limit service delivery and make it difficult to respond to inter alia natural disaster and climate change (p. 99). Once again, these challenges are situated in relation to Australian security, 'expos[ing] Australia to increased threats, which our cooperation helps to mitigate' (p. 99).

Within this Pacific chapter, a section is allocated to 'climate change, resilience, and a strengthened response to disasters' (p. 104). This section frames Australia's climate support to the region as 'strengthen[ing] the capacity of the Pacific, particularly low-lying atoll states, to respond to climate change' (p. 104). It lists support such as (AUD) '$300 million over four years to provide climate science and data and other support to help our partners plan for and adapt to climate change and mitigate its impacts', leveraging funding from multilateral banks in critical infrastructure, and improving access to the GCF, 'to which Australia has contributed $200 million' (p. 104). It devotes two paragraphs to capacity building in DRR, response, and management.

8.3. Climate-relevant policy and strategy

The first climate-relevant policy of the study period was *Integration in Practice: Integrating disaster risk reduction, climate change, and environmental considerations into AusAID programs*, published in October 2010, partially in support of an earlier DRR policy.[34] This publication provided advice for integration of DRR, climate and environmental considerations into projects. It makes only minimal reference to climate change mitigation and adaptation, rather treating climate change, DRR and environment as a cross-cutting issues for other sectors. It does however begin the policy with reference to vulnerability and engagement with relevant international platforms including the UNFCCC. It situates climate change as a barrier to poverty reduction (the main target of the development program). Though it referred to international policy dialogue and negotiations through the UNFCCC, it did not make explicit reference to the Copenhagen Accord or the requirement to provide climate finance. The policy listed commitment to the *OECD Declaration on Integrating Climate Adaptation into Development Co-operation* (2006) as a driver for integration of climate change into the development assistance program.

The *Environment Protection Policy for the Aid Program* released in 2014 only mentions climate change once, when describing the UNFCCC as a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) among others of 'relevance to the environment in Australia's aid program' (p. 10). While signature of relevant MEAs is listed as a justification for this policy (p. 2), no reference is made to updated climate obligations under the UNFCCC, nor to climate finance. Related 'good practice notes' were published

[34] *Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction policy for the Australian aid program* (2009).

on the DFAT website with some mention of climate change in four of 15 documents (Table 5).[35] This includes one brief reference to mitigation, one to vulnerability, and several to adaptation. There is no good practice note dedicated to climate change.

Table 5: Manual analysis of Good Practice Notes attached to the *Environmental Protection Policy for the Aid Program (2014)*

Document	*Reference to climate change*
1.2 How to manage pollutions and emissions	No reference to the link between emissions and climate change. One reference to the IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories as 'good practice guidance' for environmental assessments.
2.4 How to assess environmental risks to an aid activity	Refers to the climate change as a source of environmental risk. Refers to integrating climate change adaptation and mitigation considerations as a way of reducing risk, increasing resilience, and protecting natural resources as drivers of economic growth. Advises that 'Australian aid activity must comply with partner country legal frameworks for natural disasters and climate change'. Notes Australia was a signatory to the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015* which entailed some work on climate change in the context of natural disasters. Refers to climate vulnerability (locations and sectors, presumably economic. Not to populations). Refers to climate modelling and adaptation guidelines for risk assessment
2.5 How to manage environmental risks	One reference to climate risks and disaster resilience in an example of a risk mitigation strategy.
2.6 How to conduct a strategic assessment	One reference to climate adaptation: 'In deciding whether to endorse a program under a strategic assessment, the Minister will consider the extent to which the program is consistent with the objectives of the EPBC Act, in that it… demonstrates adaptation to reasonable climate change scenarios.' No indication of what is meant by 'reasonable'.

Source: Author's analysis based on Good Practice Notes for the Environmental Protection Policy for DFAT's aid program (DFAT via NLA, 2015)

Following signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015, there was reportedly 'renewed focus' on climate change in the development program (ODE, 2018). In 2017, DFAT commissioned an evaluation of Australia's past climate finance investments (see p. 40) (ODE, 2018). Plans were made to develop a climate change strategy, to be released in 2018 (ODE, 2018). In 2019, DFAT published its *Climate Change Action Strategy 2020-2025* (CCAS). This is the first strategy dealing explicitly with climate change since the 2010 AusAID policy, and the first published by DFAT. It is also the first to deal with climate change as a stand-alone issue, a decade after Copenhagen. This policy outlines relevant aspects of the international climate regime, stating that 'Australia looks to, and engages with, the rules-based international order to address complex global challenges such as climate change.' (p. 10). This section includes reference to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, noting that the latter 'recognises the need for an effective response to the threat of climate change' and constitutes 'a commitment by donor countries to provide support for climate action to developing countries in need' (p. 10). It refers to the USD 100 billion target, citing the need to draw funds from diverse sources and refers to multilateral funds including the GCF, and LDC Fund, and the Adaptation Fund (p. 10), though at the time of publication, Australia had withdrawn from GCF funding, a fact noted in the policy (p. 14). It again noted Australia's unchanged emissions reduction commitments, describing them as 'in step with the efforts of other developed countries' (p. 7), though provided no context for this claim.

It was noted that this policy was drawn up in response to relevant evaluations of the aid program by the Office of Development Effectiveness and the OECD (see ODE (2018) and OECD (2018), and Section 8.5. p. 40), and that it is 'informed by and implements' the 2014 core policy, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, and the SDGs (p. 3). As with the White Paper, this policy includes language around

[35] Like the earlier mainstreaming policy, the Good Practice Notes were directed at DFAT staff etc. involved in delivering Australia's aid program. These good practice notes were advised to be read in conjunction with an external publication: *Actions on, or impacting upon, Commonwealth, land and actions by Commonwealth agencies Significant impact guidelines 1.2* (Australian Government Department of Agriculture, 2013). Those guidelines make no reference to climate change. The Good Practice Notes were consolidated into six documents in May 2016 (remaining current as of writing), as follows: (1) Do no harm; (2) Assess and manage environmental risks and impacts; (3) Disclose information transparently; (4) Consult stakeholders; (5) Work with partners; (6) Promote improved environmental outcomes. Principle (2) is the only document that mentions climate change, primarily in the context of DRR. See DFAT (2016).

'continuing' work already underway and situates climate change in the context of security and economy. It also refers to vulnerable groups, including women and girls, people with disability, and indigenous people. It labels climate change impacts as an 'existential threat' to Pacific atoll nations (p. 2). It refers to relevant Pacific agreements such as the Boe Declaration and the Kainaki II Declaration. It notes that 'adaptation, disaster risk and resilience building' will need to be 'further integrate(ed)' and refers to the integration approach outlined in DFAT's humanitarian strategy, a potential reference to mainstreaming though this term is not used (p. 22). It describes potential for mitigation support including for renewable energies, energy efficiency, infrastructure, and 'clean technologies for fossil fuels' like carbon capture and storage (CCS), the latter of which had not been previously mentioned in development program environmental policy (p. 9, 28).

8.3.1. Other relevant climate materials

Four progress reports regarding Australia's provisions of fast-start climate finance (FSF) were published in 2010 and 2011. These reports make the most consistent and explicit references to climate justice indicators of any of the documents. These include references to inter alia balance between mitigation and adaptation; certainty, predictability, and transparency; additionality, noting explicitly that 'funding draws from a growing aid budget. It does not displace funding from existing aid programs' (December 2010, p. 1); grant-based finance; targeting of adaptation finance to LDCs and SIDS; vulnerability, including vulnerability of SIDS; capacity challenges and capacity building; improving access to climate finance; prioritisation of the Adaptation Fund by developing countries; and future finance and the USD 100 billion target. The reports note that the Pacific is 'a primary focus' of Australia's FSF and describes several climate programs in Pacific SIDS. There does not appear to be any other reporting exclusively dealing with climate finance provided by the aid program.

The *climate change communications materials* comprise a series of posters describing climate-related development projects financed by Australia, as well as well as some short descriptive documents of selected climate-relevant activities including the *Australia Pacific Climate Change Action Program*, bilateral programs for each Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, and a common informational brochure about activities in Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau (the 'North Pacific'). Some of these materials reference, variously, vulnerability, improving access to finance, capacity building, multilateral mechanisms like the GCF, national and regional climate and development strategies, adaptation for children, and gender and social inclusion.

8.4. Pacific regional policy

The Pacific consistently held a strong place in the development program throughout the study period. This was evidenced by several documents devoted to regional policy as well as bilateral partnerships[36] and programs. The first relevant document from the corpus was *Australia's regional aid program to the Pacific: 2011-2015,* published by AusAID in December 2010. This document mentioned climate change on seven occasions. It describes Pacific SIDS' vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters as a 'condition of fragility that contributes to a complex and difficult development environment' (AusAID, 2010, p. 4) and refers to Pacific engagement in international fora relating to climate change in the context of Australia's Pacific regionalism approach (p. 5, 11). It also notes that increased climate finance, especially for adaptation, and the increase in donors after Copenhagen could represent a 'key risk to the quality and value of regional activities' through 'proliferation and fragmentation' (p. 9). The program referred to decisions made by the PIF including vis-à-vis access and management of climate finance (p. 9).

In 2015 and 2016, a variety of *Aid Investment Plans* (AIPs) up to 2019 or 2020 for the regional program and for bilateral programs with PSIDS were published. These AIPs varied considerably in detail, with some only four pages long (FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, and RMI), and the longest 21 pages (PNG). The *Regional* AIP, dated 2015-16 to 2018-19, mentions climate change on 12

[36] Bilateral partnership documents were excluded from the corpus due to incompatibility with analysis software.

occasions, in the context of resilience (p. 7) and improving access to the GCF (p. 7, 8, 12). The only performance benchmark listed in this plan that related to climate change was:

> *'Pacific Island countries effectively manage global sources of climate finance:*
> *Increased Green Climate Fund finances allocated to Pacific region: USD 10 million.'*

This target was marked as *achieved* the 2015-2016 *Aid Program Progress Report* (APPR) for the regional program (p. 19), and *partially achieved* in 2016-2017 (p. 29). Between 2015 and 2018, Australia provided USD 139 million to the GCF, but abruptly ceased providing funding in 2018 (Donor Tracker, n.d.). The benchmark for climate change was altered in subsequent APPRs, becoming, '*Pacific island countries are able to meet the challenge of climate change and risk reduction'* from the Regional APPR of 2017-2018.

Around the time of AIP publication, language also emerged around Australia's 'Pacific Step-Up'. It has been described as 'one of Australia's highest foreign policy priorities' (DFAT, 2021), though it is not accompanied by a dedicated policy document. It was first announced at the PIF Leaders' Meeting in September 2016 by Malcom Turnbull and some detail is available in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, described above (p. 36) (DFAT, 2021; DFAT, 2017). Therein, the concept was presented as follows:

> *'To pursue common interests and respond to the region's fundamental challenges, Australia will engage with the Pacific with greater intensity and ambition, deliver more integrated and innovative policy and make further, substantial long-term investments in the region's development. We will look to test new ideas and adopt the most practical means to strengthen regional cooperation and integration. Some initiatives will commence bilaterally, allowing new measures to be trialled.' (p. 101).*

A description of climate-related discourse under this banner was made above (p. 36).

The '*Pacific regional – climate change and resilience'* webpage (DFAT via NLA, 2019) described climate financing commitments made to the Pacific, referring to bilateral commitments and providing examples of regional projects like the Australia Pacific Climate Partnership. Reference was also made to the *Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific* (AIFFP), which is administered by the Office of the Pacific in DFAT (see Section 9.2.1. p. 46 for more detail). Notably, the webpage also refers to the following PIF declaration:

> *'Pacific island countries reaffirmed the strategic and economic threat climate change poses to our region through the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum Kainaki Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action, which Australia's Prime Minister joined other Pacific Island Forum Leaders in issuing. This is the strongest collective statement Pacific Island Forum Leaders have ever issued on climate change.' (DFAT via NLA, 2019)*

Australia was notoriously criticised for its reticence on climate change at this forum (Clarke, 2019). Australia did not endorse all the stipulations proposed by leaders (Clarke, 2019). An alternative declaration was produced by the Smaller Island States Group for the same forum, while the *Nadi Bay Declaration on the Climate Change Crisis in the Pacific* was released in 2019 by the Pacific Island Development Forum, which excludes Australia and New Zealand (Clarke, 2019; O'Keefe, 2019). Both statements include stronger language on climate change (Clarke, 2019; O'Keefe, 2019).

8.5. Australia's Development Programme Monitoring and Evaluation

Note should be made of two evaluation documents in view of their influence on the subsequently released *CCAS* (see p. 37): the 2018 DAC Peer Review of Australian Development Assistance, and '*Investing in the future: evaluation of Australia's Climate Change Assistance*' conducted by the ODE in 2018[37].

[37] These documents are not included in the corpus, see Section 6.1.1. , p. 34.

The former recommended that 'Australia should increase the focus and level of ODA allocated to the environment and climate as part of a broad mainstreaming strategy', in response to the following critique:

> *'As its reporting against policy markers shows, Australia has yet to clearly articulate an approach to mainstreaming the environment and climate in its aid programme beyond a safeguards approach. There does not appear to be a strategic approach to mainstreaming the environment and climate across the programme that is backed by sufficient capacity and resources, despite recognition that these issues are risks for security and prosperity in the Pacific.' (OECD, 2018, p. 24)*

This is notably in comparison to the note provided in the 2013 review:

> *'AusAID has made some progress with integrating environment and climate change into the aid programme. Reducing the negative impacts of climate change and other environmental factors is now one of the ten specific objectives of Australia's development policy. AusAID can build on this progress by outlining clearly its strategic priorities for mainstreaming the environment at all levels, from strategic management and programme design right down to implementation.' (OECD 2013, p. 15).*

This recommendation appears to have gone unaddressed between this review and that of 2018.

The latter 2018 evaluation was an assessment by ODE of the situation of climate change in Australia's development program, the first to be conducted despite Australia's provision of public climate finance throughout and prior to the study period. This review made some key criticisms of Australia's approach, noting that 'DRR and climate elements of [Australian aid] policy mainly target existing extreme weather and climate variability and are only loosely connected to future climate change' (p. 58). It also noted that, 'in comparison to many other donors, climate change does not feature strongly in Australia's aid policy', and that, at the time the review was completed 'no substantive overarching climate change strategy or policy clearly articulates Australia's climate change goals, objectives or specific targets against which performance can be assessed' (p. 57). It praised 'innovative fast-start partnerships and modes of implementation', noting they were not pursued after 2013 (p. 1). It also praised linkages that have been made between climate and DRR and partner country priorities as well as Australia's 'development first approach' for some investments, such as the Pacific Risk Resilience Program (p. 2). The evaluation made note of Australia's climate work in the Pacific.[38]

The ODE was abolished in 2020, to be replaced by a dedicated internal department within DFAT. This department reportedly has a smaller staff and will focus on project-level evaluations rather than global evaluations of the development program (Howes, 2020; Galloway, 2020). There has been limited justification given for this decision, which has been subject to criticism, though it is as yet too early to appraise. Independent and transparent monitoring and evaluation are important for the just provision of development assistance. ODE publications do not feature in the below analysis, but its abolition should be considered as important context when reflecting on the implications of findings on the future of the development program. It should also be noted that no subsequent evaluation of the CCAS to see if it aligns with the ODE's (or the DAC's) recommendations could be found on the DFAT website.

[38] Several other evaluations were conducted by the ODE of specific development interventions in the Pacific, though none on climate change.

9. Combining datasets: Australian discourse and development finance in view of climate justice indicators

Keeping in mind the timeline and patterns of discourse in key documentation described above, I now turn to examination of discourse and official development finance (ODF) disbursement based on the established datasets (p. 25) over the study period. This section examines the broad situation of climate change in both ODF and discourse, before subsequent sections consider the data according to additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds, Australia's 'fair share' performance against donor peers and identified benchmarks, and climate mainstreaming and policy coherence (see p. 9).

9.1. The broad situation of climate change and the Pacific in Australia's development program

The first step to understand the way Australia approaches climate change and PSIDS in its development program is to determine the quantity of finance provided, and the incidence of "climate change" in its discourse, both independently and in relation to the Pacific. This provides context for later analysis according to climate justice indicators.

Between 2010 and 2019, Australia reported USD 30.75 billion in ODF, including USD 9.47 billion (31%) to PSIDS (Figure 5). Of its total ODF, 12%, or USD 3.75 billion, was marked as climate ODF (CODF). Similarly, 13% of the finance received by PSIDS, USD 1.26 billion, was dedicated to climate projects. Change over time will be considered in the next section (see Figure 14, p. 51).

Figure 5: Share of total Australian (C)ODF, 2010-2019, to PSIDS



Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data

Meanwhile, of the 187 documents examined in this research, 148 have at least one reference to the term "climate change", and 172 to the term "Pacific". Incidence of "climate change" changed considerably over time, with a large drop in 2014, to a low of only 3 per document mentions on average in 2015 (Figure 6). This coincides with the noted (p. 35, 37) lack of reference to climate change in both core policy and environmental policy that emerged in the period following AusAID's amalgamation (Section 8.3. , p. 37).

Interestingly, while broadly incidence does not change if climate documents are excluded, there is a slight dip in 2010, and in 2019 the trend is considerably different. A single climate document was released in the latter year, the *Climate Change Action Strategy 2020-2025* (CCAS) (see p. 37). If this document is excluded from the corpus, mentions of "climate change" trend downward. This speaks to a potential lack of climate mainstreaming across the larger corpus for that year. As noted, the core policy released after the study period makes limited reference to climate change and no reference to the CCAS (Section 8.1. p., 35).

Figure 6: Average incidence of the term "climate change" per year, 2010-2019



Note: Green markers indicate years with climate documents.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus.

Over the period, 101 corpus documents were dedicated to PSIDS, either regionally or to specific recipients. The largest number per year were published in 2015 (20) and 2018 (19). This included several AIPs and APPRs across this period, as well as the nine climate-related communications documents published in 2018. In the period up to 2013, discourse on climate change in PSIDS documents was expanding (Figure 7, Panel A). Once again, a considerable dip in references can be seen in 2014 and 2015, before an abrupt increase in 2016. In 2019, almost no reference was made to "climate change" in PSIDS documents (primarily APPRs for 2019-2020).

Figure 7: Linking "climate change" and PSIDS



Note: Panel A: No PSIDS documents in 2009. Panel B: green markers indicate years with climate documents; term "Pacific" used to expand possible reference pool, as "SIDS" and other relevant classifiers are not consistently used.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus.

Though it differs from Panel A, Panel B generally mirrors the pattern seen in Figure 6. There is a different pattern up until 2013 in the link between climate change and PSIDS across the corpus. Again, a drop in 2014 and 2015 and an increase in 2016 can be seen. The large increase in 2019 can once again be explained by the CCAS, which had 100 references – without this document, incidence falls to 3.9. Post-2015 growth seems to indicate an increase in discourse linking PSIDS and climate change in the latter half of the decade, though 2019 presents a problematic case. It should also be noted that there is no major growth in discourse surrounding the Pacific over the same period (not pictured).[39]

9.2. Distributional climate justice indicators in view of commitments made under international climate agreements

This section will examine the findings according to the indicators identified in regime commitments: additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention to the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, and the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds (Section 3.2.1. p.13).

9.2.1. Calculating additionality

One of the key measures of the justness of climate finance, frequently referenced (e.g., Carty et al. (2020)), is its additionality – or more broadly, that it be 'scaled up, new and additional, predictable, and adequate' (United Nations, 2009, p. 3). Part of this involved the commitment to collectively provide FSF 'approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012' (United Nations, 2009, p. 3). Australia disbursed AUD 599 million in FSF between 2010 and 2013, and as noted (p. 39), reported on four occasions on the provision of this finance within the corpus, including reference to its additionality (see p. 39) (ODE, 2018; AusAID, December 2010).[40] Documents in this period made specific reference to the intention to scale up finance e.g., beyond 2012 towards the USD 100 billion goal (AusAID, November 2011, p. 1). On the other hand, policy introduced in 2014 argued that a consolidation of the aid program to 'fewer, larger investments will increase the impact and effectiveness of [Australia's] aid' (DFAT, 2014, p. 29), though it fails to explain why this would be the case. This would not necessarily impede the *additionality* of finance if overall funds were also 'scaled up' – however, as demonstrated below, this was not the case.

(i) Additionality in real numbers

At the start of the decade, Australia's ODF was on the rise – growing by USD 575 million up until 2013. However, from 2014 onward it went into a relatively steep decline, dropping to a low of USD 2.19 billion in 2017. In 2019 it had fallen by 26% from its 2013 peak. Similarly, while CODF almost doubled between 2010 and 2011 to USD 466 million, it did not exceed the high of 2011 until 2019, when it reported USD 516 million. CODF made up between 8% and 15% of Australia's ODF between 2010 and 2018, jumping to 19% in 2019.

PSIDS' share of total ODF stayed between 26-36% throughout the period. While Australia reoriented its development program towards the Indo-Pacific (DFAT, 2014; DFAT, 2017), overall ODF received PSIDS did not actually expand in real terms. PSIDS' share of CODF oscillated between 18% and 32% between 2010 and 2016, before rising abruptly to 49% in 2017, and to a high of 52% in 2019, when it also rose in real terms. Of the ODF received by PSIDS, CODF varied between 6% and 22% until 2019, when it jumped to 41%. Refer to Figure 8 below.

[39] However, the emergence of the concept of the "Indo-Pacific" from 2014 onwards can be clearly seen. Though incidence was much lower (less than one per document on average), this period also saw growth in language such as "Pacific neighbour" and "Pacific family", specifically in the 2019 *DFAT Annual Report* (4 and 2 instances respectively).

[40] Other reports were made, e.g., to the UNFCCC, but these are not included in the corpus.

Figure 8: Total Australian ODF 2010-2019, with share to Pacific and CODF



	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Non-climate ODF	2881	2830	3271	3347	2798	2761	2333	2192	2341	2245
Total climate ODF	264	466	457	373	302	342	403	330	300	516
PSIDS non-climate ODF	954	859	851	870	777	863	841	728	819	644
PSIDS climate ODF	56	145	107	84	54	117	128	163	143	266
PSIDS total ODF	1010	1005	958	954	831	980	969	891	962	910
Total ODF	3145	3296	3729	3720	3100	3102	2736	2522	2641	2761

Note: Figures in USD millions
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data

While there was an additional USD 252 million in yearly CODF provided in 2019 compared to 2010, there was a reduction of USD 636 million in yearly non-climate ODF over the same period[41]. This amounts to USD 384 million less in total ODF. The overall decline in ODF – and the fact that the uptick in CODF would need to be more than doubled to even break even on the reduction in non-climate ODF – indicates that the climate finance provided cannot be considered as additional to the existing development program. Similarly, there is a USD 100 million deficit in the case of PSIDS, with USD 310 million reduction in non-climate ODF, and a USD 210 million increase in CODF.

Considering the change in approach and difference in rhetoric from 2014 onwards (from acknowledging additionality to intent to consolidate), data between these periods can be compared. Between 2010 and 2013, non-climate ODF increased by USD 466 million, and CODF by USD 109 million – climate finance thereby making up part of the "additional" finance disbursed by Australia in that time. On the other hand, between 2014 and 2019, non-climate ODF decreased by USD 553 million, and CODF increased by USD 214 million – a deficit of USD 339 million before breaking even. Within the bounds of the finance provided, PSIDS received USD 133 million ODF less in 2019 than in 2014, but USD 212 million more in CODF. Between 2010 and 2013, there was a deficit of USD 56 million for PSIDS between the reduction in non-climate ODF received by PSIDS and their increase in CODF.

[41] Note that these calculations and those following do not account for differences in the years between the beginning and end of respective periods. Calculations are based on yearly disbursements in line with the international commitment to provide USD 100 billion *per year*.

(ii) Grants vs. Loans

In addition to considering provision of ODF over time, numerous authors (e.g., Carty et al. (2020), Maclellan & Meads (2016)) also consider the use of grants as a measure of additionality (the use of grant-based resources for adaptation itself also a requirement). In Australia's case, all CODF, including to PSIDS, over the decade was in the form of grants. In fact, of the ODF provided to all recipients between 2010 and 2019, 99% was provided in the form of grants, 1% in the form of loans, and 0.2% in the form of debt forgiveness. This is consistent with emphasis placed in relevant climate agreements on grant-based climate finance, as well as that given by other authors on the 'additional' nature of grant-based CODF.

However, it should be noted that while Australia did not provide loans through its development program, it is now delivering on its 'Pacific Step-Up' rhetoric through loan finance provided by Export Finance Australia (EFA) (see p. 74), including via the *Australian Infrastructure Finance Facility in the Pacific* (AIFFP). This latter initiative, announced by Morrison in November 2018 and operational since July 2019, allows Australia to 'partner with Pacific governments and the private sector to design high impact, safeguarded projects and enable their delivery through up to AUD 1.5 billion in loan financing and up to AUD 500 million in grants' (DFAT, n.d.). It has a dedicated 'Climate Infrastructure Window' and claims to ensure 'that all investments consider and respond to climate change risks and impacts, and opportunities for low-emission, climate-resilient development are maximised', in line with the *CCAS* (DFAT, n.d.). A search of the projects reported to the OECD showed up a single project financed under this facility – a USD 104 million grant to the Timor-Leste Telecommunications Submarine Cable, a project described as being valued at '1.5 million' (presumably AUD) to be delivered 'through a blend of grant and loan'. This project was not marked as CODF. Considering administration of the EFA by DFAT and mention of the AIFFP in the CCAS, it is unclear why the loan part of this project was not reported via Australia's development program, nor why it did not receive a *significant* marker in view of alignment with the CCAS[42]. Inclusion of loan finance in reporting over the study period or in the future would of course change the share of grants.

9.2.2. Predictability

In addition to being 'scaled up, new and additional', finance should also be 'predictable'. *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (OECD, 2005, p. 1) identified 'failure to provide more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows to committed partner countries' as a challenge, indicating that these are an accepted indicator of predictability of ODF flows. Australia has endorsed the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005, p. 12). By firstly focusing on the Pacific, we can examine multi-year commitments made by Australia in the corpus. Subsequently, for funds disbursed to the broader recipient set, both the consistency in the type of projects received, and the consistency of recipients engaged in the program can be considered.

(i) A sample of multi-year commitments in the Pacific

All PSIDS received CODF every year except Wallis & Futuna (Figure 9). In the Pacific, Australia has published multi-year funding plans. For example, the corpus includes several Aid Investment Plans (AIPs) that span multiple years (2015-2016 to 2018-2019 and 2016-2017 to 2019-2020). Almost all these AIPS mentioned "climate change", except for PNG, Timor Leste and Samoa (published 2015). This is surprising, considering the growth in Australian CODF to PSIDS from 2015 onwards is largely explained by growth in CODF to PNG. All other AIPs mentioned the term between one and three times, except for that of Tuvalu, which mentioned it on 14 occasions. This is also surprising, as the AIP for Tuvalu was published in 2016, yet disbursements to Tuvalu peaked in 2015, staying between USD 0.67-2 million in the years following.

[42]There were no progress reports or the like available on the AIFFP website at the time of writing (March 2022). Start dates for projects were unclear from the website. Whether such finance will be reported from 2020 onwards is not clear based on data analysed.

Figure 9: Receipt of Australian CODF, by PSIDS recipient, 2010-2019



Notes: LDC; atoll^*
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

Data in Figure 9 also shows that while PSIDS tended to receive CODF, this is not in consistent quantities (given the variation over time), nor can scaling up be expected for all recipients (given growth to the region overall is explained by growth to PNG).

(ii) Predictability of project type

After 2010, Australia reduced considerably its number of development projects, instead leaning towards less, higher-value projects (Figure 10). For CODF, this trend was abruptly undone by a spike in the number of projects in 2019, when the accompanying ODF increase was not proportional. Over the decade, the average value per climate project in PSIDS was USD 750,000, considerably above that of non-Pacific SIDS (USD 135,000) but below that of non-SIDS states (USD 986,000). Values for the former and latter groups both spiked and troughed in a similar fashion to that shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Value per (C)ODF project and number of projects over time, 2010-2019



Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

The large number of CODF projects in 2010 coincides with Australia's FSF investments. The consolidation of the aid program in 2014 to 'fewer, larger investments' (p. 29) can be seen in the figures, though the average value per project actually shrank over time. The jump in value of projects in 2016 follows the Paris Agreement and takeover of the LNP by Turnbull. The abrupt jump in the number of CODF projects in 2019 appears to coincide with the release of the *CCAS,* and with the noted reporting anomaly (p. 30). Notably, over the period, while the number of CODF projects fell by 87% to its lowest point in 2016, the amount of CODF did not expand by the same proportion. In short, a focus on higher-value projects did not coincide with a proportionate expansion of CODF provided. Note that the large number of projects in 2010 are mitigation projects, which were considerably scaled back from 2011 onwards (see Section 9.2.3. , p. 49). While there were considerably more non-climate ODF projects than CODF projects, the average value per project over the decade of non-climate projects (USD 657 000) was lower than that of climate projects (USD 880 000). Critically, the value per project of non-climate projects stayed more stable over time. The difference in regularity over time between ODF and CODF indicates that, in comparison to non-climate ODF, CODF is less predictable in terms of quantity and value of projects.

(iii) Predictability for recipient

There was a similar difference between ODF and CODF predictability in terms of recipients. The number of Australian ODF recipients did not fluctuate massively over the period, increasing slightly after 2010 and dropping to its subsequent lowest point of 137 recipients in 2019 (Figure 11). The proportion receiving CODF, however, fluctuated more significantly, with consistently more than 50, and up to 89 ODF recipients missing out on CODF. The proportion had been growing, reaching 67% in 2013, before dropping sharply in 2014 – from 103 to 69 recipients – and continuing to fall to a low of 38% in 2017. It then abruptly increased from 29% in 2018 to 50% in 2019. This was accompanied by a jump in the number of recipients receiving a higher number (>10) of CODF interventions within the year, which after 2010 had stayed below twenty, falling to a low of three recipients in 2016 (including regional recipients and *bilateral (unspecified)*). Trends in CODF have been less stable than for ODF overall. In short, for several Australian ODF recipients and projects, receipt of CODF has not been consistent, with many apparently receiving it sparingly or losing their access over time.

Figure 11: Proportion of Australian ODF recipients receiving CODF, by year, 2010-2019



Notes: Percentages figures refer to percentage of recipients receiving CODF; other figures refer to number of ODF recipients not receiving CODF
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

9.2.3. A balance between adaptation and mitigation

International climate agreements also ask that climate finance 'be balanced between adaptation and mitigation', in view in part of the larger emphasis placed globally on mitigation (United Nations, 2009, p. 3; Buchner, et al., 2019). Within Australia's climate finance, there appears to be a relatively strong focus on adaptation, inversely to the detriment of mitigation projects. For PSIDS, an emphasis on adaptation is broadly logical, given they contribute minutely to global GHG emissions but will be strongly impacted by climate change, though there are other rationales for investing in mitigation (such as energy security or ocean conservation).

The majority of CODF both in total and to PSIDS was dedicated to projects marked *mixed (significant)*, followed by *adaptation (significant)* (Figure 12). In total, 31% of CODF went to adaptation, though this jumps to a potential 87% if mixed projects are included (Panel A). Only 5% was directed *principally* to adaptation. Proportionally, PSIDS received slightly less finance for adaptation (29%, vs. 31%) and mitigation (10%, vs. 12%) than the total (Panel B). They instead received more mixed finance (61% vs. 56%), and slightly more *principal* adaptation ODF (AODF) (8%, vs. 5%).

Figure 12: Share of Australian CODF, in total and to PSIDS, 2010-2019, by reclassified marker



Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

While this provides some indication of the overall balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention provided to these issues varied over time in both the discourse and the ODF data. To compare the discourse dealing with climate change adaptation and mitigation, the context of incidences of "climate change" within the corpus was examined. The discourse varied significantly over the study period, though adaptation consistently received more attention than mitigation (Figure 13, Panel A). A higher incidence of discourse dealing with adaptation can be seen at the start of the decade, falling to lows in 2014 and 2015, with some slight bounce back from 2016-2017 onwards (roughly consistent with the incidence pattern of "climate change", (Figure 6, p. 43). When examining the same in PSIDS documents (Panel B), a much more abrupt change is seen between 2013 and 2014, while no instances were noted at all in 2019.

Figure 13: Incidence of "adapt" and "mitigate" within two sentences of "climate change", 2010-2019



Notes: Panel B: No PSIDS documents in 2009.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus.

The trend noted in discourse does not line up cleanly with reported CODF, except in that adaptation received more funds than mitigation, and that both dipped in 2014. Australia did not engage the adaptation marker until 2011, meaning that all CODF was marked as mitigation finance in 2010 (Figure 14). From 2011 onwards, relatively few funds overall were focused exclusively on mitigation, either principally or significantly, and none were in 2019 (Panel A). Instead, total CODF was relatively strongly focused on adaptation over the decade – though, in 2019, 99% of climate projects were marked as *mixed (significant)*. These patterns were also reflected in trends in the Pacific (Panel B). Such an abrupt change in 2019 seems indicative of an anomaly in reporting procedure, corroborated by a note in the OECD's most recent *Development Cooperation Profile* of Australia, that data was only partial due to 'limitations in capturing Rio Marker information', and that the country would 'revise its Rio Marker responses for this period' (OECD, 2020)[43]. The data has since been updated (refer to Section 6.2.3. p. 30). It is unclear why any change in reporting methodology would result in such a stark overtake by *mixed (significant)* projects, so an anomaly in practice seems more likely.

[43] Post-submission note: Updated climate finance data has not been included in Australia's 2021 Development Cooperation Profile (OECD, 2022).

Figure 14: Australian CODF, 2010-2019, by reclassified marker, total and to PSIDS



Notes: Data for 2019 was since been updated in the OECD CRS, see note in Section 6.2.3. , p. 30.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(i) A note on the balance of *principal* funds in view of additionality

Australia's reporting on adaptation and mitigation finance relies heavily on *mixed (significant)* finance – that is, ODF marked as having both adaptation and mitigation objectives, where these are 'explicitly stated but…not the fundamental driver or motivation for undertaking [the activity]'. In other terms, the disbursements reported are for projects that would have taken place whether the climate objective was included or not. It is possible that these projects have been marked with Rio Markers retroactively, another barrier to finance being seen as *additional.* Many see *principal* climate finance – that is, finance that would not have been spent if it weren't for the climate target – as another indicator of additionality, bearing in mind the limitations of these markers and that *significant* projects will have their entire amount attributed to climate change while only a portion may actually be contributing to a climate objective (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019).

Australian ODF that focused *principally* on a climate objective decreased considerably over the decade (Figure 15). Even PSIDS, whose CODF overall increased, saw a decrease in *principal* finance (Panel B). Overall, *principal* adaptation ODF (AODF) fell from 11% of CODF in 2011 to 2% in 2017 and 0.2% in 2018 (Panel A) (see Section 9.2.5. p. 58 for further detail). In PSIDS, this saw a fall from 24%, to, respectively, 3% and 0.3%. The amount fell over time, to a low of USD 33.5 million in 2016. For PSIDS, *principal* CODF made up, respectively, 13% and 2% of the CODF and ODF received in the region. The trend was slightly different to overall recipients, rising again in 2017 and 2018. Overall, the amount of funding devoted *principally* to any marker was just USD 618 million, only 16% of total CODF, or 2% of total ODF over the decade.

Figure 15: Australian principal CODF, 2010-2019, by reclassified marker



Note: Data missing for 2019 due to reporting update.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

Use of the markers varies across DAC donors, in part due to the lack of common reporting methodology (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). Comparing Australia's reporting with that of its peers helps to contextualise its use of the markers in view of this variation in practice. As noted, the majority of Australia's CODF over the decade was marked as *mixed (significant)* – Australia's disbursements under this marker were almost twice the DAC average (Table 6).

Table 6: Australian and DAC average use of Rio Markers (reclassified), total 2010-2019

Climate marker	*Australia (USD millions)*		*DAC Average (USD millions)*	*Australia rank*
Mixed (sig.)	1496.18	>	787.57	4/29
Adaptation (sig.)	1302.62	>	1130.17	7/28
Mixed (princ.)	218.57	<	387.43	7/25
Adaptation (princ.)	189.39	<	395.90	11/29
Mitigation (princ.)	210.83	<	1973.65	13/27
Mitigation (sig.)	269.26	<	964.33	14/27
Mixed	119.10	<	188.74	14/27

Note: This table incorporates the updated 2019 data reported by Australia. See Section 6.2.3. p. 30.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS

At the same time, Australia provided only USD 204 million in *principal* mitigation finance – considerably below the DAC average of USD 1.97 billion. This amounts to 5.5% of its total CODF, and just 0.7% of its total ODF. This is entirely inconsistent with Australia's recent discourse concerning the need for developing countries to reduce their emissions (e.g., DFAT (2017)), particularly considering that much of this figure (51%) was already provided in 2010, primarily to *bilateral (unspecified)* (USD 58.1 million) and Indonesia (USD 36.6 million).[44] Low amounts were provided after this, and none was disbursed in 2016. After 2014, all recipients were PSIDS, while earlier high-emitting recipients, such as China, India, and Brazil, no longer received this kind of finance.

[44] The largest single amounts were provided that year, while smaller amounts were provided to more and varied recipients in 2012 and 2013. Indonesia was the only recipient in 2014 (USD 285 000). All the recipients after 2014 were PSIDS, with Solomon Islands the only recipient in each 2017 and 2018 (receiving around USD 25 million from 2015-2018).

Notably, Australia provided USD 219 million in *principal* mixed finance throughout the study period. It appears to be relatively normal practice for DAC donors to use this marker, with Australia below average though ranking high (7th) amongst its DAC peers (Table 6). Duplicate marking with principal markers should only take place 'upon explicit justification' (OECD, n.d., p. 6), and it poses a considerable double counting risk (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). However, 36% of Australian projects marked in this manner included no reference to the term 'climate' in the long descriptions provided as a part of its OECD reporting (based on Author's manual review of Australian reporting to the OECD, 2010-2019). Critical review of the veracity of Australia's reporting is beyond the scope of this research, however attention should be paid to this issue in view of international commitments relating to robust and transparent reporting, and its importance for the just provision of climate finance (Maclellan & Meads, 2016; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019).

9.2.4. Vulnerability and capacity of recipients

The vulnerability and capacity of recipients is a critical factor to the logic of climate finance provision in the context of the international climate regime (though of course other factors often driven the distribution of development finance, see Section 3.1. p. 11). Several classifiers can be engaged as proxies for vulnerability and capacity constraint – SIDS, LDCs, atolls, GNI, and vulnerability indices.

Australia is the largest provider of both ODF and CODF to PSIDS, who are amongst the most climate-vulnerable ODA recipients. As noted, during the study period Australia re-oriented its development program towards the Indo-Pacific (DFAT, 2014; DFAT, 2017). While overall Australian CODF is not additional over time, and both in total ODF and ODF to PSIDS has shrunk in absolute terms over time PSIDS receipt of CODF grew in both absolute terms and as a proportion of total CODF (per Section 9.2.1. p. 44).

Despite a refocusing of the development program on the Pacific and an expansion in their CODF, there does not appear to have been a corresponding discursive shift towards climate vulnerability (Figure 16). Indeed, while capacity maintained its position in relation to climate change, discourse related to climate vulnerability shrank (Panel A). When looking at PSIDS documents only (Panel B) an inconsistent trend emerges, with little emphasis apparently placed on climate vulnerability before 2013; a now anticipated drop in 2014 and 2015; and more emphasis from 2016 to 2018, before the concept is apparently ignored entirely in 2019, despite there being ten PSIDS documents (APPRs) that year of the same type as preceding years. In addition, while there are clear links made between climate change and islands over time, there is very little corresponding reference made to the "atoll" classification (atolls being especially vulnerable), either in the whole corpus or in PSIDS documents. Eight references in 2013 were found in program budget documents, and four in 2019 in the *CCAS*.

Figure 16: Incidence of select vulnerability-related terms in the context of climate change, 2009-2019





Notes: Panel B: No PSIDS documents in 2009. The largest rise in references to "island" in 2018 corresponds with the publication of several climate communications materials in that year.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus

Every year, PSIDS figured amongst the top recipients for both ODF and CODF. The two largest recipients, both overall and in terms of CODF, were Indonesia and PNG (Figure 17). The largest share of total ODF (23%) went to *bilateral (unspecified)*[45]. After that, PNG (13%), Indonesia (11%), Solomon Islands (4.9%), Afghanistan (4.1%), Oceania (3.7%), Philippines (2.9%), Vietnam (2.8%), Asia (2.5%), and Timor-Leste (2.4%) were the top recipients (Panel A). Over the period, while changing ranks, the top recipients did not change considerably. In terms of total CODF over the same period, more than a quarter (USD 1.02 billion, or 27.1%) went to *bilateral (unspecified)*. Subsequently, Indonesia (11%), PNG (9.8%), Oceania (6%), Vanuatu (4.4%), Timor-Leste (3.5%), Solomon Islands (3.5%), Vietnam (2.9%), Afghanistan (2.6%), and Philippines (2.2%) received the most CODF (Panel B).

Figure 17: Top recipients of Australian (C)ODF, total 2010-2019



[45] Finance that applies to recipients across multiple regions (e.g., scholarship programs, multilateral initiative core funding, strategy development) (OECD, n.d.)



Notes: ~PSIDS; LDC; atoll^; excl. bilateral, unspecified for space, data as follows: Panel A. (USD billion): CODF: 1.02; Non-climate ODF: 5.96; Panel B (USD millions): Ad (princ.): 7.5; Ad (sig.): 247.5; Mit (princ.): 93.2; Mit (sig.): 66.4; Mixed: 15.3; Mixed (princ.): 28.5; Mixed (sig.): 560.1*
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

Per capita, PSIDS are by far the largest recipients of both Australian ODF and CODF over the study period (Figure 18). PNG, the most populous of the PSIDS, received amongst the least of these states per capita; though it still ranks highly as one of the top recipients overall.[46] Some atolls and LDCs, such as Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Kiribati, were amongst the top per capita recipients of CODF. Of the recipients below, only one is not a SIDS – Bhutan.

Figure 18: Top recipients of Australian ODF and CODF per capita, total, 2010-2019



Notes: ~PSIDS; LDC; atoll^; data for Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, and Wallis & Futuna was not available from the World Bank and so was sourced from the Pacific Data Hub (n.d.). Population data for Eritrea, North Macedonia and 'States Ex-Yugoslavia unspecified' were also not available in World Bank data; these recipients received very small portions of ODF so were simply excluded from the per capita analysis. All regional recipients were removed, as well as bilateral unspecified. Total figure calculated as sum of ODF per capita for each year from 2010 to 2019.*
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS, World Bank National Accounts data, and Pacific Data Hub.

[46] PNG was amongst those PSIDS whose population grew over the study period, though some, like Niue and Palau, shrank.

In aggregate terms, PSIDS and LDCs improved their share of CODF over time (Figure 19). Over the period, 23% of CODF was disbursed to LDCs, between 18% in 2010 to a peak of 28% in 2015. 34% of total Australian CODF from 2010 to 2019 went to SIDS, of which 98% went to PSIDS. PSIDS' share fluctuated but grew overall, falling from 31% in 2011 to a low of 18% in 2014, before growing to a height of 52% in 2019. Non-Pacific SIDS received a negligible and shrinking amount. In total, adjusting for those SIDS who are also LDCs, SIDS and LDCs received 1.64 billion in Australian CODF from 2010 to 2019, amounting to 44% of the CODF provided by Australia during that period. Their share of CODF improved from 30% in 2010 to 64% in 2019.

Figure 19: Share of Australian CODF to (P)SIDS and LDCs, 2010-2019



Notes: Figure adjusted for those SIDS who are also LDCs.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

While this provides an overview of the distribution of CODF to vulnerable groups in aggregate terms, it does not engage with the heterogeneity of these countries. Therefore, relative recipient vulnerability and capacity within the broader pool should also be considered. GNI/GNI per capita was used as a proxy, in view of its use as a determinant of ODA access, though bearing in mind that this measure fails to fully account for the relative vulnerability of these states (see Section 9.2.6. (iv) , p. 66 regarding vulnerability indices).

Referring to Figure 20, for both Panels A & B it could be considered that targeting of CODF to, respectively, lower GNI and lower GNI per capita recipients would see those with lower GNI concentrated in the lower right-hand quadrant, moving progressively upwards and to the left as GNI improves (without prejudice to the quantity of CODF). In this case, PNG and Tuvalu are the outer limit of Australia's CODF 'generosity'. Both countries have relatively low GNI, and Tuvalu is an LDC.[47] Timor Leste was amongst the recipients in lowest receipt of CODF per capita (Panel B). Some countries with relatively high GNI or GNI per capita, such as Bangladesh and the Philippines, or Palau and Nauru, received sums of CODF that were on par with or more than others with lower GNI.

[47] It should be noted that all countries in this selection improved, respectively, their GNI and GNI per capita over the study period, except for Timor-Leste, who lost USD 800 per capita between 2010 and 2019, or USD 594 million in total (GNI went into steep decline after 2011) (World Bank, 2020).

Figure 20: Ratio of Australian CODF to GNI per annum of recipients, in total and per capita, 2010-2019



Notes: World Bank data unavailable for Cook Islands, Tokelau, therefore excluded.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS and World Bank National Accounts data.

9.2.5. Distributing adaptation funds

The above analysis gives us a ballpark image of the distribution of CODF according to vulnerability and capacity. However, international climate agreements make specific note of targeting *adaptation* funds to vulnerable and capacity-constrained groups, such as SIDS and LDCs. There is some Australian discourse linking adaptation and vulnerability, particularly in the first few years of the decade (Figure 21). There appears to be limited discourse regarding the link between adaptation and islands, atolls and LDCs. Australia mentioned islands more often than atolls or LDCs, which are not mentioned in this context after 2013.

Figure 21: Incidence of select terms within two sentences of "climate change" and "adapt"



Note: "vulnerab" used to search "vulnerable, vulnerability", see Section 6.1.3. 26.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus.

While this is the case, Australia had a relatively strong focus on adaptation in its CODF over the decade. In total, Australia provided USD 1.17 billion in adaptation finance from 2010 to 2019, with use of the marker commencing only in 2011. Of this amount, however, only 16%, or USD 187.83 million, was directed towards projects focused *principally* on adaptation (accounting for only 0.6% of total ODF). As noted, over time the amount directed *principally* to adaptation shrank to zero; though *mixed* projects, which technically have an adaptation component, have grown considerably (USD 2.11 billion for *mixed (total)* over the study period, and an almost 100% share in 2019) (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Share of potentially adaptation-related Australian ODF over time, 2010-2019, by relevant reclassified marker



Note: Adaptation marker use by Australia commenced in 2011.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(i) Vulnerable? recipients of Australian adaptation finance

SIDS (all from the Pacific) and LDCs, including Afghanistan (6.3%), Vanuatu (6.2%), the Solomon Islands (5.9%), PNG (2%), Timor-Leste (2%), Kiribati (1.3%), Bangladesh (1.3%), and Tonga (1.2%), featured amongst Australia's top recipients of AODF, though the largest portion went to *bilateral (unspecified)* – 255 million, or 21.8% of all AODF (Figure 23, Panel B). Overall, the quantity of adaptation finance provided per recipient was relatively low. In total, no recipient received more than USD 100 million in AODF from Australia across the entire decade; and indeed, no single bilateral recipient received more than USD 75 million in AODF (Panel B), or more than USD 20 million in *principal* AODF (Panel A). Additionally, many PSIDS were displaced as top recipients by non-PSIDS recipients when considering *principal* AODF. Where *mixed* projects were included, larger recipients Indonesia and PNG took precedence (Panel C).

Figure 23: Top recipients of Australian AODF, 2010-2019, according to different applications of the Rio Markers





Notes: ~PSIDS; LDC; atoll^; Panels A & C exclude bilateral (unspecified) for space, data as follows: adaptation (princ.): USD 7.53 million; adaptation (sig.): USD 247.53 million; mixed (total): USD 603.88 million*
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(ii) Distribution of adaptation finance to SIDS & LDCs

For the sake of clarity, one can consider how Australia distributed its *principal* and *significant* adaptation finance, but not *mixed*.[48] Just over half (54%) of *principal* AODF over the decade – USD 101.5 million – went to SIDS, of which 97% were from the Pacific (Figure 24, Panel A). LDCs received 27%. Non-Pacific SIDS ceased receiving *principal* AODF after 2013. The share of *principal* AODF directed to SIDS grew over time, to a height of 89% in 2018. As noted, this does not correspond with an expansion in *principal* adaption finance (or indeed ODF overall), but rather a considerable fall. Panel B shows the larger quantities received overall when including *significant* AODF, though the quantity trends down, nonetheless. The share provided to LDCs and SIDS rose until 2015, before trending down for the remainder of the study period to a low of 28% in 2019. Even when counting *mixed* finance, SIDS and LDCs together only received a 32% share over the period, though after a bottoming out in 2014, this expanded to 51% in 2019 (not pictured).

Figure 24: Share of Australian AODF to LDCs and (P)SIDS, 2010-2019



[48] *Significant* and *mixed* finance run some risk of accounting for targeting of other objectives. Ideally, only *principal* would be considered, given adaptation is fundamental as a driver of these projects, rather than only secondary – however, there is minimal *principal* finance provided in the second half of the decade which undermines the representativeness of the analysis over time.



Notes: Panel A: Adaptation marker usage commenced in 2011. No adaptation (principal) ODF provided in 2019, refer to updated data (p. 27). Percentage share adjusted for SIDS who are also LDCs.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(iii) Distribution of adaptation finance according to recipient GNI

Many of the top recipients of *principal* AODF had relatively low GNI, including Timor-Leste, the top recipient who is also an LDC and whose GNI shrank during the study period (Figure 25, Panel A). Again, with Timor-Leste as the outer bound, other low-GNI recipients do not receive proportional amounts of *principal* AODF, with some of the lowest like Vanuatu, RMI, and Tonga outstripped by, for example, Indonesia. Given the relatively small amount of *principal* AODF provided overall and the clustering of recipients, the difference in amounts received is not substantial and rapidly diminishing. In the case of total AODF (Panel B), Indonesia is again a clear outlier, with higher GNI and AODF; otherwise, other recipients with on-par low GNI received variable amounts of AODF relative to one another. LDCs and SIDS were distributed widely in both cases, without any apparent prejudice.

Figure 25: Ratio of *principal* and total AODF to GNI, top recipients, 2010-2019





Note: No ODF marked adaptation (principal) was disbursed in 2010 or 2019. Note that GNI p.a. is not a fixed figure and has been averaged for demonstrative purposes.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS and World Bank National accounts data.

9.2.6. The Pacific Case: a deeper look at the distribution of Australian adaptation funds

Now is a good juncture to consider the PSIDS case in more depth. This is in part due to the high relevance of adaptation finance to their situation, recognising their relative vulnerability and capacity constraints. In addition, given the discrepancy found in existing literature between the targeting of adaptation finance to vulnerable recipients in aggregate terms (Betzold & Weiler, 2017) that is not repeated amongst SIDS recipients (Klöck & Fagotto, 2020), it is interesting to see whether such a pattern can be discerned when examining data for a single donor (Australia). PSIDS themselves of course vary in terms of both vulnerability and capacity – for example, some are atolls, and some are LDCs. With Australia devoting strong attention to the Pacific in its development program – this relatively small pool of recipients receiving a substantial and growing share of the overall pot – it is useful to consider to what extent there is discourse linking PSIDS and adaptation, and whether the funds provided to this group are targeting the most vulnerable and/or capacity constrained.

(i) Shifts in Pacific-adaptation discourse over time and by recipient

In instances where Australia was discussing climate change, adaptation, and the Pacific in proximity, a major difference between the beginning and the end of the study period can once again be traced, as well as a repetition of the large discrepancy in 2019 when the *CCAS* is removed (Figure 26, Panel A). In short, where Australia appeared to be much more frequently and systematically considering these issues in tandem towards the beginning of the period, not so towards the end. Zero instances were recorded in 2014. A similar pattern can be seen in Panel B, though with lower incidence overall (below 2.5 per year) and a more pronounced spike in discussion of climate vulnerability in 2017. When excluding climate documents, vulnerability was spoken about less frequently and less systematically by the end of the decade than capacity was (though not by a huge amount in actual terms).

Figure 26: Incidence of select terms within two sentences of "climate change" and "Pacific"



Notes: Green markers indicate years with climate documents; bars the whole corpus; markers for data excl. climate documents.
Source: Author's compilation based on analysis of document corpus.

This kind of discourse does not only vary over time, but also by PSIDS recipient. As can be seen below, PNG, Kiribati, Fiji, and Tuvalu received a much higher incidence of discourse relating to climate change, vulnerability, and adaptation, than Palau, FSM, RMI and Nauru (Figure 27). Taken together, while there is clearly some discourse linking the Pacific to climate adaptation, vulnerability, and capacity, this is relatively limited, and varies over time and according to recipient.

Figure 27: Incidence of select terms in PSIDS documents, by recipient, average years 2010-2019



Note: Atoll^; LDC; the average for each recipients' yearly score was found, then averaged over the decade. Incidence of pairs of terms is when they appear within two sentences of each other.*
Source: Author's compilation based on document corpus.

(ii) Pacific recipients of Australian AODF

As noted, (Figure 12, Panel B, p. 49), for PSIDS the majority of CODF goes to projects with adaptation outcomes, though only if *mixed* projects are included[49]. In total, between 2010 and 2019, PSIDS received USD 365.4 million in AODF, though only USD 98.5 million in *principal* AODF. As can be seen in Figure 28, PSIDS received differing shares of their CODF devoted to adaptation (Panel A), and the top PSIDS recipients for AODF change, in cases considerably, according to the definition of AODF applied (Panels B & C).

Figure 28: Distribution of Australian adaptation-related ODF to PSIDS, 2010-2019, according to different applications of the Rio Markers



49 If mixed projects are included, PSIDS received USD 1.13 billion in ODF towards projects with some connection to adaptation.



Notes: ^; LDC; income classifications per OECD DAC list. Panel C excludes Oceania (regional) for space; data as follows: Oceania, regional: USD 40.82 million marked adaptation (principal). Mixed CODF is not included in this Figure to avoid potential bias relating to distribution according to mitigation objectives.*
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(iii) Adaptation funds for Pacific LDCs & atolls

LDCs and atoll states are amongst the most vulnerable to climate change. In the Pacific, LDCs received a considerably variable share of *principal* AODF – ranging from a high of 87% in 2015 to 3% in 2016 (Figure 29, Panel A). However, the actual amount received per annum did not change considerably – hovering between USD 4 and 7.4 million – until 2016, when there was an abrupt drop to USD 118 000. This abrupt drop was remedied somewhat if *adaptation (significant)* funds are included (Panel B), though overall receipt of funds was more variable and still fell. LDCs experienced a drop in their share after 2015 even when mixed finance was included (not pictured).

In all cases, atolls received less funding than LDCs, except for a brief moment in *principal* funding in 2011 (Panel A). There are the same number of atolls as LDCs (four) in the PSIDS examined in this study, including Kiribati and Tuvalu, which carry both classifiers. This indicates the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, the other LDCs, frequently received a larger share of adaptation financing than atoll states (indicated by the gap between LDC and atoll markers) (largely explained by the Solomon Islands, refer to Figure 28, p. 64). Atolls received a smaller share by the end of the period in all cases except the first (Panel A), where the share jumped to 17% in 2018 (though the overall amount provided to atolls was considerably lower, at USD 69 000 compared to USD 4.8 million in 2011 (Panel A).

Figure 29: Distribution of Australian AODF to LDCs and atolls, 2010-2019, over time and by share, according to different applications of the Rio Marker for adaptation





Notes: Panel A: Adaptation marker usage commenced in 2011. No adaptation (principal) ODF provided in 2019.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

(iv) Adaptation distribution according to the Commonwealth *Universal Vulnerability Index*

A more holistic way of considering the relationship between AODF and vulnerability involves comparing distribution with the relative vulnerability of recipients as determined by a vulnerability index (see Section 6.2.4. , p. 31). Given the difference in distribution over time noted above (Figure 29) it is also interesting to see if there are any special cases over time – and indeed, average disbursements of both *principal* AODF and total AODF shrank for all recipients except for Timor Leste (Panel A) and Vanuatu (Panel B) respectively (Figure 30). In the case of *principal* AODF (Panel A), Timor Leste, who was amongst the most vulnerable according to its UVI score, received the most and an increasing amount. For all other PSIDS recipients, however, there is no discernible relationship between *principal* AODF disbursement and vulnerability. Even when examining relative decrease or increase over time, Kiribati, the most vulnerable, and PNG, the least vulnerable, experience comparable decreases. For total AODF (Panel B), the pattern is again unclear; some of the most vulnerable received the least, and their receipt decreased over time (e.g., Kiribati and RMI), while Vanuatu, the third most resilient, received an increasing amount, and Solomon Islands, the sixth most resilient, even after its decrease in funds still received more than other more vulnerable recipients.

Figure 30: PSIDS receipt of Australian *principal* and total AODF, change over time 2010-2013 to 2014-2019, in relation to recipient UVI (2018) score



Note: COT: change over time. Panel A: no principal *AODF disbursed in 2010 or 2019. Panel B. No AODF disbursed in 2010.*
Source: Author's compilation based off OECD CRS, World Bank National Accounts data, and Commonwealth UVI (2018)

9.3. Donor coordination in view of the collective nature of climate finance commitments

Having examined Australia's CODF according to more explicit regime commitments, this section turns to the issue of donor coordination, in view of the *collective* commitment to reach the USD 100 billion goal and the commons and coordination problems identified in the literature (Section 3.2.2. p. 14).

9.3.1. Adequacy and distributional justice via the notion of the 'fair share'

The first method engaged in view of donor coordination was peer comparison in relation to calculated 'fair share' targets (see Sections 3.2.2. , p. 14 and 4.2.1. , p. 20).

(i) Australian CODF disbursements compared to DAC average and indicative faire share trajectory

The quantity of both Australian ODF and CODF was considerably below the DAC average throughout the study period, only passing the DAC ODF average in 2012 and worsening as a share over time (Figure 31). In 2010, Australian ODF and CODF accounted for, respectively, 84% and 67% of the respective DAC averages, however by 2019 they accounted for only 63% and 32% In addition, Australian CODF departs immediately from the indicative pathway to a 2020 fair share target calculated by Jotzo et al. (2011), bearing in mind that this target was selected as the lower bound of those proposed in the literature (see Sections 4.2.1. and 6.2.4. 31). Indeed, total ODF does not even meet this target.

Figure 31: Total (C)ODF over time, Australia against DAC average and indicative fair share target calculated by Jotzo et al. (2011), 2010-2019



Note: 10Y av.: ten-year average, 2010-2019. Fair share illustrative trajectory based on linear trendline between 2010 actual disbursed CODF and fair share target set by Jotzo et al. (2011).
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data and Jotzo et al. (2011).

(ii) (C)ODF as a share of GNI: comparing peers and measuring against 'just' targets

In 2005, both the Labor and LNP parties committed to providing ODF to the equivalent of 0.5% of GNI by 2015 (AusAID, 2011, p. v). An 'aspirational goal' of 0.7% after 0.5% was reached was also articulated in 2011 (AusAID, 2011, p. 1). In the interim, targets were readjusted, explained in the aid budget of 2013-2014:

> *'... the Australian Government remained committed to increasing its aid budget to 0.5% of GNI to meet the UN's Millennium Development Goals, but this would be delayed to 2017-18 due to a write-down in budget revenues. To reach the revised 0.5% target, the Government expects to increase Australian aid to around 0.39% in 2014-15, 0.41% in 2015-16 and 0.45% in 2016-17.' (DFAT, 2013, p. 1)*

After the dissolution of AusAID in 2014, the newly released core policy did not refer to Australia's ODF as a share of GNI, and no subsequent budget document appears to make reference (DFAT, 2014). In fact, Australian ODF as a share of GNI continued to decrease over time, worsening by 0.08% (Figure 32, Panel A). It has remained considerably below the international target of 0.7% (Panel A). There does not appear to have been a comparable target made for CODF.

Within the broader pool of donors, Australia's ODF and CODF as a share of GNI (Figure 32) ranks poorly – it fell from 13th place in 2010 to 16th in 2019 for ODF, and from 12th to 15th for CODF. For ODF, it provided more as a share of GNI than the DAC average up until 2015-2016, only recently overtaking in 2019 to the tune of 0.09% as the DAC average fell by 0.01%. In terms of CODF, Australia diverged from the DAC, reaching 0.04% below the average by 2019, though improving against its own 2010 score by 0.02% (Panel B). Australia would need to more than quintuple its 2019 CODF as a share of GNI to meet the 'fair share' target determined by WRI (see Section 4.2.1. p. 20). Germany, Japan, and France, who are among the largest providers of CODF of the DAC, provide more than Australia in both ODF and CODF as a share of GNI, despite its smaller GNI (Panels A & B). New Zealand (NZ) and the US, some of the largest providers of ODF in the Pacific after Australia, rank, respectively, similarly, and worse than Australia over time, though NZ has improved to a larger extent. Japan, who is also a Pacific donor peer, has improved most of the selected donors below, apart from Germany.

Figure 32: (C)ODF as share of GNI, Australia and selected DAC peers

Notes: COT: change over time, 2010-2019. Germany, France, and Japan were amongst the top providers of CODF in 2019. Japan is also a large bilateral provider of ODF in the Pacific, as are NZ and the US.
Source: Author's compilation based of OECD CRS data and World Bank national accounts data.

(iii) Australia amongst DAC donor peers in the Pacific

Australia was consistently the largest ODF provider in the Pacific over the study period (Figure 33, Panel A)[50]. However, its annual ODF shrank by USD 101 million from 2010 to 2019, and its share within DAC providers shrank from 57% to 47%. Overall, the amount of ODF disbursed by the DAC to PSIDS did not grow substantially. CODF received by PSIDS, however, grew by USD 292 million, with USD 197 million on the part of Australia. While this is the case, *principal* AODF fell considerably over time, both from Australia and in total (Panel B). Critically, Australia's share of *principal* AODF fell from 70% in 2011 to 3% in 2018. This rose to 10% in 2019 when Australia's updated data is included (see Figure 33, *note*), though this only amounted to an extra USD 111 million from 2018. In fact, after 2014, several donors in various years provided more *principal* AODF than Australia, including Japan, Germany, US, UK, Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada. The overall fall in *principal* AODF seems to indicate that all donors, not only Australia, have not coordinated to improve this figure, despite strong advocacy of PSIDS for improved adaptation finance. This does not align well with Australia's strategic emphasis on the Pacific, nor its more recent claims that the 'development program magnifies the influence that Australia brings to bear on pressing regional and global problems', considering PSIDS' pressing adaptation needs and the donor's loss of relative heft (DFAT, 2017, p. 18).

Figure 33: (C)ODF disbursed by Australia and other DAC donors to PSIDS, 2010-2019



Note: Data in these figures differ slightly from others in this paper due to inclusion of Australia's updated 2019 figures; several donors only used the adaptation marker from 2011 onwards.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

[50] According to the Lowy Institute (2020), this remains true when data for China is included. China does not report to the OECD.

9.3.2. Policy coherence: climate mainstreaming and other public spending

The second aspect of donor coordination that can be considered is policy coherence (see Section 3.2.2. p. 14). This incorporates two aspects: contradictory spending and the 'mainstreaming' of climate change across relevant sectors, essentially to ensure that any potentially just CODF is not undercut by other counter-productive activities.

(i) Sectoral breakdown

CODF is reported according to the sector a project contributes to. Understanding its sectoral allocation helps to illustrate Australia's real approach and contextualise the finance data when considering policy coherence. Of Australia's total ODF from 2010 to 2019 (Figure 34, Panel A), a large portion was not reported by sector (with 18% as *other multisector*, and 4% as *sectors not specified*). A further 7% was allocated to Australia's *administrative costs.* Otherwise, the largest sector in receipt of Australia's ODF over the decade was *government and civil society*, which received 18%, followed by *emergency response* (6%), *transport and storage* (4%), and *agriculture* (4%). None of the top sectors below received a substantial portion to CODF, indicating limited mainstreaming in these sectors.

Figure 34: Australian total ODF, 2010-2019, by sector, by climate marker







Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data

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Other multisector was also the largest sector to receive Australia's CODF over the decade, receiving almost a quarter (23%) of the 2010-2019 total (Panel B). This comprised primarily mixed finance. After, *government and civil society (general)* (12%), *water supply and sanitation* (11%), *general environmental protection* (10%), and *agriculture* (7%) received the largest amounts of CODF, with *water supply and sanitation* receiving the most adaptation funding. In the Pacific, the largest sector was *government & civil society (general)* (23%) (Panel C). Besides this sector, no other sector received more than USD 150 million in CODF over the decade. In both cases (Panels B & C), limited *principal* CODF is provided relative to *significant*.

(ii) Climate mainstreaming

Excluding multisector funding, over half of Australia's CODF is concentrated in six sectors, and in the case of PSIDS, only four. Considering the early introduction of a climate mainstreaming policy (AusAID, 2010) during the study period, this casts doubt on the extent to which climate was actually mainstreamed across the program. The mainstreaming policy targeted in particular education, infrastructure, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and food security, and humanitarian action, disaster response and recovery. After 2010, there was very minimal reference to climate change in thematic policy, with the highest incidence in the 2011 humanitarian policy – six mentions across 72 pages. After this, there was one mention in a single policy in 2014 (the environmental protection policy), and an incidence of less than one in the nine policies introduced in 2015 (including policies for education, infrastructure, and agriculture, water, and fisheries). These latter policies were introduced after the dissolution of AusAID.

The mainstreaming of climate change across relevant or potentially contradictory sectors can also be considered. For example, throughout the decade, USD 8.59 million in Australian ODF was provided to fossil fuel generation projects, of which just one project, accounting for around 22% of that funding, was classified as CODF (*mixed (principal)*). No ODF was reported for fossil fuel generation projects after 2013. Considerably more ODF – USD 83.83 million – was provided to *mineral resources and mining,* of which the vast majority went to *mining policy and administrative management.* The amount provided ballooned in 2013 but has since shrunk. Of the total provided, only 3%, or 22 projects, received a climate marker, either *mitigation (significant)* or *mixed (significant)* (Figure 35). From a climate mainstreaming perspective, it is potentially concerning if projects in extractive sectors do not include at least a *significant* marker, which would imply the inclusion of climate outcomes in project design,

particularly considering Australia's discourse around 'clean technologies for fossil fuels' (DFAT, 2017; DFAT, 2019).[51]

Other potentially climate-relevant sectors received variable shares of CODF – *environmental protection* (76%), *renewable energy generation* (68%), and *energy* projects overall (57%) all had a larger than 50% share, while several other sectors such as *construction* (29%), *agriculture, forestry, and fishing* (27%), and *transport and storage* (16%) received only small share. Overall, only 7% of Australian tourism projects were marked with a climate marker – USD 4 473 as *mitigation (significant)* in 2010, and USD 680 000 as *mixed (significant)* in 2019. The Pacific, for whom tourism is a critical industry, received a higher proportion of CODF for its tourism projects – 29% as opposed to 3% for non-Pacific projects. The share was also much higher for *water supply & sanitation* (75%) and mineral *resources and mining* (29%). On the other hand, PSIDS ODF to *agriculture* (USD 112 000) and *non-renewable energy generation* (USD 6.7 million) was never marked with a climate marker. Interestingly, despite criticism of an overt focus on DRR in its approach to climate change (ODE, 2018), less than half of ODF disbursements to *disaster prevention and preparedness* were labelled with a climate marker, including for PSIDS. *Government and civil society (general),* which was the largest sector in receipt of CODF across the board (besides *multisector*) and for PSIDS, had very low mainstreaming (8% and 9% respectively).

Figure 35: Share of CODF in Australian ODF for selected sectors, total and PSIDS, 2010-2019



Notes: Sectors represent a sample of potentially relevant and/or contradictory sectors to climate change. These include some high-ranking sectors in terms of CODF receipt and some based on inclusion on the initial mainstreaming policy. Tourism was included in line with its importance to PSIDS and the large difference between the PSIDS and whole samples.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data.

[51] This example is illustrative of some of the challenges with using Rio marker data to account towards the USD 100 billion goal. While designed for mainstreaming purposes originally, the whole amount of a project assigned with a Rio marker is counted as climate finance (OECD, n.d.; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). This presents an analytical difficulty – introducing climate objectives into potentially harmful projects (fossil extraction, non-renewable energy, etc.) is arguably useful; however, these projects may be contradictory to the just provision of finance according to commitments made in international agreements (e.g., additionality). This is part of the reason that principal finance may be considered a better measurement towards this goal.

(iii) Policy coherence: public financing beyond ODF

Next, Australia's CODF spending was compared with spending in other relevant sectors (Figure 36).[52] For example, while Australia ceased providing public financing for fossil fuels internationally via its development programme during the study period, it has done so via the Export Finance Agency (EFA). Recent analysis of transaction data found that between 2009 and 2020, the EFA provided between USD 1.34 and 1.45 billion in financing for fossil fuel projects (Hopstead Rui & Strachan, 2021) (Panel A). [53] This is more than the total ODF or CODF provided to energy projects between 2010 and 2019, and indeed more than was provided in CODF to PSIDS over the same period. Another pattern of contradictory spending is public subsidisation of fossil fuels (Panel B). Tax expenditure on fossil fuels significantly outpaced public spending on CODF over the study period[54], with divergence commencing after 2013, made more significant by its abrupt and significant rise in 2015. No proportional rise is seen in CODF trends. If the upwards trend in CODF, and the downwards trend of tax expenditure on fossil fuels up until 2013 had continued, all else being equal CODF would have converged with and then overtaken tax expenditure on fossil fuels in around 2021 (Annex 5).

Figure 36: How Australia's CODF compares to other relevant public spending



Notes: Panel A.: EFA: Export Finance Agency. Includes the upper and lower bounds of fossil fuel spending as classified by Hopstead Rui & Strachan (2021). Incl. figures for both ODF and CODF for energy projects. Jubilee Australia Research Centre was contacted for access to time series data, but no response was received. Due to availability, data covers slightly different periods so should be considered an estimate. USD figures calculated with same exchange rate as Panel B. Panel B.: OECD data for tax expenditure was provided in AUD with no detail of normalisation of data over time. USD figures were calculated based on the average monthly exchange rate from 2010-2019, data from RBA. Due to this ambiguity, total quantities should be considered estimates relative to one another. However, conclusions can be drawn from the change over time of different expenditures.
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data, Hopstead Rui & Strachan (2021), and OECD Stat Fossil Fuel Support (OECD, n.d.), with exchange calculations based on RBA exchange rate data.

[52]These contradictory spending findings are not exhaustive but can be considered illustrative of incoherent spending that may undermine the capacity for Australia's CODF to be considered just.
[53] AUD 1.57 and 1.69 billion, converted according to RBA exchange rate. No time series data available.
[54] Here, CODF to energy is too small for comparison on the graph

Discussion

This section outlines the key findings identified in the results and situates them in a broader context. It draws out critical patterns and discusses them in relation to the theoretical framework, as well as the tensions described earlier regarding climate finance acting as a mechanism of climate justice. Together with the conclusion, it seeks to answer the research question:

> *How does Australia approach climate change in its development program, particularly in Pacific Small Island Developing States? And, to what extent does this approach reflect the concept of climate justice?*

10. Situating climate justice in Australia's development cooperation

The wealth of results in the previous section provides for several clear indications of Australia's performance against identified climate justice indicators – in terms of both regime commitments and donor coordination – while also casting light on some issues that may be worthy of further research.

10.1. Australian CODF adherence to climate justice according to regime commitments

This research engages several indicators drawn from international climate agreements that can be used to consider the 'justness' of climate finance. These include additionality, predictability, the balance between adaptation and mitigation, attention to the vulnerability and capacity constraints of recipients, and the related 'fair' distribution of adaptation funds (see Section 3.2.1. p.13). Below, I will outline how Australia approaches climate change and PSIDS in its development program according to these indicators, along with some relevant issues that these findings raise.

Australia's climate finance has quite clearly not been additional over time. While CODF during the ALP period (2010-2013) was additional, in the long term this trend ceased. Not only did CODF not expanded substantially in real terms (to be 'scaled up'), the overall quantity of ODF provided shrank considerably over the decade. Even in the Pacific, a consolidation and reorientation of the development program towards the region, while seeing an expansion of the CODF provided, has not been accompanied by the disbursement of 'additional' CODF. Similarly, the share of finance provided as *principal* CODF was so low, and shrank so considerably over time, that if this standard of additionality is applied, Australia's performance was critically inadequate and diminishing.

On the other hand, if provision of grant-based financed as a measure of additionality is considered, the overwhelming grants share of Australia's CODF (100%), and indeed ODF overall (99%), would indicate partial additionality. However, this requires Australia's development program to be considered in isolation from other investments made through DFAT (e.g., via the EFA and AIFFP), whose activities claim to support development and climate objectives (e.g., sustainable infrastructure) and may be at least partly funded via the development program (see EFA (2019)). Reporting data from these mechanisms as well as the modalities of funding (how much of the AIFFP, for example, is funded through the EFA and how much by the development program, and how will this be reported?) is worthy of scrutiny and could be considered for future work (bearing in mind it appears to have bipartisan support; consider, e.g., preliminary investigations by Howes & Dornan (2019)). Inclusion of Australian loan financing provided through such mechanisms could change considerably the share of grants and loans provided to climate objectives, though initial reports suggest that only the grant part will be reported in view of the loans being non-concessional (Howes & Dornan, 2019). This beggars larger questions about both policy coherence and the reporting and tracking of particular finance streams through the ODA system. It also draws into question the motivations for provision – and thereby the mandate – of this kind of mechanism in the Pacific, given it has also been touted as a response to China's growing presence (Howes & Dornan, 2019). Importantly, despite linking the mechanism to climate change response (DFAT, n.d.), there is no indication that it will align with the international agreed requirements for climate finance, and thereby climate justice.

Australia's climate finance has not been consistently predictable. Its CODF was less predictable in terms of quantity and value of projects than non-climate ODF, while many ODF recipients either received CODF sparingly, or lost access. Moreover, Australia's long-term intention to scale up its ODF

more broadly appears inconsistent, with the early bipartisan commitment to provide 0.5% of GNI in ODA not maintained, and against which measurement worsened over time. Likewise, 'Pacific Step-Up' discourse has not resulted in expanded ODF overall in the Pacific, nor consistent or expanded CODF for most recipients. In combination with the non-additionality of CODF over time, and the lack of a long-term goal for a share to climate, such patterns impede the predictable 'scaling up' of resources. Similarly, commitments to multilateral efforts through the GCF have not been maintained despite discourse indicating the intention to do so (DFAT, 2017), given Australia's unexpected cessation of funding in 2018 (DFAT, 2019; Donor Tracker, n.d.).

Unpredictability in Australia's CODF provision could be particularly detrimental to PSIDS, as Australia is by far their largest source of ODF, while climate-related impacts in the region continue to grow. Australia has maintained its Pacific CODF flows, though this provision has been slightly variable over time and amongst recipients, with latter-year growth principally explained by expanded disbursements to PNG. In addition, while Australia prepared several multi-year investment plans for the Pacific, an accepted measure of predictability, discursive patterns showed that these plans did not appear to be a good predictor of the CODF PSIDS could expect to be disbursed. Similarly, discourse linking the Pacific to climate change and climate-related terms also varied considerably both across the decade and across recipients. This kind of discursive inconsistency is reflective of the same found in core policies, and the clear disruption that the 2014 dissolution of AusAID appears to have provoked for not only the program overall, but for the situation of climate change within it. This latter issue indicates that climate finance predictability may also be impacted by donor political shifts or governance modalities, which may be worthy of further research.

Australian CODF had a relatively strong though diminishing focus on adaptation throughout the study period, paying limited attention to mitigation. This is not necessarily contrary to a just distribution of climate finance, given the larger neglect of adaptation finance globally (Buchner, et al., 2019; OECD, 2021). Donor coordination in view of a just repartition could in principle see some donors give 100% of their finance to adaptation if others compensated with provision to mitigation. Australia's focus on adaptation also aligns with its focus on PSIDS, given their critical adaptation needs and minimal contribution to global GHG emissions. However, Australia's adaptation finance to PSIDS shrank over time, particularly *principal* finance, a trend also reflected in the broader recipient pool. Further, there appears to be a critical lack of coordination amongst DAC providers of CODF to PSIDS, with an overall reduction in *principal* AODF across the Pacific, largely explained by the huge reduction on the part of Australia, as well as low and patchy provision across DAC donors. This is despite the fact Australia identified fragmentation as a critical risk to CODF in the Pacific early in the study period (AusAID, 2010). Apparently, efforts have not been made to address this issue, either in general or in view of the balance between adaptation and mitigation finance in the region.

In fact, the diminishing trend in overall Australian AODF was partly explained by the mounting dominance of *significant* mixed finance. There is some methodological difficulty in accounting for mixed finance, in view of double counting risks (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). Australia provided above-average amounts of *significant* adaptation and mixed finance, compared to other DAC providers (while providing below-average amounts in all other categories). Domination by *significant* finance could be indicative of Australian CODF being provided in a 'mainstreamed' fashion, with climate-related objectives added to projects with other, non-climate related *principal* objectives (this is not consistent with other findings though (see Section 10.2. p. 79). However, this could also be indicative of mis- or overreporting, in view of the ambiguity and potential for ex-post application associated with *significant* and cross-cutting markers (Carty, et al., 2020; Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). In addition, donors are meant to mark projects with two principal markers (i.e., mixed *(principal)* projects) only upon explicit justification (OECD, n.d.), however Australia's use of this combination of markers was accompanied by apparent ambiguity (as opposed to explicitness) in reporting. These reporting issues, as well as the veracity of Australia's reporting overall, would be worthy of further study, particularly in view of recent research estimating considerable overreporting of climate finance by DAC donors (e.g., Borst et al. (2022)).

There were also incoherencies in Australia's disbursement of mitigation finance, which after 2010, was low relative to other markers and diminished over time. Disbursements of *principal* MODF were

close to 10 times smaller than the DAC average over the same period, and in later years were provided exclusively to PSIDS, primarily the Solomon Islands, while disbursements to larger emitters ceased. There is no suggestion that PSIDS should not receive mitigation funding, however this pattern of disbursement is not consistent with Australia's rhetoric about the need for developing countries to reduce their emissions; nor with its insistence that it 'will continue to support activities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (DFAT, 2019, p. 2; DFAT, 2017). The distribution of mitigation finance is also a critical issue for climate justice, with many countries facing barriers to decarbonisation alongside pressing and sometimes conflicting development challenges, such as energy access and rapid urbanisation, while being acutely aware of the benefits developed countries have historically drawn from high-emission development. Given Australia's insistence that it be allowed to continue funding fossil fuels internationally (OECD, 2021) ostensibly in view of the competing development needs and priorities of recipients, it would be interesting to further explore the logic of Australia's low MODF provision in relation to these justice issues. This is also interesting in light of the fact it no longer provides – and thereby reports – such financing via the development program.

While CODF and AODF have generally been concentrated on SIDS and LDCs as a group, targeting at the recipient level cannot be explained by relative vulnerability or capacity. Firstly, a large and growing share of Australia's CODF goes towards SIDS and LDCs as a group, but there is no clear targeting according to vulnerability by recipient. The former is largely explained by Australia's focus on PSIDS within the bounds of both its development program and its climate financing. This means that, within the limits of these identifiers, many of its top recipients, in both actual and per capita terms, are particularly vulnerable and capacity constrained. Priority provision of CODF to these groups aligns with the emphasis placed on these groups in international frameworks. However, when considering distribution at the recipient level, there was no clear indication of targeting according to vulnerability or capacity as measured by total or per capita GNI, suggesting this is not a good indicator of Australian allocation of CODF amongst its recipients.

Secondly, the growing share of adaptation finance disbursed to SIDS and LDCs early in the study period diminished over time along with their receipt of total and *principal* adaptation finance in real terms. Several SIDS and LDCs were amongst the largest recipients of Australian total and *principal* AODF[55], and they began the period with a large share. However, as a group both their gross receipt and share of AODF shrank over the study period. Similarly, while share of *principal* AODF technically grew, this was simultaneous with such a sharp decline in this type of finance as to not be of note. As with CODF, there was no discernible pattern to indicate allocation according to vulnerability/capacity as measured by GNI.

Thirdly, the Pacific received shrinking sums of adaptation finance over time. Further, while LDCs dominated in their receipt of AODF, atoll states including LDCs were worse off in the recipient pool than non-atoll LDCs (Solomon Islands and Timor Leste). Moreover, Timor Leste's larger receipt of *principal* AODF (over time and relative to other recipients) appeared to be the only instance where relative vulnerability aligned with more and scaled up receipt of adaption finance. In fact, when differentiated according to firstly, GNI, and secondly, UVI, no clear pattern presented itself, with some of the most vulnerable (like Kiribati and RMI) receiving limited and diminishing AODF, both *principal* and in total.

Lastly, Australian discourse linking adaptation and vulnerability varied over time and by PSIDS recipient. Australian discourse made some connection between climate change adaptation and vulnerability, islands, atolls and LDCs, though this was primarily focused in the first half of the decade. Similarly, the link between adaptation and the Pacific was much stronger in the first part of the decade. The most considerable disparity was between recipients, with the documents for some PSIDS hosting a considerably higher incidence of climate change, adaptation, and vulnerability discourse than others.

[55] In view of both the emphasis placed on provision of adaptation finance to vulnerable and capacity-constrained recipients, and the nature of the principal adaptation marker – which indicates projects for which adaptation is a central motivation – it would have been prudent to consider only the distribution of *principal* adaptation finance amongst Australian CODF recipients. However, the considerable decline in *principal* adaptation finance over the study period meant that this would have provided a skewed representation of Australia's aggregate distribution over time, weighted towards the first three years when this marker was used (2011-2013). As such, consideration was also given to *significant* adaptation finance.

These results indicate that the development program's sensitivity to the relative vulnerability and capacity of its CODF recipients aligns only partially with international requirements. Several thoughts can be drawn from this finding. Firstly, the use of SIDS and LDCs as aggregate groups to measure the justness of climate finance may mask underlying distributional inequalities. Herein, the Pacific case was a particular good demonstrator – for example, growth in CODF receipt by PNG influenced the apparent growth in aggregate PSIDS receipt; however, it was not accompanied by growth for other PSIDS, including many whose relative vulnerability is higher. Secondly, climate finance literature does well to integrate other potentially explanatory factors for the distribution of climate finance (e.g., Blodgett Bermeo (2017), Couharde et al. (2020), Weiler et al. (2018)), and in this spirit further research could incorporate these factors to explain Australia's approach to distribution, given it cannot be explained by relative recipient vulnerability and capacity constraints. Lastly, the strange discrepancy in discourse across PSIDS recipients and between these recipients and their CODF receipt, seems to suggest that broader climate discourse treating the Pacific as a collective may be misleading in terms of the actual distribution of climate finance.

10.2. Donor coordination for just Australian climate finance

Donor coordination is of critical importance to the achievement of the USD 100 billion goal, in view of the collective nature of this commitment, and the broader commons and coordination problems associated with climate change. The provision of climate finance by developed to developing countries can be seen as a method of operationalising the notion of CBDRRC and thereby climate justice; and the capacity of this provided and/or 'mobilised' finance to contribute to climate justice is dependent on its effective collective provision. Effective donor coordination of CODF is therefore an important foundation for the indicators described in the previous section to be met. Indeed, as noted, Australia cited coordination issues (specifically, fragmentation) amongst climate finance providers in the Pacific as a future risk early in the study period (AusAID, 2010). However, it does not appear that the Australian development program has been operationalised to address this issue over the long term, despite insistence in the CCAS that 'Australia is working with other donors' in this field (DFAT, 2019, p. 20). This research employs two indicators of donor coordination: fair share contribution in relation to donor peers and benchmarks, and policy coherence according to climate mainstreaming and contradictory spending. Below, I outline how Australia's approach can be explained by these indicators.

Australia does not provide its 'fair share' of CODF in relation to either its donor peers or to various finance targets. Australia provided quantities of both ODF and CODF well below the DAC average, with the difference worsening over time for both. Australia immediately diverged from the indicative trajectory towards the 'fair share' quantity determined by Jotzo et al. (2011), which was the lowest of the targets identified in the literature (see p. 20). Further, Australia did not meet the collective target of 0.7% of GNI to ODF over the study period nor its own 0.5% target. Australian ODF as a share of GNI in fact decreased over the period, while measurements against DAC average ODF and CODF as a share of GNI worsened. It also did not reach the 0.22% fair share target designated by the WRI. This has implications for Australia's credibility in not only the international climate regime, but the international development cooperation system and the Pacific context. Furthermore, it does not align with the notion of CBDRRC.

In addition, while Australia was the largest provider of ODF in the Pacific, its share amongst DAC donors decreased over the study period, while its share of CODF increased. Its provision and overall share of *principal* AODF, of critical importance to PSIDS, likewise decreased considerably, along with overall provision by DAC donors overall. As noted, this is not indicative of effective coordination between donors in the region, particularly in view of the discord between considerable and growing adaptation needs in the Pacific and the actual support provided to adaptation in the region (Maclellan & Meads, 2016). Beyond misalignment with the requirement to provide adaptation finance to SIDS, this reflects a broader disconnect between DAC donors and the plight of SIDS, as well as with their own assertions made within the development cooperation system; as early as 2006, donors were acknowledging the need for adaptation finance in SIDS (OECD, 2006).

Australia did not exhibit consistent mainstreaming of climate change across its program. Following introduction of the mainstreaming policy, climate change was mentioned very sparingly across other policies, including core, thematic, and environmental policies – particularly after 2013. It is not necessarily surprising that policy would be updated following agency change, however the lack of mainstreaming from 2014 onwards appears to undermine the earlier mainstreaming work. In addition, lack of movement on the mainstreaming recommendation made in the 2013 OECD DAC Peer Review suggests poor coordination on the part of Australia with the development cooperation system. Additionally, in the ODF disbursed, several sectors that are arguably highly relevant to climate change (evidenced in e.g., their inclusion in the initial mainstreaming policy) had a relatively low share of CODF, e.g., DRR, and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. This is of concern given Australia's recourse to *significant* finance, which should arguably be a floor to additional (*principal*) climate finance, in view of the threat of mainstreaming acting as a 'superficial accounting exercise' to increase the finance counted towards the USD 100 billion goal (Carty, et al., 2020, p. 22). Further, disaster resilience in particular is presented by Australia as one of its key contributions to the Pacific in the context of climate change, yet more than half of this finance did not receive a climate marker (DFAT, 2019, p. 2)

Australia also displayed some critical points of policy incoherence that would be worthy of further research. Notably, this included finance provided to fossil fuels by the EFA (also managed by DFAT) which far outstripped the ODF and CODF provided to energy projects in the development program over the study period (or indeed EFA investments in renewables, despite its communications emphasis of these activities, see (DFAT, n.d.)). Similarly, Australian tax expenditure on fossil fuels, while decreasing early in the period, ballooned massively over time, while CODF hardly increased. This kind of policy incoherence – support to fossil fuels, which are the primary source of GHG emissions globally (Ritchie & Roser, 2020) – presents a critical threat to the capacity of CODF to act as a mechanism of climate justice. This is in large part due to the additional climate debt accrued through additional emissions, in view of the rapidly diminishing emissions budget allowed to all countries and developed countries most of all (who were supposed to go furthest, fastest) (Carbon Tracker, 2020).

In the case of Australia, the sheer proportional difference between these expenditures raises a clear question as to, for example, any additionality that can be attributed to its public climate finance considering the emissions growth that would be prompted from expenditure on fossil fuels. Further research could be undertaken to support this calculation. Nonetheless, the capacity of Annex I countries to coordinate for effective global emissions reduction and maintain the trust of non-Annex I Parties relies on these Parties to take effective and transparent steps towards actual emissions reduction and provision of climate finance according to the agreed parameters. For climate debt accounting in the context of climate justice, these steps are mutually supportive, deducting from potential debt in a way that respects the principle of CBDRRC. However, maintaining trust in this system requires climate finance data to be accurate and reliable. This means addressing many of the issues previously described, such as all ODF marked with a Rio marker being counted as climate finance, regardless of the portion of finance actually targeting a climate objective (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019). Such questions have been frequently raised in critiques of the Rio Marker system, though, as noted, solutions have been offered across a vast literature – such as transparent provision of CODF according to regime commitments. Within this framework, Australia has a clear role to provide just climate finance broadly, but especially in the Pacific region, in view of its own climate debt, as well as PSIDS's vulnerability, capacity constraints, and lack of responsibility within the frame of the international climate regime.

11. Patterns over time and looking towards the future

In the decade after Copenhagen, the Australian development program saw two governing parties, five Prime Ministers, the dissolution of a forty-year-old development agency, and a raft of new policy (see Figure 4, p. 34, Annex 4). The period also saw some interesting developments in its treatment of climate change, some of which can be clearly aligned with these contextual factors.

Initially, in the aftermath of Copenhagen, Australia's public climate finance expanded – and was additional up to 2013. It had a strong focus on adaptation, including through *principal* finance, the number of ODF recipients who received CODF expanded, its discourse indicated an intention to scale up in an additional manner over time, and it gave more total and *principal* AODF to LDCs and SIDS

(particularly PSIDS) in real terms than later in the decade. Similarly, compared to the second part of the decade, this period saw more discourse relating to climate change, including related issues like vulnerability and adaptation, along with the latter's link to vulnerability, islands, atolls, LDCs, and the Pacific. Based on the approach taken, is not reasonable to predict how the situation of climate change and the Pacific would have continued to evolve in the development program had the Labor party stayed in power (beyond e.g., *ceteris paribus* financial projections (Annex 5)). Notably, towards the end of their tenure, the projected development budget was reduced and the 0.5% target pushed back, though at the same time FSF had been delivered and climate mainstreaming efforts were at least nominally underway (AusAID, 2010; AusAID, November 2011; DFAT, 2013).

However, it is clear that the dissolution of AusAID and absorption of the development program into DFAT coincided with a considerable shift – most notably in discourse, when that relating to climate change and related issues reduced massively or vanished, even in environmental policy. This is almost unsurprising, given the apparent loss of institutional knowledge and expertise, including as relates to climate change, that accompanied this governance shift (ODE, 2018). Questions should however be raised regarding other potential explanatory factors – such as ideological shifts and domestic political dynamics (e.g., considering the apparent role of domestic climate policy in the election of Tony Abbot and the deposition of Malcolm Turnbull (Crabb, 2018; Hudson, 2019)), voter perceptions of climate change, the aid program, and other issues in the Pacific (see, e.g., Dreher & Voyer (2015), Pickering & Mitchell (2017)), and other foreign policy objectives and concerns, such as securitisation of the Pacific (e.g., Sora (2022)). In particular, Australia's securitisation of climate migration and indeed of migration issues more broadly, the latter of which has also implicated Pacific Island nations through e.g., offshore processing of asylum seekers in PNG and Nauru (Warbrooke, 2014) (see Annex 6), raises questions about how climate change-induced migration may be dealt with in the future, particularly given the raising of the issue by both major Parties in the past (Elliott, 2011). In fact, incorporation of the adaptation-migration nexus into climate justice literature would be of particular relevance to this case (see e.g., Barnett (2017), Dreher & Voyer (2015), Filho et al. (2020)), as would the concept of climate securitisation (see e.g., (Methmann & Rothe, 2012)).

The second part of the decade also saw a move away from earlier targets for ODF expansion, with cessation of reference to the 0.5% target previously endorsed by the Howard LNP government (AusAID, 2011), as well as to the DAC's 0.7% target, and a decrease in overall ODF that prevented CODF from being additional. It also saw a major reduction in *principal* finance, particularly for adaptation, while many ODF recipients ceased to receive CODF, and the share of AODF to LDCs and SIDS decreased, including in the Pacific, where the share to atolls also decreased. Poor performance against these and other factors – such as response to DAC peer review – raises questions about the government's meaningful engagement with the international climate regime and the development cooperation system. In addition, the lack of *additional* climate resources to PSIDS, or indeed scaled up resources for the majority of these recipients, does not align well with the government's Pacific Step-up discourse and its assertions that it supports action on climate change in the context of the Pacific Islands Forum, particularly in view of the region's climate-related needs and clear prioritisation of the issue (e.g., Pacific Islands Forum (2018)).

Indeed, on the other side of the water, there are clear implications of these results for Pacific SIDS and Australia's relationship with them. Firstly, the lack of CODF targeting of differentiated Pacific recipients according to vulnerability is not indicative of a particularly nuanced approach to climate change in the region – and broad statements about provision of CODF to the Pacific (or indeed the Indo-Pacific) fail to account for the heterogeneity of these states. Additionally, donor coordination is of critical importance to SIDS, in view of the vulnerability provoked by donor concentration and fragmentation (OECD, 2018). Australia arguably has a clear role to play in promoting collaboration amongst donors in the region, firstly as the largest development partner in the region, and secondly, as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum, where it has the opportunity to liaise and collaborate with Pacific states at a regional level. This is particularly critical in view of the apparently expanding DAC adaptation finance gap in the region, given Pacific states have repeatedly used this Forum to highlight their climate-related needs and priorities.

Looking towards the future, the move away from grant-based finance toward (non-concessional) loan-based finance in the Pacific is both a considerable change in approach and a potential concern (Howes & Dornan, 2019; Rajah, et al., 2019; Wood & Otor, 2019). This is in part due to the lower effectiveness of aid projects funded through loans in the Pacific than elsewhere, as well as concerns about debt sustainability and the provision of loan-based aid in view of short-term geopolitical goals as opposed to longer-term structural improvements (OECD, 2018; Rajah, et al., 2019; Wood, et al., 2020). In the context of the development program, Australia's approach on this latter score has been unclear, with China set to potentially become the largest provider of development finance in the region, while Australia's ODF is has been shrinking (Clarke & Feeney, 2019). At the same time the AIFFP, for example, has been touted as an answer to China's Belt and Road Initiative, while also positioned in response to climate impacts in the region (Rajah, et al., 2019; DFAT, n.d.). While Australia cites China as a regional security concern (e.g., Reuters (2022)), PSIDS leaders arguably consider climate change a more pressing threat – given how differentiated attitudes towards Chinese influence compare to a collective statement of the threat posed by climate change in, e.g., the 2018 *Boe Declaration on Regional Security* (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018).

For climate finance, a move towards loans presents a clear threat to the *additionality* of this finance in the Pacific, and thereby the capacity of that finance to serve climate justice in the region. Coupled with its considerably reduced focus on *principal* ODF, and *principal* AODF in particular, this begs the question of how well Australia is seeking to align its development program climate activities with the needs and priorities of PSIDS. Poor discursive mainstreaming of climate across its discourse, not to mention the demonstrated ambiguity of Pacific AIPs in predicting disbursement of CODF make the discursive situation of climate change seem tenuous at best, and superficial at worst. In the meantime, there is no clear intention to predictably scale up CODF in the future – with limited mention of climate change and no mention of the CCAS in Australia's new development policy (DFAT, 2020). In fact, one of the most notable findings over time is the difference in incidence of climate change and related terms in 2019 according to the inclusion or exclusion of the CCAS. This difference is so stark, in fact, that in many cases, discursive incidence actually trended downward when the CCAS was removed.

This repetitive discrepancy may be indicative of reduced mainstreaming or the potential superficiality of the strategy as an answer to the critiques levelled in 2018 by the ODE and the DAC Peer Review. This is notably supported by, for example, an almost complete cessation of reference to climate change in *development program progress reports* in 2019, a drop that mimics that seen in Pacific APPRs in 2014 – accompanied by a marked reduction in their substantiveness – despite relatively high incidence in this kind of document (APPRs) in the preceding years. These discrepancies coincided with the anomalous Rio marker reporting in the same year. Together with the termination of substantive climate finance reporting after the FSF period, the dissolution of the ODE, and the continued absence of the scheduled DAC mid-term review letter (post-2018) (OECD, n.d.)[56], this does not appear to bode well for the transparency of Australia's climate finance provision, an issue which could undoubtedly benefit from further investigation in years to come.

It should be noted here that even a maintenance in the status quo across the decade would have been open to criticism, in view of the need to progressively scale up efforts towards the USD 100 billion goal. In short, worsening of the position of climate in the development program over time is of considerable concern, in view of not only climate justice, but also Australia's credibility as a development partner and participant in the international climate regime. Combined with the Pacific issues discussed above, it appears that Australia's approach – or indeed, lack of approach – to climate change does not align with the clearly additional, currently pressing and progressively worsening threat that the phenomenon poses either globally, or in Pacific Small Island Developing States.

[56] Post-submission note: Ultimately unpublished, see OECD (2022)

Conclusion

In the case of Australia, public climate finance has not acted as a mechanism of climate justice. Despite the country's commitment to international frameworks like the Paris Agreement that stipulate climate finance requirements, many of these have not been meet, while broader issues relating to donor coordination are posing a problem. Australia's CODF is not new and additional, scaled up, nor predictable. It has largely provided grant-based climate finance; however, this appears set to change and is offset by public loan-based finance provided through another agency. It is ambiguous in its balance between adaptation and mitigation, with disbursements to projects targeting adaptation, and indeed *principally* targeting any climate outcome diminishing hugely over time. Its rhetoric regarding the need for developing countries to reduce their emissions expresses a poor comprehension of the notion of common but *differentiated* responsibilities, while its finance to mitigation – low and shrinking – does not even reflect its own stance. It devotes a large share of its climate finance to SIDS and LDCs, who are amongst the most vulnerable countries in the world to the impacts of climate change. Yet, amongst these recipients, there is no clear pattern of allocation according to recipient vulnerability or capacity. Australia performs poorly in relation to several of its peers, and financing targets set by itself and others. It demonstrates incoherent spending in other areas, including on fossil fuels domestically and internationally, and limited mainstreaming of climate across its development program despite introduction of a climate mainstreaming policy early in the study period and several high-level critiques of this aspect throughout.

Pacific SIDS, for many of whom climate change represents an existential threat, have not been silent about their climate-related needs and priorities. However, despite Australia's insistence that its development program is a relevant tool for influence and addressing 'pressing regional problems', its provision of public climate finance in the region has not aligned with global requirements it has signed on to, nor indeed with the prioritisation of climate-related needs articulated by Pacific states (DFAT, 2017, p. 18). In addition, its discursive approach has been inconsistent both over time and between recipients and has on occasion not aligned with the actual distribution of its climate finance.

In short, Australia has approached climate change inconsistently and at times incoherently across its development program and in Pacific SIDS, in a manner that has diminished its position over time. Further, its approach broadly does not reflect the concept of climate justice. In line with the results of this research, Australia's development program will need to address multiple points if its provision of climate finance is to be considered 'just':

- Australian CODF resources should be scaled up rapidly to be new and additional and meet its fair share
- Australia should continue to provide grant-based sources of funding, and its foray into loan-based finance in the Pacific should be undertaken with caution in view of both climate justice and relative loan effectiveness in the region
- The predictability of CODF should be improved through the provision of multi-year investment plans that make clear connections to climate change and set clear, outcome-based targets to enhance accountability
- Efforts should be urgently made to scale up the provision of *principal* climate finance, particularly for adaptation to the Pacific SIDS
- Efforts should also be made to scale up mitigation finance that respects the principle of CBDRRC
- Within the larger scaling up effort, Australia should continue to focus on LDCs and SIDS, and steps should be taken to more fairly distribute adaptation finance amongst vulnerable and capacity-constrained recipients, particularly in the Pacific
- In view of improved coordination, Australia should better engage with the international climate regime and the international development cooperation system, for example by resetting the 0.7% share of GNI ODF target and incorporating criticism levelled through the peer review process in a more-than-nominal fashion (i.e., publishing a climate strategy is not sufficient if climate change is not consistently mainstreamed across the development program in line with recommendations)
- It should also better coordinate with other Pacific donors to ensure they are collectively meeting the region's climate-related needs (particularly for adaptation)

- Australia should set and meet or beat an ambitious near-future target for CODF provision as a share of GNI in line with a calculated fair share figure, bearing in mind the need to also scale up ODF more broadly in respect of additionality
- Australia should ensure that climate change is mainstreamed across its program, particularly in critical sectors, and this mainstreaming should be considered a floor to the *additional* climate finance provided in line with its international commitments
- Australia should address its policy incoherence by taking immediate and rapid steps to cease providing public money and subsidies to fossil fuels and undertake decarbonisation in view of its global and regional responsibility, climate debt, and CBDRRC more broadly
- Australia should improve its climate finance transparency and accountability by (a) improving Rio marker reporting practices; (b) reversing the decline in substantiveness of progress reports and other M&E documents; (c) introducing regular reports on climate finance provision including targets and monitoring; and (d) re-establishing an independent evaluation body or ensuring the mandate, resources, and accountability frameworks of the newly instated internal department are sufficient in this capacity.

Beyond the issues addressed in the research, other areas Australia could consider, particularly in relation to the Pacific, include re-engaging with the Green Climate Fund and devoting resources to improving GCF access for PSIDS; providing support to the development of the loss and damage mechanism in the COP process and potentially introducing loss and damage funding that is additional to its climate finance provision; and engaging more strongly, collaboratively, and meaningfully with the PIF on the topic of climate change in view of Pacific SIDS' strong stance on the issue.

This case has been a useful illustration of the ways in which various methodologies for measuring the justness of climate finance can be applied to a single donor, while also shining a light on some of the concrete mechanics that can be used to address challenges identified in more abstract statistics (like the recommendations above). This latter outcome is a good justification for incorporating discourse analysis into development finance analysis, to help trace some of the logic and drivers behind particular trends, to contextualise them, and seek remedies. This case would benefit from some additional source materials, such as a wider corpus for discourse analysis, or the inclusion of stakeholder interviews.

Further research would also be useful regarding the veracity of Australia's Rio marker reporting, its multilateral climate financing, the justness of apparently fragmented reporting modalities between the development program and other DFAT mechanisms, its overall transparency, and the actual effectiveness of its climate finance, once disbursed. It could also incorporate recipient needs and priorities more systematically, such as through analysis of NDCs and NAPs. The broader literature may also benefit from examination of, amongst other things, the relationship between climate finance provision and delivering agencies, donor political shifts, or domestic voter perception; and the evolution of securitisation discourse and its relationship with climate change and development finance, particularly in view of the justice implications of climate-induced migration as adaptation, which will grow as a challenge for the Pacific as climate change advances.

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Annexes

Annex 1: IPCC Sea Level Rise projections, Pacific



Sea level change, -1 to 1metre

Notes: Baseline for change 1995-2014. y-axis values refer to different illustrative scenarios (SSP – Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) exhibited in the IPCC Working Group I AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis Report (2021), designed to cover the range of possible future development of anthropogenic drivers of climate change found in the literature reviewed. SSP1 1.9 was not available for comparison in the Interactive Atlas for this data set. The scenarios can be summarised as follows:
***SSP1 1.9**: very low GHG and CO_2 emissions declining to net zero around or after 2050, followed by varying levels of net negative CO_2 emissions*
***SSP1 2.6:** low GHG and CO_2 emissions declining to net zero around or after 2050, followed by varying levels of net negative CO_2 emissions*
***SSP2 4.5:** intermediate GHG and CO_2 emissions remaining around current levels until 2050*
***SSP3 7:** high GHG and CO_2 emissions that roughly double from current levels by 2100*
***SSP5 8.5:** very high GHG and CO_2 emissions that roughly double from current levels by 2050*

Source: Author's compilation, based on IPCC Interactive Atlas [Regional Information], available at: https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch and IPCC Working Group I AR6 Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis Report [Summary for Policy Makers], available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM

Annex 2: Map of the Pacific, with study states indicated



Source: Author's compilation based on Sciences Po Atelier de Cartographie (2007) Fond de carte Pacifique Sud 2007, available: https://bibnum.sciencespo.fr/s/catalogue/ark:/46513/sc16dvvs#?c=&m=&s=&cv=

Annex 3: PSIDS vulnerability and capacity characteristics

PSIDS	Atoll	LDC	Income group	GNI (2019)	GNI p.c. (2019)	UVI 2018	SVI 2010	SVI 2018
Cook Islands								
Fiji			UMIC	5045561193	5800	0.85	44.66	48.71
Kiribati	^	*	LMIC	375392118.2	3430	1.16	56.53	61.18
Republic of the Marshall Islands	^		UMIC	294801700	5050	1.10		
Federated States of Micronesia			LMIC	454357100	3930	0.79		
Nauru			HIC	174653125.4	16620			
Niue			UMIC					
Republic of Palau			UMIC	292047700	16710	0.91		
Papua New Guinea			LMIC	23707267061	2720	0.68	37.54	33.73
Samoa			UMIC	816189678.8	4230	0.85	52.79	48.13
Solomon Islands		*	LMIC	1553502893	2370	0.88	43.53	47.08
Timor-Leste		*	LMIC	2730967258	2050	1.15		
Tokelau	^		LMIC					
Tonga			UMIC	553664950	5150	0.93		
Tuvalu	^	*	UMIC	65326451.16	5620	0.97	60.42	59.88
Vanuatu			LMIC	1008738588	3450	0.83	41.69	48.18
Wallis & Fortuna			UMIC					

Notes: UVI: Commonwealth Universal Vulnerability Index; SVI: Commonwealth structural vulnerability index
Source: Author's compilation based on Commonwealth Secretariat (2021), OECD DAC List of ODA recipients (OECD, 2022), World Bank National Accounts data (World Bank, 2020)

Annex 4: Case Timeline



Source: Author's compilation

Annex 5: *Ceteris paribus* trendline projection of Australian tax expenditure on fossil fuels compared to CODF, Labor compared to LNP, 2010-2022



Notes: This graph is demonstrative of trends and does not account for any potential change in policy
Source: Author's compilation based on OECD CRS data, Hopstead Rui & Strachan (2021), and OECD Stat Fossil Fuel Support (OECD, n.d.), with exchange calculations based on RBA exchange rate data.

Annex 6: A note on donor refugee costs in the Pacific

A small note can also be made of funds devoted to costs for *refugees in donor countries,* which made up 2% of total ODF over the study period. This is in part because – as with fossil fuel generation – they were no longer reported as ODF after 2013. This is despite being the third largest sector in receipt of ODF that same year. It is not immediately clear why this reporting method was changed. It is useful to compare figures, given these funds amount to a sizeable contribution by Australia to two PSIDS in particular: PNG and Nauru. Comparing funds gives some indication of prioritisation of the issues in question, provides context to the relevant bilateral relationships, and allows for tracking of funds that may have otherwise been reported as ODF.

According to Australian government figures analysed by the Refugee Council of Australia, between 2012 and 2021, USD 4.16 billion and USD 3.2 billion[57] were provided to, respectively, Nauru and PNG under their respective MoUs for the offshore processing of refugees (RCA, 2022). Taken together, this is more than five times the amount of CODF provided to the whole Pacific between 2010 and 2019. While comparable amounts of ODF were provide to PNG between 2012 and 2019, CODF was consistently outstripped by refugee costs (Figure 37, Panel B). PNG ended its arrangement with Australia in 2016 after its Supreme Court found Australia's detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island was illegal, likely explaining the drop in funds provided thereafter (Tlozek & Anderson, 2016). By 2019, CODF was approaching refugee finance levels. For Nauru, finance across the decade so hugely and consistently outstripped climate finance that it is not even visible on the graph below (Panel A). Australia and Nauru have recently signed an MoU 'to establish an enduring regional processing capability in Nauru' (Australian Government, 2021).

Figure 37: Comparing finance provided to PSIDS by Australia for development, climate, and offshore refugee processing



Notes: Data for refugee costs was available by financial year. i.e., 2012: 2012-2013, and so on. All refugee costs data converted from AUD to USD according to exchange rates in December 2021 and so therefore represent an estimation of costs. Time period selected based on available data. Data can be found: https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/operation-sovereign-borders-offshore-detention-statistics/6/
Source: Author's compilation based on data from OECD CRS and RCA (2022)

[57] AUD 4855.3 million and AUD 3743.1 million respectively

Annex 7: Document Corpus Table with document characteristics and key word search coding data

Notes: EXCL.: documents that were excluded from the corpus due to technical difficulties. Each document was manually assigned a document ID, so documents from separate tables can be matched with the document ID. This table is a sample of the key word searches that were used in the final research paper, drawn from a larger database.
Source: Author's compilation of documents sourced from the current DFAT Website (October 2020) and Trove, the web archive of the National Library of Australia (various dates). Data prepared by the author using MAXQDA software.

Document ID	Year	Agency	Country	Document name	Document Type	Document sub-type	Source	Climate Document	PSIDS Recipient	Ex ante / ex poste
11100	2017	DFAT	NA	Foreign Policy White Paper: Opportunity Security Strength	White Paper	White Paper	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
12101	2011	AUSAID	NA	An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a real difference—Delivering real results	Aid Policy	Core policy	ARCHIVE [2012]			EX ANTE
12102	2014	DFAT	NA	Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability	Aid Policy	Core policy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12103	2014	DFAT	NA	Australia's new development policy and performance framework: a summary	Aid Policy	Supporting document	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12104	2014	DFAT	NA	Making Performance Count: enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of Australian aid	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12201	2009	AUSAID	NA	Investing in a Safer Future: A Disaster Risk Reduction policy for the Australian aid program	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12202	2009	AUSAID	NA	Development for All; Towards a disability-inclusive Australian aid program 2009–2014; Achievement highlights—the first two years	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2012]			EX ANTE
12203	2010	AUSAID	NA	Pandemics and Emerging Infectious Diseases Framework 2010–2015	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2012]			EX ANTE
12204	2010	AUSAID	NA	Integration in practice: Integrating disaster risk reduction, climate change and environmental considerations in AusAID programs (2010)	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2012]	CLIMATE		EX ANTE
12205	2010	AUSAID	NA	Financial Services for the Poor: A strategy for the Australian aid program 2010–15	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2012]			EX ANTE
12206	2011	AUSAID	NA	Humanitarian Action Policy (2011)	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2012]			EX ANTE
12207	2013	AUSAID	NA	Protection in Humanitarian Action Framework for the Australian aid program (2013)	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12208	2013	DFAT	NA	Child Protection Policy for the Australian Government's aid program 2013, 2014	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12209	2014	DFAT	NA	Environment Protection Policy for the Aid Program (2014)	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12210	2015	DFAT	NA	Strategy for Australia's aid investments in social protection	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12211	2015	DFAT	NA	Strategy for Australia's aid investments in education 2015–2020	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12212	2015	DFAT	NA	Strategy for Australia's Aid Investments in Economic Infrastructure	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12213	2015	DFAT	NA	Strategy for Australia's aid investments in agriculture, fisheries and water	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12214	2015	DFAT	NA	Strategy for Australia's Aid for Trade Investments: Supporting developing countries to trade and prosper	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12215	2015	DFAT	NA	Health for Development Strategy 2015–2020	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12216	2015	DFAT	NA	Effective Governance Strategy for Australia's aid investments	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12217	2015	DFAT	NA	Displacement and Resettlement of People in Development Activities	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
12218	2015	DFAT	NA	Development for All 2015–2020: Strategy for strengthening disability-inclusive development in Australia's aid program	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE

12219	2019	DFAT	NA	Climate Change Action Strategy 2020-2025	Aid Policy	Thematic Strategy	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE		EX ANTE
12301	2010	AUSAID	Pacific Regional	Australia's regional aid program to the Pacific: 2011-2015	Aid Policy	Regional Strategy	ARCHIVE [2016]			EX ANTE
13101	2010	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2009-2010 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13102	2011	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2010-2011 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13103	2012	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2011-2012 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13104	2014	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2013-2014 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13105	2015	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2014-2015 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13106	2016	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2015-2016 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13107	2017	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2016-2017 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13108	2018	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2017-2018 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13109	2019	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2018-2019 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13110	2020	DFAT	NA	Annual Report 2019-2020 (DFAT)	Annual Report	DFAT Annual Report	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
13201	2010	AUSAID	NA	Annual Report 2009-2010 (AusAID)	Annual Report	AusAID Annual Report	ARCHIVE [2014]			EX POSTE
13202	2011	AUSAID	NA	Annual Report 2010-2011 (AusAID)	Annual Report	AusAID Annual Report	ARCHIVE [2014]			EX POSTE
13203	2012	AUSAID	NA	Annual Report 2011-2012 (AusAID)	Annual Report	AusAID Annual Report	ARCHIVE [2014]			EX POSTE
13204	2013	AUSAID	NA	Annual Report 2012-2013 (AusAID)	Annual Report	AusAID Annual Report	ARCHIVE [2014]			EX POSTE
14101	2009	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-2010	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE

14102	2010	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2010-2011	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14103	2011	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2011-2012	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14104	2012	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2012-2013	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14105	2013	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-2014	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14106	2014	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2014-2015	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14107	2015	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2015-2016	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14108	2016	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2016-2017	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14109	2017	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2017-2018	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14110	2018	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2018-2019	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14111	2019	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Budget Statements 2019-2020	Budget documents	Portfolio budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14201	2011	DFAT	NA	Summary of Australia's Overseas Aid Program: Budget Highlights 2011-2012	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14202	2012	DFAT	NA	Summary of Australia's Overseas Aid Program: Budget Highlights 2012-2013	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14203	2013	DFAT	NA	Summary of Australia's Overseas Aid Program: Budget Highlights 2013-2014	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14204	2015	DFAT	NA	Development Assistant Budget Summary 2015-2016	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14205	2015	DFAT	NA	Development Assistant Budget Summary 2015-2016 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook Update (as at February 2016)	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14206	2015	DFAT	NA	Development Assistant Budget 2015-2016 as at Budget Night 12 May 2015	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14207	2016	DFAT	NA	Aid Budget Summary 2016-2017	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14208	2017	DFAT	NA	Aid Budget Summary 2017-2018	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14209	2018	DFAT	NA	Aid Budget Summary 2018-2019	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14210	2019	DFAT	NA	Aid Budget Summary 2019-2020	Budget documents	Budget summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE

14301	2011	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2011-2012	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14302	2012	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2012-2013	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14303	2013	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2013-2014	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14304	2014	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2014-2015	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14305	2015	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2015-2016	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14306	2016	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2016-2017	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14307	2017	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2017-2018	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14308	2018	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2018-2019	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14309	2019	DFAT	NA	Australia's Official Development Assistance: Statistical Summary 2019-2020	Budget documents	Statistical summary	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
14401	2009	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2009-2010	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14402	2010	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2010-2011	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14403	2011	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2011-2012	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14404	2012	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2012-2013	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14405	2013	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2013-2014	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14406	2014	DFAT	NA	Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance Program 2014-2015	Budget documents	Development program budget	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX ANTE
14501	2010	AUSAID	NA	Australia's Fast Start finance progress report update [December 2010]	Budget documents	Fast-start finance report	ARCHIVE [2012]	CLIMATE		EX POSTE
14502	2011	AUSAID	NA	Australia's 2011 Progress Report on Fast-Start Finance [November 2011]	Budget documents	Fast-start finance report	ARCHIVE [2012]	CLIMATE		EX POSTE
14503	2011	AUSAID	NA	Australia's Fast Start finance progress report update [November 2011]	Budget documents	Fast-start finance report	ARCHIVE [2012]	CLIMATE		EX POSTE
14504	2011	AUSAID	NA	Australia – Update Report on Fast-Start Finance [May 2011]	Budget documents	Fast-start finance report	ARCHIVE [2012]	CLIMATE		EX POSTE
14601	2010	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2010-2011	Budget documents	Portfolio additional	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE

						budget statements				
14602	2011	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2011-2012	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14603	2012	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2012-2013	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14604	2014	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2014-2015	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14605	2015	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2015-2016	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14606	2016	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2016-2017	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14607	2017	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2017-2018	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
14608	2018	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2018-2019	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
14609	2019	DFAT	NA	Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2019-2020	Budget documents	Portfolio additional budget statements	DFAT WEBSITE [FEB 2022]			EX ANTE
15101	2015	DFAT	NA	Australian engagement with developing countries: Part 1: Bilateral Relationships at a Glance 2015-16	Informational brochure	Bilateral relationships at a glance	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
15102	2016	DFAT	NA	Australian engagement with developing countries: Bilateral Relationships at a Glance 2016-17	Informational brochure	Bilateral relationships at a glance	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]			EX POSTE
21101	2015	DFAT	PNG	Aid investment plan 2015-16 to 2017-18 (extended to 2018-19) (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX ANTE
21102	2015	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX ANTE
21103	2015	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX ANTE

						plan [by country]				
21104	2015	DFAT	Samoa	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX ANTE
21105	2015	DFAT	RMI	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (RMI)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		RMI	EX ANTE
21106	2015	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX ANTE
21107	2015	DFAT	Nauru	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX ANTE
21108	2015	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX ANTE
21109	2015	DFAT	Fiji	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX ANTE
21110	2015	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid investment plan 2015-2016 to 2018-2019 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX ANTE
21111	2016	DFAT	Tuvalu	Aid investment plan 2016-2017 to 2019-2020 (Tuvalu)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tuvalu	EX ANTE
21112	2016	DFAT	Palau	Aid investment plan 2016-2017 to 2018-2019 (Palau)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Palau	EX ANTE
21113	2016	DFAT	FSM	Aid investment plan 2016-2017 to 2018-2019 (FSM)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		FSM	EX ANTE
21114	2016	DFAT	Tonga	Aid investment plan 2016-2016 to 2018-2019 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid investment plan [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX ANTE
21201	2010	DFAT	Timor Leste	Annual Program Performance Report 2010 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE

21202	2011	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Annual Program Performance Report 2011 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21203	2011	DFAT	Timor Leste	Annual Program Performance Report 2011 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21204	2011	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2011 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21205	2012	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2012-2013 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21206	2012	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2012-2013 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21207	2012	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2012-2013 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21208	2012	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2012-2013 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21209	2012	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2012-2013 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21210	2013	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21211	2013	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21212	2013	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21213	2013	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21214	2013	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE

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21215	2013	DFAT	Tuvalu	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Tuvalu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tuvalu	EX POSTE
21216	2013	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21217	2014	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21218	2014	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21219	2014	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21220	2014	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21221	2014	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21222	2014	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21223	2015	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21224	2015	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21225	2015	DFAT	Nauru	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX POSTE
21226	2015	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE

21227	2015	DFAT	PNG	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX POSTE
21228	2015	DFAT	Samoa	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21229	2015	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21230	2015	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21231	2015	DFAT	Tonga	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX POSTE
21232	2015	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2015-2016 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21233	2016	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21234	2016	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21235	2016	DFAT	Nauru	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX POSTE
21236	2016	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21237	2016	DFAT	PNG	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX POSTE
21238	2016	DFAT	Samoa	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21239	2016	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE

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21240	2016	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21241	2016	DFAT	Tonga	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX POSTE
21242	2016	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21243	2017	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21244	2017	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21245	2017	DFAT	Nauru	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX POSTE
21246	2017	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21247	2017	DFAT	PNG	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX POSTE
21248	2017	DFAT	Samoa	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21249	2017	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21250	2017	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21251	2017	DFAT	Tonga	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX POSTE

21252	2017	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2017-2018 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21253	2018	DFAT	Fiji	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21254	2018	DFAT	Kiribati	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE
21255	2018	DFAT	Nauru	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX POSTE
21256	2018	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21257	2018	DFAT	PNG	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX POSTE
21258	2018	DFAT	Samoa	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21259	2018	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21260	2018	DFAT	Timor Leste	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21261	2018	DFAT	Tonga	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX POSTE
21262	2018	DFAT	Vanuatu	Aid Program Performance Report 2018-2019 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21263	2019	DFAT	Fiji	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Fiji)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21264	2019	DFAT	Kiribati	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Kiribati)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Kiribati	EX POSTE

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21265	2019	DFAT	Nauru	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Nauru)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Nauru	EX ANTE
21266	2019	DFAT	Pacific Regional	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Pacific Regional)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Pacific Regional	EX POSTE
21267	2019	DFAT	PNG	Developoment Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (PNG)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		PNG	EX POSTE
21268	2019	DFAT	Samoa	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Samoa)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21269	2019	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Solomon Islands)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Solomon Islands	EX POSTE
21270	2019	DFAT	Timor Leste	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Timor Leste)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Timor Leste	EX POSTE
21271	2019	DFAT	Tonga	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Tonga)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Tonga	EX POSTE
21272	2019	DFAT	Vanuatu	Development Program Progress Report 2019-2020 (Vanuatu)	Country-specific communications	Aid Program performance report [by country]	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21301	2010	AUSAID	Samoa	Samoa – Australia Partnership for Development report 2010–11	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		Samoa	EX POSTE
21302	2010	AUSAID	PNG	Papua New Guinea Development Cooperation Report 2010	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		PNG	EX POSTE
21303	2010	AUSAID	Fiji	Fiji Development Cooperation Report 2010	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		Fiji	EX POSTE
21304	2010	AUSAID	Vanuatu	Australia – Vanuatu Partnership Report 2010	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		Vanuatu	EX POSTE
21305	2011	AUSAID	Kiribati	Reitaki Joint Report on the Kiribati-Australia Partnership for Development Annual Talks (2011)	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		Kiribati	EX POSTE

21306	2011	AUSAID	Tonga	Australia –Tonga Partnership for Development Partnership Report August 2009 to August 2011	Country-specific communications	Partnership report	ARCHIVE [2012]		Tonga	EX POSTE
22101	2018	DFAT	NA	Australia Pacific Climate Change Action Program: Supporting Climate Change and Disaster Resilience	Climate-relevant promotional material	Australia Pacific Climate Program	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Pacific Regional	CURRENT
22201	2018	DFAT	Kiribati	Australian Pacific Climate Change Action Poster Series Kiribati-Ed	Climate-relevant promotional material	Climate Poster Series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Kiribati	CURRENT
22202	2018	DFAT	PNG	Australian Pacific Climate Change Action Poster Series PNG Infrastructure	Climate-relevant promotional material	Climate Poster Series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	PNG	CURRENT
22203	2018	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Australian Pacific Climate Change Action Poster Series Tina River Hydro	Climate-relevant promotional material	Climate Poster Series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Solomon Islands	CURRENT
22204	2018	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Australian Pacific Climate Change Action Poster Series Gizo Market	Climate-relevant promotional material	Climate Poster Series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Solomon Islands	CURRENT
22205	2018	DFAT	Vanuatu	Australian Pacific Climate Change Action Poster Series Vanuatu Skills	Climate-relevant promotional material	Climate Poster Series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Vanuatu	CURRENT
22301	2018	DFAT	North Pacific	Australia's Commitment to Climate Change Action in the North Pacific	Climate-relevant promotional material	Australia's Commitment to Climate Action series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Pacific Regional	EX ANTE
22302	2018	DFAT	Solomon Islands	Australia's Commitment to Climate Change Action in the Solomon Islands	Climate-relevant promotional material	Australia's Commitment to Climate Action series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Solomon Islands	EX ANTE
22303	2018	DFAT	Tuvalu	Australia's Commitment to Climate Change Action in Tuvalu	Climate-relevant promotional material	Australia's Commitment to Climate Action series	DFAT WEBSITE [OCT 2021]	CLIMATE	Tuvalu	EX ANTE

Document ID	PDF Pages	Sentences	Words	climate change [term]	climate change [adapt, 2 sent.]	climate change [mitigat, 2 sent.]	climate change [capacity, 2 sent.]	climate change [vulnerab, 2 sent.]	climate change [atoll, 2 sent.]	Pacific [term]	Pacific friend [term]	Pacific family [term]	Pacific neighbour OR Pacific neighbor [term]	Indo-Pacific [term]	small island state OR small island developing SIDS
11100	136	2829	42731	29	0	2	5	0	2	159	0	0	0	0	2
12101	73	1507	25986	26	7	4	3	9	0	54	0	0	0	0	1
12102	41	774	12796	1	0	0	0	0	0	60	0	0	0	17	0
12103	4	116	1485	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	2	0
12104	17	168	2592	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	4	0
12201	42	946	13729	47	39	6	1	11	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
12202	32	288	5153	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
12203	16	285	4822	2	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
12204	29	403	8120	92	13	2	6	14	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
12205	32	494	9376	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
12206	72	1192	19935	6	2	0	0	3	0	17	0	0	0	0	2
12207	31	375	5916	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12208	27	427	5905	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12209	12	240	3303	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12210	27	556	8213	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	8	0
12211	34	699	10655	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	3	2
12212	23	501	8189	3	1	1	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	3	0
12213	24	614	9956	4	0	0	2	0	0	26	0	0	0	11	1
12214	38	796	10652	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	0	0	6	0
12215	28	487	7670	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	4	1
12216	19	463	7421	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
12217	13	220	4189	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12218	34	518	10432	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	0	0	8	0
12219	48	833	14554	332	78	28	37	33	4	109	0	0	0	16	3
12301	14	318	4956	7	4	2	6	2	0	173	0	0	1	0	1
13101	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13102	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13103	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
13104	468	10410	173446	69	0	0	7	0	0	279	0	0	0	1	3
13105	468	13410	174497	46	0	0	3	0	0	277	0	0	0	2	4
13106	376	8127	124164	34	2	0	5	1	0	256	0	0	0	0	0
13107	302	7640	96814	19	1	1	3	0	0	174	0	0	1	0	0
13108	296	6484	94296	19	2	2	2	0	0	214	0	0	0	74	1
13109	268	6277	96192	17	1	1	7	0	0	329	1	0	0	96	0

13110	134	6130	98340	29	3	3	6	2	0	307	0	2	4	94	0
13201	352	7092	113932	74	19	3	7	11	0	349	0	0	1	0	6
13202	389	6822	122277	98	41	4	6	24	0	331	0	0	0	0	5
13203	397	8064	135381	100	36	0	6	26	0	5	0	0	0	0	1
13204	396	8195	141341	67	11	2	4	15	2	306	0	0	0	0	1
14101	199	3015	40223	10	4	0	1	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	0
14102	191	2619	37557	14	4	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	0
14103	188	4378	73129	14	10	0	4	0	0	48	0	0	0	0	0
14104	186	2741	38558	5	2	0	3	0	0	29	0	0	0	0	1
14105	189	2649	37876	6	0	0	4	0	0	23	0	0	0	1	0
14106	205	3021	42945	13	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	0	0	1	0
14107	201	2887	41472	5	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	0	0	15	0
14108	187	2660	39709	4	1	1	0	0	0	53	0	0	0	31	0
14109	175	3157	38420	6	0	0	1	0	0	42	0	0	0	28	0
14110	169	3026	35795	8	2	2	0	0	0	39	0	0	0	25	0
14111	177	3003	35791	4	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	0	0	24	0
14201	2	88	1364	2	1	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
14202	2	61	1360	2	1	0	0	1	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
14203	3	39	937	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
14204	7	188	1612	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
14205	7	187	1654	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
14206	4	106	884	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
14207	78	1227	21569	23	5	2	2	6	0	123	0	0	1	22	0
14208	114	1955	31094	34	10	4	3	7	0	159	0	0	1	28	1
14209	144	2163	39324	29	0	7	1	6	0	264	0	0	0	45	2
14210	120	2319	39041	26	5	0	3	2	0	310	0	0	2	53	1
14301	64	1101	20671	11	3	2	0	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	0
14302	62	2664	20467	10	3	2	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	0	0
14303	64	2821	21095	7	4	2	0	0	0	38	0	0	0	0	1
14304	88	2231	28357	6	3	2	0	0	0	35	0	0	0	0	0
14305	90	2694	28858	6	3	2	0	0	0	96	0	0	0	0	0
14306	54	1278	18496	6	3	2	0	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	0
14307	77	3749	22682	8	3	2	0	0	0	52	0	0	0	4	0
14308	75	3567	22259	7	3	2	0	0	0	42	0	0	0	1	0
14309	71	3491	20760	20	3	3	0	0	0	46	0	0	0	1	0
14401	87	1805	30353	28	12	8	3	6	0	135	0	0	0	0	0
14402	85	1708	28838	47	28	9	9	9	0	126	0	0	0	0	5
14403	149	4184	60522	90	31	6	12	29	0	189	0	0	0	0	2
14404	154	3962	64512	65	25	6	6	21	0	157	0	0	0	0	2

14405	160	4643	69885	76	22	5	9	27	8	189	0	0	0	0	0
14406	-9	1219	23562	3	0	0	0	0	0	102	0	0	0	9	0
14501	5	103	1851	7	6	0	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
14502	12	197	3296	21	30	11	3	9	0	25	0	0	0	0	7
14503	2	36	603	3	5	0	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
14504	4	96	1438	10	10	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
14601	91	1389	18461	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
14602	111	1571	21870	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
14603	119	1827	25612	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
14604	144	2202	28302	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0
14605	121	1721	23621	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
14606	119	2247	24260	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
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15101	84	2887	12507	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	1	3	0
15102	98	5637	20130	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	0	0	0	6	0
21101	21	405	7306	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0
21102	9	194	3332	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21103	16	278	5039	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
21104	4	85	1306	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21105	4	59	1235	2	2	0	0	1	2	11	0	0	0	0	1
21106	12	277	5367	1	0	0	0	0	0	123	0	0	0	0	2
21107	4	67	1344	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
21108	4	71	1217	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21109	11	184	3119	3	0	0	0	2	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
21110	10	192	3382	3	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
21111	8	133	2103	14	3	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2
21112	4	63	1272	1	2	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	1
21113	4	60	1210	2	2	0	0	1	0	13	0	0	0	0	1
21114	5	107	1945	2	1	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
21201	42	1118	19211	2	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
21202	22	519	8599	2	2	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
21203	27	629	12046	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21204	19	461	8161	2	0	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
21205	25	793	12185	9	7	0	0	0	0	52	0	0	0	0	0
21206	30	778	14139	14	7	0	2	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	0
21207	29	778	13232	5	3	0	3	0	0	42	0	0	0	0	0
21208	35	1022	17139	5	1	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

21209	24	621	10936	2	1	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	0	1
21210	15	394	6680	1	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0
21211	25	583	9228	9	5	0	0	5	0	25	0	0	0	0	1
21212	58	1280	24405	27	8	0	4	3	1	507	0	0	0	0	1
21213	27	819	14295	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
21214	30	887	12853	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21215	17	434	7078	20	10	0	4	3	0	32	0	0	0	0	0
21216	22	555	9355	1	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	1	1
21217	16	426	6792	2	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0
21218	6	157	2596	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
21219	26	561	9970	4	2	0	0	0	0	179	0	0	0	0	0
21220	26	556	9576	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
21221	33	821	15320	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21222	24	574	9029	2	0	2	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
21223	22	652	11995	3	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	0	0	0	0
21224	12	363	5879	2	0	0	2	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0
21225	10	198	3711	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
21226	27	1057	10620	13	2	0	0	1	0	234	0	0	0	0	1
21227	36	1059	18023	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0
21228	12	317	4356	3	2	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
21229	33	840	12761	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
21230	28	759	14470	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21231	14	330	6101	5	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	0
21232	25	719	10767	12	0	5	2	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
21233	26	632	11730	14	2	0	0	2	0	23	0	0	0	0	0
21234	13	324	4589	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
21235	16	393	6070	4	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0
21236	37	999	17750	29	3	0	4	6	0	398	0	0	0	0	0
21237	48	1264	23090	44	3	2	10	5	0	32	0	0	0	0	0
21238	15	407	5259	5	0	0	2	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
21239	30	806	13040	9	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
21240	27	802	13130	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21241	15	338	5297	4	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
21242	21	643	9383	7	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
21243	37	951	15645	20	4	2	0	4	0	36	0	0	0	0	2
21244	16	384	5287	3	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	0
21245	14	337	5133	1	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
21246	29	1083	13003	24	3	0	1	4	0	308	0	0	0	1	0
21247	37	951	16811	21	6	6	3	4	0	31	0	0	0	0	0

21248	15	358	4375	1	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	0
21249	33	918	13837	5	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
21250	26	824	12913	3	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
21251	13	300	4793	2	0	0	0	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
21252	27	833	11702	6	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
21253	40	1146	16645	17	0	0	0	1	0	57	0	0	0	0	0
21254	14	385	5293	10	0	2	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	1	0
21255	15	386	5468	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
21256	34	1090	15513	30	2	0	3	0	0	380	0	0	0	0	0
21257	36	1015	17450	14	2	0	3	3	0	26	0	0	0	1	0
21258	20	546	7669	6	1	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	1	0
21259	33	1020	14206	1	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	0	1	0	0
21260	29	962	13499	8	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	1	0
21261	15	347	4854	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
21262	26	875	12024	8	1	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0
21263	4	116	1369	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21264	3	91	1161	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21265	3	83	1125	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21266	5	169	2281	4	0	0	0	0	0	78	0	0	0	0	0
21267	6	226	2500	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
21268	3	120	1164	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21269	5	124	1873	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
21270	4	103	1520	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21271	3	132	1211	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
21272	5	144	2063	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
21301	11	312	4480	10	2	1	1	1	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
21302	19	482	9394	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21303	10	228	4367	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
21304	12	256	4359	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
21305	15	375	6655	15	12	0	1	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
21306	12	298	5945	4	5	0	2	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0
22101	2	47	775	15	3	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
22201	1	22	349	6	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
22202	1	13	273	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
22203	1	19	310	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
22204	1	18	294	4	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
22205	1	16	296	5	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
22301	2	52	912	21	8	0	3	6	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
22302	2	61	928	16	4	0	5	1	0	13	0	0	0	0	0

22303	2	59	954	17	3	0	6	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	0

Document ID	atoll [term]	Pacific [climate change, 2 sent.]	Pacific [vulnerab , 2 sent.]	Pacific [climate change, vulnerab, 2 sent.]	Pacific [capacity, 2 sent.]	Pacific [climate change, capacity, 2 sent.]	island [climate change, 2 sent.]	island [vulnerab , 2 sent.]	island [climate change, vulnerab, 2 sent.]	island [capacity, 2 sent.]	island [climate change, capacity, 2 sent.]	Pacific [climate change, adapt, 2 sent.]	climate change [adapt, atoll, 2 sent.]	climate change [adapt, island, 2 sent.]	climate change [adapt, vulnerab, 2 sent.]	climate change [adapt, least develope d countr, LDC 2 sent.]
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12218	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12219	2	100	6	9	0	3	26	3	4	0	0	37	0	9	16	0
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13108	0	6	9	0	0	2	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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13203	2	0	0	0	0	0	21	8	8	0	0	0	0	3	11	1
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14403	0	27	11	10	0	6	24	19	11	0	0	11	0	4	14	0
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14501	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
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14601	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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14607	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.	EXCL.
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21101	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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21103	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21104	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21105	2	2	2	2	0	0	4	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21106	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21107	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21108	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21109	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21111	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21112	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21113	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21114	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21201	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21202	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21203	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21204	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

21205	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
21206	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
21207	0	6	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	5	0	1	0	0
21208	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21209	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21210	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21211	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
21212	2	29	7	2	0	4	10	1	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
21213	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21214	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21215	2	7	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	0
21216	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21217	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21218	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21219	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21220	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21221	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21222	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21223	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21224	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21225	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21226	0	15	5	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
21227	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21228	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21229	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21230	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21231	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21232	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21233	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21234	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21235	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21236	0	37	10	7	0	5	15	6	6	0	0	3	0	2	2	0
21237	0	5	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21238	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21239	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21240	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21241	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21242	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21243	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

21244	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21245	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21246	0	31	8	7	0	3	9	5	4	0	0	6	0	1	0	0
21247	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21248	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21249	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21251	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21252	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21253	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21254	0	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21255	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21256	0	43	0	0	0	5	14	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
21257	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21258	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21259	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21260	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21261	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21262	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21263	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21264	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21265	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21266	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21267	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21268	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21269	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21270	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21271	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21272	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21301	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
21302	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21303	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21304	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21305	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21306	0	4	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	0
22101	0	11	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22201	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
22202	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22203	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

22204	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22205	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22301	0	16	4	6	0	2	14	2	4	0	0	5	0	0	2	0
22302	0	8	2	2	0	4	16	2	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	0
22303	0	10	2	2	0	3	7	1	1	0	0	2	0	2	2	0